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OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
NATURE
OF
CIVIL LIBERTY,
THE
PRINCIPLES
OF
GOVERNMENT,
AND THE
JUSTICE AND POLICY
OF THE
WAR WITH AMERICA.

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To which is added
AN APPENDIX,
Containing a STATE of the NATIONAL DEBT, an Eſtimate of the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes, and an Account of the National Income and Expenditure ſince the laſt War.

Heu miſeri cives; non Hoſtem, inimicaque caſtra,
——— *Veſtras Spes uritis.* VIRG.

By RICHARD PRICE, D.D. F.R.S.

00143139

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN the following Obſervations, I have taken that liberty of examining public meaſures, which, happily for this kingdom, every perſon in it enjoys. They contain the ſentiments of a private and unconnected man; for which, ſhould there be any thing wrong in them, he alone is anſwerable.

After all that has been written on the diſpute with America, *no reader can expect to be informed, in this publication, of much that he has not before known. Perhaps, however, he may find in it ſome new matter; and if he ſhould, it will be chiefly in the Obſervations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, and the Policy of the War with America; and in the* Appendix.

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OBSERVATIONS, &c.

OUR Colonies in NORTH AMERICA appear to be now determined to do and ſuffer every thing, under the perſuaſion, that GREAT BRITAIN is attempting to rob them of that Liberty to which every member of ſociety, and all civil communities, have a natural and unalienable right. The queſtion, therefore, whether this is a reaſonable perſuaſion, is highly intereſting, and deſerves the moſt careful attention of every *Engliſhman* who values Liberty, and wiſhes to avoid ſtaining himſelf with the guilt of invading it. But it is impoſſible to judge properly of this queſtion without correct ideas of Liberty *in general*; and of the nature, limits, and principles of Civil Liberty *in particular*.— The following obſervations on this ſubject appear to me important, as well as juſt; and I cannot make myſelf eaſy without offering them to the public at the preſent period, big with events of the laſt conſequence to this kingdom. I do this, with reluctance and pain, urged by ſtrong feelings, but at the ſame time checked by the conſciouſneſs that I am likely to deliver ſentiments not favourable to the preſent meaſures of that government, under which I live, and to which I am a conſtant and zealous well-wiſher. Such, however, are my preſent ſentiments and views, that this is a conſideration of inferior moment with me; and, as I hope never to go beyond the bounds of decent diſcuſſion and expoſtulation, I flatter myſelf, that I ſhall be able to avoid giving any perſon juſt cauſe of offence.

The obſervations with which I ſhall begin, are of a more general and abſtracted nature; but being, in my opinion, of particular conſequence, and neceſſary to introduce what I have principally in view, I hope they will be patiently read and conſidered.

SECT. I.

Of the Nature of Liberty in General.

IN order to obtain a more diſtinct and accurate view of the nature of Liberty as ſuch, it will be uſeful to conſider it under the four following general diviſions.

Firſt, *Phyſical* Liberty. —— Secondly, *Moral* Liberty.——Thirdly, *Religious* Liberty.——And Fourthly, *Civil* Liberty.——Theſe heads comprehend under them all the different kinds of Liberty. And I have placed *Civil* Liberty laſt, becauſe I mean to apply to it all I ſhall ſay of the other kinds of Liberty.

By PHYSICAL LIBERTY I mean that principle of *Spontaneity*, or *Self-determination*, which conſtitutes us *Agents*; or which gives us a command over our actions, rendering them properly *ours*, and not effects of the operation of any foreign cauſe.——MORAL LIBERTY is the power of following, in all circumſtances, our ſenſe of right and wrong; or of acting in conformity to our reflecting and moral principles, without being controuled by any contrary principles.——RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ſignifies the power of exerciſing, without moleſtation, that mode of religion which we think beſt; or of making the deciſions of our own conſciences, reſpecting religious truth, the rule of our conduct, and not any of the deciſions of others.——In like manner; CIVIL LIBERTY is the power of a *Civil Society* or *State* to govern itſelf by its own diſcretion; or by laws of its own making, without being ſubject to any foreign diſcretion, or to the impoſitions of any extraneous will or power.

It ſhould be obſerved, that, according to theſe definitions of the different kinds of liberty, there is one general idea, that runs through them all; I mean, the idea of *Self-direction*, or *Self-government*.—Did our volitions originate not with *ourſelves*, but with ſome cauſe over which we have no power; or were we under a neceſſity of always following ſome will different from our own, we ſhould want PHYSICAL LIBERTY.

In like manner; he whoſe perceptions of moral obligation are controuled by his paſſions has loſt his *Moral Liberty*; and the moſt common language applied to him is, that he wants *Self-government.*

He likewiſe who, in religion, cannot govern himſelf by his convictions of religious duty, but is obliged to receive formularies of faith, and to practiſe modes of worſhip impoſed upon him by others, wants *Religious Liberty.*——And the Community alſo that is governed, not by itſelf, but by ſome will independent of it, and over which it has no controul, wants *Civil Liberty.*

In all theſe caſes there is a force which ſtands oppoſed to the agent's *own* will; and which, as far as it operates, produces *Servitude.*——In the firſt caſe, this force is incompatible with the very idea of voluntary motion; and the ſubject of it is a mere paſſive inſtrument which never *acts*, but is always *acted upon.*——In the *ſecond* caſe; this force is the influence of paſſion getting the better of reaſon; or the *brute* overpowering and conquering the will of the *man.* —— In the *third* caſe; it is *Human Authority* in religion requiring conformity to particular modes of faith and worſhip, and ſuperſeding *private judgment.*——And in the laſt caſe, it is any will diſtinct from that of the Majority of a Community, which claims a power, of making laws for it, and diſpoſing of its property.

This it is, I think, that marks the limit, or that lays the line between *Liberty* and *Slavery*. As far as, in any inſtance, the operation of any cauſe comes in to reſtrain the power of Self-government, ſo far Slavery is introduced: Nor do I think that a preciſer idea than this of Liberty and Slavery can be formed.

I cannot help wiſhing I could here fix my reader's attention, and engage him to conſider carefully the dignity of that bleſſing to which we give the name of LIBERTY, according to the repreſentation now made of it. There is not a word in the whole compaſs of language which expreſſes ſo much of what is important and excellent. It is, in every view of it, a bleſſing truly ſacred and invaluable.——Without *Phyſical Liberty*, man would be a machine acted upon by mechanical ſprings, having no principle of motion in himſelf, or command over events; and, therefore, incapable of all merit and demerit.——Without *Moral Liberty* he is a wicked and deteſtable being, ſubject to the tyranny of baſe luſts, and the ſport of every vile appetite.——And without *Religious* and *Civil Liberty* he is a poor and abject animal without rights, without property, and without a conſcience, bending his neck to the yoke, and crouching to the will of every ſilly creature who has the inſolence to pretend to authority over him.——Nothing, therefore, can be of ſo much conſequence to us as *Liberty*. It is the foundation of all honour, and the chief privilege and glory of our natures.

In fixing our ideas on the ſubject of Liberty it is of particular uſe to take ſuch an enlarged view of it as I have now given. But the immediate object of the preſent enquiry being *Civil Liberty*, I will confine to it all the ſubſequent obſervations.

SECT. II.

Of Civil Liberty and the Principles of Government.

FROM what has been ſaid it is obvious, that all civil government, as far as it can be denominated *free*, is the creature of the people. It originates with them. It is conducted under their direction; and has in view nothing but their happineſs. All its different forms are no more than ſo many different modes in which they chuſe to direct their affairs, and to ſecure the quiet enjoyment of their rights.——In every free ſtate every man is his own Legiſlator.——All *taxes* are free-gifts for public ſervices.——All *laws* are particular proviſions or regulations eſtabliſhed by COMMON

CONSENT for gaining protection and ſafety.—— And all *Magiſtrates* are Truſtees or Deputies for carrying theſe regulations into execution.

Liberty, therefore, is too imperfectly defined when it is ſaid to be "a Government by LAWS, and not by MEN." If the laws are made by one man, or a junto of men in a ſtate, and not by COMMON CONSENT, a government by them does not differ from Slavery. In this caſe it would be a contradiction in terms to ſay that the ſtate governs itſelf.

From hence it is obvious that *Civil Liberty*, in its moſt perfect degree, can be enjoyed only in ſmall ſtates, where every member is capable of giving his ſuffrage in perſon, and of being choſen into public offices. When a ſtate becomes ſo numerous, or when the different parts of it are removed to ſuch diſtances from one another, as to render this impracticable, a diminution of Liberty neceſſarily ariſes. There are, however, in theſe circumſtances, methods by which ſuch near approaches may be made to perfect Liberty as ſhall anſwer all the purpoſes of government, and at the ſame time ſecure every right of human nature.

Tho' all the members of a ſtate ſhould not be capable of giving their ſuffrages on public meaſures, *individually* and *perſonally*, they may do this by the appointment of *Subſtitutes* or *Repreſentatives*. They may entruſt the powers of legiſlation, ſubject to ſuch reſtrictions as they ſhall think neceſſary, with any number of *Delegates*; and whatever can be done by ſuch delegates, within the limits of their truſt, may be conſidered as done by the united voice and counſel of the Community. ——In this method a free government may be eſtabliſhed in the largeſt ſtate; and it is conceivable that by regulations of this kind, any number of ſtates might be ſubjected to a ſcheme of government, that would exclude the deſolations of war, and produce univerſal peace and order.

Let us think here of what may be practicable in this way with reſpect to *Europe* in particular. ——While it continues divided, as it is at preſent, into a great number of independent kingdoms whoſe intereſts are continually claſhing, it is impoſſible but that diſputes will often ariſe which muſt end in war and carnage. It would be no remedy to this evil to make one of theſe ſtates ſupreme over the reſt; and to give it an abſolute plenitude of power to ſuperintend and controul them. This would be to ſubject all the ſtates to the arbitrary diſcretion of one, and to eſtabliſh an ignominious ſlavery not poſſible to be long endured. It would, therefore, be a remedy worſe than the diſeaſe; nor is it poſſible it ſhould be approved by any mind that has not loſt every idea of Civil Liberty. On the contrary.—Let every ſtate, with reſpect to all its internal concerns, be continued independent of all the reſt; and let a general confederacy be formed by the appointment of a SENATE conſiſting of Repreſentatives from all the different ſtates. Let this SENATE poſſeſs the power of managing all the *common* concerns of the united ſtates, and of judging and deciding between them, as a common *Arbiter* or *Umpire*, in all diſputes; having, at the ſame time, under its direction, the common force of the ſtates to ſupport its deciſions.——In theſe circumſtances, each ſeparate ſtate would be ſecure againſt the interference of foreign power in its private concerns, and, therefore, would poſſeſs *Liberty*; and at the ſame time it would be ſecure againſt all oppreſſion and inſult from every neighbouring ſtate.——Thus might the ſcattered force and abilities of a whole continent be gathered into one point; all litigations ſettled as they roſe; univerſal peace preſerved; and nation prevented *from any more lifting up a ſword againſt nation.*

I have obſerved, that tho', in a great ſtate, all the individuals that compoſe it cannot be admitted to an immediate participation in the powers of legiſlation and government, yet they may participate in theſe powers by a delegation of them to a body of repreſentatives.——In this caſe it is evident that the ſtate will be ſtill *free* or *ſelf-governed*; and that it will be more or leſs ſo in proportion as it is more or leſs fairly and adequately repreſented. If the perſons to whom the truſt of government is committed hold their places for ſhort terms; if they are choſen by the unbiaſſed voices of a majority of the ſtate, and ſubject to their inſtructions; Liberty will be enjoyed in its higheſt degree. But if they are choſen for long terms by a part only of the ſtate; and if during that term they are ſubject to no controul from their conſtituents; the very idea of Liberty will be loſt, and the power of chuſing conſtituents becomes nothing but a power, lodged in a *few*, to chuſe at certain periods, a body of *Maſters* for themſelves and for the reſt of the Community. And if a ſtate is ſo ſunk that the majority of its repreſentatives are elected by a handful of the meaneſt *(a)* perſons in it, whoſe votes are always paid for; and if alſo, there is a higher will on which even theſe mock repreſentatives themſelves depend, and that directs their voices: In theſe circumſtances, it will be an abuſe of language to ſay that the ſtate poſſeſſes Liberty. Private men, indeed, might be allowed the exerciſe of Liberty; as they might alſo under the moſt deſpotic government; but it would be an *indul-*

(a) In *Great Britain*, conſiſting of near ſix *millions* of inhabitants, 5723 perſons, moſt of them the loweſt of the people, elect one half of the *Houſe of Commons*; and 364 votes chuſe a ninth part. This may be ſeen diſtinctly made out in the *Political Diſquiſitions*, Vol. I. Book 2. C. 4. a work full of important and uſeful inſtruction.

gence or *connivance* derived from the ſpirit of the times, or from an accidental mildneſs in the adminiſtration. And, rather than be governed in ſuch a manner, it would perhaps be better to be governed by the will of one man without any repreſentation: For a repreſentation ſo degenerated could anſwer no other end than to miſlead and deceive, by diſguiſing ſlavery, and keeping up a *form* of Liberty when the *reality* was loſt.

Within the limits now mentioned, Liberty may be enjoyed in every poſſible degree; from that which is complete and perfect, to that which is merely nominal; according as the people have more or leſs of a ſhare in government, and of a controuling power over the perſons by whom it is adminiſtered.

In general, to be *free* is to be guided by one's own will; and to be guided by the will of another is the characteriſtic of *Servitude*. This is particularly applicable to Political Liberty. That ſtate, I have obſerved, is *free*, which is guided by its own will; or, (which comes to the ſame) by the will of an aſſembly of repreſentatives appointed by itſelf and accountable to itſelf. And every ſtate that is not ſo governed; or in which a body of men repreſenting the people make not an eſſential part of the Legiſlature, is in *ſlavery*.——In order to form the moſt perfect conſtitution of government,

ment, there may be the beſt reaſons for joining to ſuch a body of repreſentatives, an *Hereditary Council*, conſiſting of men of the firſt rank in the ſtate, with a *Supreme executive Magiſtrate* at the head of all. This will form uſeful checks in a legiſlature; and contribute to give it vigour, union, and diſpatch, without infringing liberty: for, as long as that part of a government which repreſents the people is a *fair repreſentation*; and alſo has a negative on all public meaſures, together with the ſole power of impoſing taxes and originating ſupplies; the eſſentials of liberty will be preſerved. ——We make it our boaſt in this country, that this is our own conſtitution. I will not ſay with how much reaſon.

Of ſuch Liberty as I have now deſcribed, it is impoſſible that there ſhould be an exceſs. Government is an inſtitution for the benefit of the people governed, which they have power to model as they pleaſe; and to ſay, that they can have too much of this power, is to ſay, that there ought to be a power in the ſtate ſuperior to that which gives it being, and from which all juriſdiction in it is derived.——Licentiouſneſs, which has been commonly mentioned, as an extreme of liberty, is indeed its oppoſite. It is government by the will of rapacious individuals, in oppoſition to the will of the community, made known and declared in the laws. A free ſtate, at the ſame time that it is free itſelf, makes all its members free by excluding licentiouſneſs, and guarding their perſons and property and good name againſt inſult. It is the end of all juſt government, at the ſame time that it ſecures the liberty of the public againſt *foreign* injury, to ſecure the liberty of the individual againſt *private* injury. I do not, therefore, think it ſtrictly juſt to ſay, that it belongs to the nature of government to entrench on private liberty. It ought never to do this, except as far as the exerciſe of private liberty encroaches on the liberties of others. That is; it is licentiouſneſs it reſtrains, and liberty itſelf only when uſed to deſtroy liberty.

It appears from hence, that licentiouſneſs and deſpotiſm are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined. They are both alike inconſiſtent with liberty, and the true end of government; nor is there any other difference between them, than that the one is the licentiouſneſs of *great* men, and the other the licentiouſneſs of *little* men; or that, by the one, the perſons and property of a people are ſubject to outrage and invaſion from a King, or a lawleſs body of *Grandees*; and that, by the other, they are ſubject to the like outrage from a *lawleſs mob*.——In avoiding one of theſe evils, mankind have often run into the other. But all well-conſtituted governments guard equally againſt both.

Indeed of the two, the laſt is, on ſeveral accounts, the leaſt to be dreaded, and has done the leaſt miſchief. It may be truly ſaid, that if licentiouſneſs has deſtroyed its thouſands, deſpotiſm has deſtroyed its millions. The former, having little power, and no ſyſtem to ſupport it, neceſſarily finds its own remedy; and a people ſoon get out of the tumult and anarchy attending it. But a deſpotiſm, wearing the form of government, and being armed with its force, is an evil not to be conquered without dreadful ſtruggles. It goes on from age to age, debaſing the human faculties, levelling all diſtinctions, and preying on the rights and bleſſings of ſociety.——It deſerves to be added, that in a ſtate diſturbed by licentiouſneſs, there is an animation which is favourable to the human mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. But in a ſtate habituated to a deſpotiſm, all is ſtill and torpid. A dark and ſavage tyranny ſtifles every effort of genius; and the mind loſes all its ſpirit and dignity.

Before I proceed to what I have farther in view, I will obſerve, that the account now given of the principles of public Liberty, and the nature of an equal and free government, ſhews what judgment we ſhould form of that OMNIPOTENCE, which, it has been ſaid, muſt belong to every government as ſuch. Great ſtreſs has been laid on this, but moſt unreaſonably.——Government, as has been before obſerved, is, in the very nature of it, a TRUST; and all its powers a DELEGATION for gaining particular ends. This *truſt* may be miſapplied and abuſed. It may be employed to defeat the very ends for which it was inſtituted; and to ſubvert the very rights which it ought to protect.——A PARLIAMENT, for inſtance, conſiſting of a body of repreſentatives, choſen for a limited period, to make laws, and to grant money for public ſervices, would forfeit its authority by making itſelf perpetual, or even prolonging its own duration; by nominating its own members; by accepting bribes; or ſubjecting itſelf to any kind of foreign influence. This would convert a *Parliament* into a *conclave* or *junto* of ſelf-created tools; and a ſtate that has loſt its regard to its own rights, ſo far as to ſubmit to ſuch a breach of truſt in its rulers, is enſlaved.——Nothing, therefore, can be more abſurd than the doctrine which ſome have taught, with reſpect to the omnipotence of parliaments. They poſſeſs no power beyond the limits of the truſt for the execution of which they were formed. If they contradict this truſt, they betray their conſtituents, and diſſolve themſelves. All delegated power muſt be ſubordinate and limited.——If omnipotence can, with any ſenſe, be aſcribed to a legiſlature, it muſt be lodged where all legiſlative authority originates; that is, in the PEOPLE. For *their* ſakes government is inſtituted; and their's is the only real omnipotence.

I am ſenſible, that all I have been ſaying would be very abſurd, were the opinions juſt which ſome have maintained concerning the origin of government. According to theſe opinions, government is not the creature of the people, or the reſult of a convention between them and their rulers: But there are certain men who poſſeſs in themſelves, independently of the will of the people, a right of governing them, which they derive from the Deity. This doctrine has been abundantly refuted by many (*a*) excellent writers. It is a doctrine which avowedly ſubverts Civil Liberty; and which repreſents mankind as a body of vaſſals, formed to deſcend like cattle from one ſet of owners to another, who have an abſolute dominion over them. It is a wonder, that thoſe who view their ſpecies in a light ſo humiliating, ſhould ever be able to think of themſelves without regret and ſhame. The intention of theſe obſervations is not to oppoſe ſuch ſentiments; but, taking for granted the reaſonableneſs of Civil Liberty, to ſhew wherein it conſiſts, and what diſtinguiſhes it from its con-

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(*a*) See among others Mr. Locke on Government, and Dr. Prieſtley's Eſſay on the firſt Principles of Government.

trary.——And, in conſidering this ſubject, as it has been now treated, it is unavoidable to reflect on the excellency of a free government, and its tendency to exalt the nature of man.——Every member of a free ſtate, having his property ſecure, and knowing himſelf his own governor, poſſeſſes a conſciouſneſs of dignity in himſelf, and feels incitements to emulation and improvement, to which the miſerable ſlaves of arbitrary power muſt be utter ſtrangers. In ſuch a ſtate all the ſprings of action have room to operate, and the mind is ſtimulated to the nobleſt exertions (*a*).—But to be obliged, from our birth, to look up to a creature no better than ourſelves as the maſter of our fortunes; and to receive his will as our law—What can be more humiliating? What elevated ideas can enter a mind in ſuch a ſituation?—— Agreeably to this remark; the ſubjects of free ſtates have, in all ages, been moſt diſtinguiſhed for genius and knowledge. Liberty is the ſoil where the arts and ſciences have flouriſhed; and the more free a ſtate has been, the more have the powers of the human mind been drawn forth into action, and the greater number of brave men has it produced. With what luſtre do the antient free ſtates of *Greece* ſhine in the annals of the world? How different is that country now, under the Great *Turk*? The differ-

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(*a*) See Dr. Prieſtley on Government, page 68, 69, &c.

ence between a country inhabited by men, and by brutes, is not greater.

Theſe are reflexions which ſhould be conſtantly preſent to every mind in this country.——As *Moral* Liberty is the prime bleſſing of man in his *private* capacity, ſo is *Civil* Liberty in his *public* capacity. There is nothing that requires more to be *watched* than power. There is nothing that ought to be oppoſed with a more determined reſolution than its encroachments. Sleep in a ſtate, as *Monteſquieu* ſays, is always followed by ſlavery.

The people of this kingdom were once warmed by ſuch ſentiments as thoſe. Many a ſycophant of power have they ſacrificed. Often have they fought and bled in the cauſe of Liberty. But that time ſeems to be going. The fair inheritance of Liberty left us by our anceſtors many of us are not unwilling to reſign. An abandoned venality, the inſeparable companion of diſſipation and extravagance, has poiſoned the ſprings of public virtue among us: And ſhould any events ever ariſe that ſhould render the ſame oppoſition neceſſary that took place in the times of King *Charles* the Firſt, and *James* the Second, I am afraid all that is valuable to us would be loſt. The terror of the ſtanding army, the danger of the public funds, and the all-corrupting influence of the treaſury, would deaden all zeal, and produce general acquieſcence and ſervility.

SECT. III.

Of the Authority of one Country over another.

FROM the nature and principles of Civil Liberty, as they have been now explained, it is an immediate and neceſſary inference that no one community can have any power over the property or legiſlation of another community, that is not incorporated with it by a juſt and adequate repreſentation.——Then only, it has been ſhewn, is a ſtate *free*, when it is governed by its own will. But a country that is ſubject to the legiſlature of another country, in which it has no voice, and over which it has no controul, cannot be ſaid to be governed by its own will. Such a country, therefore, is in a ſtate of ſlavery. And it deſerves to be particularly conſidered, that ſuch a ſlavery is worſe, on ſeveral accounts, than any ſlavery of private men to one another, or of kingdoms to deſpots within themſelves.——Between one ſtate and another, there is none of that fellow-feeling that takes place between perſons in private life. Being detached bodies that never ſee one another, and reſiding perhaps in different quarters of the globe, the ſtate that governs cannot be a witneſs to the ſufferings occaſioned by its oppreſſions; or a competent judge of the circumſtances and abilities of the people who are governed. They muſt alſo have in a great degree ſeparate intereſts; and the more the one is loaded, the more the other may be eaſed. The infamy likewiſe of oppreſſion, being in ſuch circumſtances ſhared among a multitude, is not likely to be much felt or regarded.——On all theſe accounts there is, in the caſe of one country ſubjugated to another, little or nothing to check rapacity; and the moſt flagrant injuſtice and cruelty may be practiſed without remorſe or pity.——I will add, that it is particularly difficult to ſhake off a tyranny of this kind. A ſingle deſpot, if a people are unanimous and reſolute, may be ſoon ſubdued. But a deſpotic ſtate is not eaſily ſubdued; and a people ſubject to it cannot emancipate themſelves without entering into a dreadful, and, perhaps, very unequal conteſt.

I cannot help obſerving farther, that the ſlavery of a people to internal deſpots may be qualified and limited; but I don't ſee what can limit the authority of one ſtate over another. The exerciſe of power in this caſe can have no other meaſure than diſcretion; and, therefore, muſt be indefinite and abſolute.

Once more. It ſhould be conſidered that the government of one country by another, can only be ſupported by a military force; and, without ſuch a ſupport, muſt be deſtitute of all weight and efficiency.

This will be beſt explained by putting the following caſe.——There is, let us ſuppoſe, in a province ſubject to the ſovereignty of a diſtant ſtate, a ſubordinate legiſlature conſiſting of an Aſſembly choſen by the people; a Council choſen by that Aſſembly; and a Governor *appointed* by the Sovereign State, and paid by the Province. There are, likewiſe, judges and other officers, appointed and paid in the ſame manner, for adminiſtering *juſtice* agreeably to the laws, by the verdicts of juries fairly and indiſcriminately choſen.——This forms a conſtitution ſeemingly free, by giving the people a ſhare in their own government, and ſome check on their rulers. But, while there is a higher legiſlative power, to the controul of which ſuch a conſtitution is ſubject; it does not itſelf poſſeſs Liberty, and therefore, cannot be of any uſe as a ſecurity to Liberty; nor is it poſſible that it ſhould be of long duration. Laws offenſive to the Province will be enacted by the Sovereign State. The legiſlature of the Province will remonſtrate againſt them. The magiſtrates will not execute them. Juries will not convict upon them; and conſequently, like the Pope's Bulls which once governed *Europe*, they will become nothing but forms and empty ſounds, to which no regard will be ſhewn.——In order to remedy this evil, and to give efficiency to its government, the ſupreme ſtate will naturally be led to withdraw the *Governor*, the *Council*, and the *Judges (a)* from the controul of the Province, by making them entirely dependant on itſelf for their *pay* and *continuance in office*, as well as for their appointment. It will alſo alter the mode of chuſing Juries on purpoſe to bring them more under its influence: And in ſome caſes, under the pretence of the impoſſibility of gaining an impartial trial where government is reſiſted, it will perhaps ordain, that offenders ſhall be removed from the Province to be tried within its own territories: And it may even go ſo far in this kind of policy, as to endeavour to prevent the effects of diſcontents; by forbidding all meetings and aſſociations of the people, except at ſuch times, and for ſuch particular purpoſes, as ſhall be permitted them.

(a) The independency of the Judges we eſteem in this country one of our greateſt privileges.——Before the revolution they generally, I believe, held their places *during pleaſure.* King William gave them their places *during good behaviour*. At the acceſſion of the preſent Royal Family their places were given them *during good behaviour*, in conſequence of the Act of Settlement, 12 and 13 W. III. C. 2. But an opinion having been entertained by ſome, that though their commiſſions were made under the Act of Settlement to continue, during good behaviour, yet that they determined on the demiſe of the Crown; it was enacted by a ſtatute made in the firſt year of his preſent Majeſty, Chap. 23. "That the commiſſions of Judges for "the time being ſhall be, continue, and remain in full force, "during their good behaviour, notwithſtanding the demiſe "of his Majeſty, or of any of his Heirs and Succeſſors;" with a proviſo, "that it may be lawful for his Majeſty, his "Heirs and Succeſſors, to remove any Judge upon the addreſs "of both Houſes of Parliament." And by the ſame Statute their ſalaries are ſecured to them during the continuance of their commiſſions: His Majeſty, according to the preamble of the Statute, having been pleaſed to declare from the Throne to both Houſes of Parliament, "That he looked upon the "independency and uprightneſs of Judges as eſſential to the "impartial adminiſtration of Juſtice, as one of the beſt ſecurities to the Rights and Liberties of his loving Subjects, and "as moſt conducive to the honour of his Crown."

A worthy friend and able Lawyer has ſupplied me with this note. It affords, when contraſted with that *dependence* of the Judges which has been thought reaſonable in *America*, a ſad ſpecimen of the different manner in which a kingdom may think proper to govern itſelf, and the provinces ſubject to it.

Thus will ſuch a Province be exactly in the ſame ſtate that *Britain* would be in, were our firſt executive magiſtrate, our Houſe of Lords, and our Judges, nothing but the inſtruments of a foreign democratical power; were our Juries nominated by that power; or were we liable to be tranſported to a diſtant country to be tried for offences committed here; and reſtrained from calling any meetings, conſulting about any grievances, or aſſociating for any purpoſes, except when leave ſhould be given us by a *Lord Lieutenant* or *Viceroy*.

It is certain that this is a ſtate of oppreſſion which no country could endure, and to which it would be vain to expect, that any people ſhould ſubmit an hour without an armed force to compel them.

The late tranſactions in *Maſſachuſet's Bay* are a perfect exemplification of what I have now ſaid. The government of *Great Britain* in that Province has gone on exactly in the train I have deſcribed; till at laſt it became neceſſary to ſtation troops there, not amenable to the civil power; and all terminated in a government by the SWORD. And ſuch, if a people are not ſunk below the character of men, will be the iſſue of all government in ſimilar circumſtances.

It may be aſked——" Are there not cauſes by " which one ſtate may acquire a *rightful* authority " over another, though not conſolidated by an ade- " quate Repreſentation?"——I anſwer, that there are no ſuch cauſes.——All the cauſes to which ſuch an effect *can* be aſcribed are CONQUEST, COMPACT, or OBLIGATIONS CONFERRED.

Much has been ſaid of the right of *conqueſt*; and hiſtory contains little more than accounts of kingdoms reduced by it under the dominion of other kingdoms, and of the havock it has made among mankind. But the authority derived from hence, being founded on violence, is never *rightful*. The *Roman Republic* was nothing but a faction againſt the general liberties of the world; and had no more right to give law to the Provinces ſubject to it, than thieves have to the property they ſeize, or to the houſes into which they break. ——Even in the caſe of a juſt war undertaken by one people to defend itſelf againſt the oppreſſions of another people, conqueſt gives only a right to an indemnification for the injury which occaſioned the war, and a reaſonable ſecurity againſt future injury.

Neither can any ſtate acquire ſuch an authority over other ſtates in virtue of any *compacts* or *ceſſions*. This is a caſe in which compacts are not binding. *Civil* Liberty is, in this reſpect, on the ſame footing with *Religious* Liberty. As no people can lawfully ſurrender their *Religious* Liberty, by giving up their right of judging for themſelves in religion, or by allowing any human beings to preſcribe to them what faith they ſhall embrace, or what mode of worſhip they ſhall practiſe; ſo neither can any civil ſocieties lawfully ſurrender their *Civil* Liberty, by giving up to any extraneous juriſdiction their power of legiſlating for themſelves and diſpoſing their property. Such a ceſſion, being inconſiſtent with the unalienable rights of human nature, would either not bind at all; or bind only the individuals who made it. This is a bleſſing which no one generation of men can give up for another; and which, when loſt, a people have always a right to reſume.——Had our anceſtors in this country been ſo mad as to have ſubjected themſelves to any foreign Community, we could not have been under any obligation to continue in ſuch a ſtate. And all the nations now in the world who, in conſequence of the tameneſs and folly of their predeceſſors, are ſubject to arbitrary power, have a right to emancipate themſelves as ſoon as they can.

If neither *conqueſt* nor *compact* can give ſuch an authority, much leſs can any favours received, or any ſervices performed by one ſtate for another. ——Let the favour received be what it will, Liberty is too dear a price for it. A ſtate that has been *obliged* is not, therefore, bound to be *enſlaved*. It ought, if poſſible, to make an adequate return for the ſervices done to it; but to ſuppoſe that it ought to give up the power of governing itſelf, and the diſpoſal of its property, would be to ſuppoſe, that, in order to ſhew its gratitude, it ought to part with the power of ever afterwards exerciſing gratitude.——How much has been done by this kingdom for *Hanover*? But no one will ſay that on this account, we have a right to make the laws of *Hanover*; or even to draw a ſingle penny from it without its own conſent.

After what has been ſaid it will, I am afraid, be trifling to apply the preceding arguments to the caſe of different communities, which are conſidered as different parts of the ſame *Empire.* But there are reaſons which render it neceſſary for me to be explicit in making this application.

What I mean here is juſt to point out the difference of ſituation between communities forming an *Empire*; and particular bodies or claſſes of men forming different parts of a *Kingdom.* Different communities forming an *Empire* have no connexions, which produce a neceſſary reciprocation of intereſts between them. They inhabit different diſtricts, and are governed by different legiſlatures. ——On the contrary. The different claſſes of men *within* a *kingdom* are all placed on the ſame ground. Their concerns and intereſts are the ſame; and what is done to one part muſt affect all. ——Theſe are ſituations totally different; and a conſtitution of government that may be conſiſtent with Liberty in one of them, may be entirely inconſiſtent with it in the other. It is, however, certain that, even in the laſt of theſe ſituations, no one part ought to govern the reſt. In order to a fair and equal government, there ought to be a fair and equal repreſentation of all that are governed; and as far as this is wanting in any government, it deviates from the principles of Liberty, and becomes unjuſt and oppreſſive.——But in the circumſtances of different communities, all this holds with unſpeakably more force. The government of a part in this caſe becomes complete tyranny;

ranny; and ſubjection to it becomes complete ſlavery.

But ought there not, it is aſked, to exiſt ſomewhere in an *Empire* a ſupreme legiſlative authority over the whole; or a power to controul and bind all the different ſtates of which it conſiſts.——This enquiry has been already anſwered. The truth is, that ſuch a ſupreme controuling power ought to exiſt no-where except in ſuch a SENATE or body of delegates as that deſcribed in page 8; and that the authority or ſupremacy of even this ſenate ought to be limited to the common concerns of the *Empire.*——I think I have proved that the fundamental principles of Liberty neceſſarily require this.

In a word. An *Empire* is a collection of ſtates or communities united by ſome common bond or tye. If theſe ſtates have each of them free conſtitutions of government, and, with reſpect to taxation and internal legiſlation, are independent of the other ſtates, but united by compacts, or alliances, or ſubjection to a Great *Council*, repreſenting the whole, or to one monarch entruſted with the ſupreme executive power: In theſe circumſtances, the Empire will be an Empire of Freemen.——If, on the contrary, like the different provinces ſubject to the *Grand Seignior*, none of the ſtates poſſeſs any independent legiſlative authority; but are all ſubject to an abſolute monarch, whoſe will is their law; then is the Empire an Empire of Slaves.—— If one of the ſtates is free, but governs by its will all the other ſtates; then is the Empire, like that of the Romans in the times of the republic, an Empire conſiſting of one ſtate free, and the reſt in ſlavery: Nor does it make any more difference in this caſe, that the governing ſtate is itſelf free, than it does in the caſe of a kingdom ſubject to a *deſpot*, that this deſpot is himſelf free. I have before obſerved, that this only makes the ſlavery worſe. There is, in the one caſe, a chance, that in the quick ſucceſſion of deſpots, a good one will ſometimes ariſe. But bodies of men continue the ſame; and have generally proved the moſt unrelenting of all tyrants.

A great writer before (*a*) quoted, obſerves of the *Roman Empire*, that while Liberty was at the center, tyranny prevailed in the diſtant provinces; that ſuch as were free under it were extremely ſo, while thoſe who were ſlaves groaned under the extremity of ſlavery; and that the ſame events that *deſtroyed* the liberty of the former, *gave* liberty to the latter.

The Liberty of the *Romans*, therefore, was only an additional calamity to the provinces governed by them; and though it might have been ſaid of the *citizens* of *Rome*, that they were the " freeſt

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(*a*) Monteſquieu's Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book 11. C. xix.

" members of any civil ſociety in the known " world;" yet of the *ſubjects* of *Rome*, it muſt have been ſaid, that they were the completeſt ſlaves in the known world.——How remarkable is it, that this very people, once the freeſt of mankind, but at the ſame time the moſt proud and tyrannical, ſhould become at laſt the moſt contemptible and abject ſlaves that ever exiſted?

PART II.

IN the foregoing diſquiſitions, I have, from one leading principle, deduced a number of conſequences, that ſeem to me incapable of being diſputed. I have meant that they ſhould be applied to the great queſtion between this kingdom and the Colonies which has occaſioned the preſent war with them.

It is impoſſible, but, my readers muſt have been all along making this application; and if they ſtill think, that the claims of this kingdom are reconcilable to the principles of true liberty and legitimate government, I am afraid, that nothing I ſhall farther ſay will have any effect on their judgments. I wiſh, however, they would have the patience and candour to go with me, and grant me a hearing ſome time longer.

Though clearly decided in my own judgment on this ſubject, I am inclined to make great allowances for the different judgments of others. We have been ſo uſed to ſpeak of the Colonies as *our*

Colonies, and to think of them as in a ſtate of ſubordination to us, and as holding their exiſtence in *America* only for our uſe, that it is no wonder the prejudices of many are alarmed, when they find a different doctrine maintained. The meaneſt perſon among us is diſpoſed to look upon himſelf as having a body of ſubjects in *America*; and to be offended at the denial of his right to make laws for them, though perhaps he does not know what colour they are of, or what language they talk. ——Such are the natural prejudices of ths country.——But the time is coming, I hope, when the unreaſonableneſs of them will be ſeen; and more juſt ſentiments prevail.

Before I proceed, I beg it may be attended to, that I have choſen to try this queſtion by the general principles of Civil Liberty; and not by the practice of former times; or by the *Charters* granted the colonies.——The arguments *for* them, drawn from theſe laſt topics, appear to me greatly to outweigh the arguments *againſt* them. But I wiſh to have this queſtion brought to a higher teſt, and ſurer iſſue. The queſtion with all liberal enquirers ought to be, not what juriſdiction over them *Precedents*, *Statutes*, and *Charters* give, but what reaſon and equity, and the rights of humanity give.——This is, in truth, a queſtion which no kingdom has ever before had occaſion to agitate.

The caſe of a free country branching itſelf out in the manner *Britain* has done, and ſending to a diſtant world colonies which have there, from ſmall beginnings, and under free legiſlatures of their own, increaſed, and formed a body of powerful ſtates, likely ſoon to become ſuperior to the parent ſtate—This is a caſe which is new in the hiſtory of mankind; and it is extremely improper to judge of it by the rules of any narrow and partial policy; or to conſider it on any other ground than the general one of reaſon and juſtice.——*Thoſe* who will be candid enough to judge on this ground, and who can diveſt themſelves of national prejudices, will not, I fancy, remain long unſatisfied.——But alas! Matters are gone too far. The diſpute probably muſt be ſettled another way; and the ſword alone, I am afraid, is now to determine what the rights of *Britain* and *America* are.——Shocking ſituation!—Deteſted be the meaſures which have brought us into it: And, if we are endeavouring to enforce injuſtice, curſed will be the war.——A retreat, however, is not yet impracticable. The duty we owe our gracious ſovereign obliges us to rely on his diſpoſition to ſtay the ſword, and to promote the happineſs of all the different parts of the Empire at the head of which he is placed. With ſome hopes, therefore, that it may not be too late to reaſon on this ſubject, I will, in the following Sections, enquire what the war with *America* is in the following reſpects.

1. In reſpect of Juſtice.
2. The Principles of the Conſtitution.
3. In reſpect of Policy and Humanity.
4. The Honour of the Kingdom.

And laſtly, The Probability of ſucceeding in it.

SECT. I.

Of the Juſtice of the War with America.

THE enquiry, whether the war with the Colonies is a *juſt* war, will be beſt determined by ſtating the power over them, which it is the end of the war to maintain: And this cannot be better done, than in the words of an act of parliament, made on purpoſe to define it. That act, it is well known, declares, "That this kingdom has "power, and of right ought to have power to "make laws and ſtatutes to bind the Colonies, "and people of *America*, in all caſes whatever." ——Dreadful power indeed! I defy any one to expreſs ſlavery in ſtronger language. It is the ſame with declaring "that we have a right to do with them what we pleaſe."——I will not waſte my time by applying to ſuch a claim any of the preceding arguments. If my reader does not feel more in this caſe, than words can expreſs, all reaſoning muſt be vain.

But, probably, moſt perſons will be for uſing milder language; and for ſaying no more than, that the united legiſlatures of *England* and *Scotland* have of right power to tax the Colonies, and a ſupremacy of legiſlation over *America*.——But this comes to the ſame. If it means any thing, it means, that the property, and the legiſlations of the Colonies, are ſubject to the abſolute diſcretion of *Great Britain*, and ought of right to be ſo. The nature of the thing admits of no limitation. The Colonies can never be admitted to be judges, how far the authority over them in theſe caſes ſhall extend. This would be to deſtroy it entirely.——If *any* part of their property is ſubject to our diſcretion, the *whole* muſt be ſo. If we have a right to interfere at all in their internal legiſlations, we have a right to interfere as far as we think proper.——It is ſelf-evident, that this leaves them nothing they can call *their own*.——And what is it that can give to any people ſuch a ſupremacy over another people?———I have already examined the principal anſwers which have been given to this enquiry. But it will not be amiſs in this place to go over ſome of them again.

It has been urged, that ſuch a right muſt be lodged ſomewhere, "in order to preſerve the "UNITY of the Britiſh Empire."

Pleas of this ſort have, in all ages, been uſed to juſtify tyranny.——They have in RELIGION given riſe to numberleſs oppreſſive claims, and ſlaviſh Hierarchies. And in the *Romiſh Communion* particularly, it is well known, that the POPE claims the title and powers of the ſupreme head on earth of the Chriſtian church, in order to preſerve its UNITY.——With reſpect to the *Britiſh Empire*, nothing can be more prepoſterous than to endeavour to maintain its unity, by ſetting up ſuch a claim. This is a method of eſtabliſhing unity, which, like the ſimilar method in religion, can produce nothing but diſcord and miſchief.—The truth is, that a common relation to one ſupreme executive head; an exchange of kind offices; tyes of intereſt and affection, and *compacts*, are ſufficient to give the Britiſh Empire all the unity that is neceſſary. But if not——If, in order to preſerve its *Unity*, one half of it muſt be enſlaved to the other half, let it, in the name of God, want Unity.

Much has been ſaid of "the *Superiority* of the "Britiſh State." But what gives us our ſuperiority?—Is it our *Wealth?*—This never confers real dignity. On the contrary: Its effect is always to debaſe, intoxicate, and corrupt.——Is it the *number of our people?* The colonies will ſoon be equal to us in number.——Is it our *Knowledge* and *Virtue?* They are probably *equally* knowing, and *more* virtuous. There are names among them that will not ſtoop to any names among the philoſophers and politicians of this iſland.

"But we are the PARENT STATE."—Theſe are the magic words which have faſcinated and miſled us.———The Engliſh came from *Germany*. Does that give the *German* ſtates a right to tax us?—Children, having no property, and being incapable of guiding themſelves, the author of nature has committed the care of them to their parents, and ſubjected them to their abſolute authority. But there is a period when, having acquired property, and a capacity of judging for themſelves, they become independent agents; and when, for this reaſon, the authority of their parents ceaſes, and becomes nothing but the reſpect and influence due to benefactors. Suppoſing, therefore, that the order of nature in eſtabliſhing the relation between parents and children, ought to have been the rule of our conduct to the Colonies, we ſhould have been gradually relaxing our authority as they grew up. But, like mad parents, we have done the contrary; and, at the very time when our authority ſhould have been moſt relaxed, we have carried it to the greateſt extent, and exerciſed it with the greateſt rigour. No wonder then, that they have turned upon us; and obliged us to remember, that they are not Children.

" But we have, it is ſaid, protected them, and " run deeply in debt on their account."—The full anſwer to this has been already given, (page 26,) Will any one ſay, that all we have done for them has not been more on our *own* account, (*a*) than on *theirs?*——But ſuppoſe the contrary. Have they done nothing for us? Have they made no compenſation for the protection they have receiv-ed? Have they not helped us to pay our *taxes*, to ſupport our poor, and to bear the burthen of our debts, by taking from us, at our own price, all the commodities with which we can ſupply them?—Have they not, for our advantage, ſubmitted to many

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(*a*) This is particularly true of the *bounties* granted on ſome American commodities (as pitch, tar, indigo, &c) when imported into *Britain*; for it is well known, that the end of granting them was, to get thoſe commodities cheaper from the Colonies, and in return for our manufactures, which we uſed to get from *Ruſſia* and other foreign countries. And this is expreſſed in the preambles of the laws which grant theſe bounties. See the Appeal to the Juſtice, &c. page 21, third edition. It is, therefore, ſtrange that Doctor TUCKER and others, ſhould have inſiſted ſo much upon theſe bounties as favours and indulgencies to the Colonies.——But it is ſtill more ſtrange, that the ſame repreſentation ſhould have been made of the compenſations granted them for doing more during the laſt war in aſſiſting us than could have been reaſonably expected; and alſo of the ſums we have ſpent in maintaining troops among them *without* their conſent; and in oppoſition to their wiſhes.——See a Pamphlet, entitled " The rights of Great Britain aſſerted againſt the claims of America."

many reſtraints in acquiring property ? Muſt they likewiſe reſign to us the diſpoſal of that property ? —Has not their excluſive trade with us been for many years one of the chief ſources of our national wealth and power ?—In all our wars have they not fought by our ſide, and contributed much to our ſucceſs ? In the laſt war, particularly, it is well known, that they ran themſelves deeply in debt ; and that the parliament thought it neceſſary to grant them conſiderable ſums annually as compenſations for going beyond their abilities in aſſiſting us. And in this courſe would they have continued for many future years ; perhaps, for ever.—In ſhort ; were an accurate account ſtated, it is by no means certain which ſide would appear to be moſt indebted. When aſked as *freemen*, they have hitherto ſeldom diſcovered any reluctance in giving. But, in obedience to a demand, and with the bayonet at their breaſts, they will give us nothing but blood.

It is farther ſaid, “ that the land on which they “ ſettled was ours.”—But how came it to be ours ? If ſailing along a coaſt can give a right to a country, then might the people of *Japan* become, as ſoon as they pleaſe, the proprietors of *Britain*. Nothing can be more chimerical than property founded on ſuch a reaſon. If the land on which the Colonies firſt ſettled had any proprietors, they were the natives. The greateſt part of it they bought of the natives. They have ſince cleared and cultivated it; and, without any help from us, converted a wilderneſs into fruitful and pleaſant fields. It is, therefore, now on a double account their property; and no power on earth can have any right to diſturb them in the poſſeſſion of it, or to take from them, without their conſent, any part of its produce.

But let it be granted, that the land was ours. Did they not ſettle upon it under the faith of charters, which promiſed them the enjoyment of all the rights of *Engliſhmen*; and allowed them to tax themſelves, and to be governed by legiſlatures of their own, ſimilar to ours? Theſe charters were given them by an authority, which at the time was thought competent; and they have been rendered ſacred by an acquieſcence on our part for more than a century. Can it then be wondered at, that the Colonies ſhould revolt, when they found their charters violated; and an attempt made to force INNOVATIONS upon them by famine and the ſword? ——But I lay no ſtreſs on charters. They derive their rights from a higher ſource. It is inconſiſtent with common ſenſe to imagine, that any people would ever think of ſettling in a diſtant country, on any ſuch condition, as that the people from whom they withdrew, ſhould for ever be maſters of their property, and have power to ſubject them to any modes of government they pleaſed. And had there been expreſs ſtipulations to this purpoſe in all the charters of the colonies, they would, in my opinion, be no more bound by them, than if it had been ſtipulated with them, that they ſhould go naked, or expoſe themſelves to the incurſions of wolves and tigers.

The defective ſtate of the repreſentation of this kingdom has been farther pleaded to prove our right to tax *America*. We ſubmit to a parliament that does not repreſent us, and therefore they ought.——How ſtrange an argument is this? It is ſaying we want liberty; and therefore, they ought to want it.——Suppoſe it true, that they are indeed contending for a better conſtitution of government, and more liberty than we enjoy: Ought this to make us angry?——Who is there that does not ſee the danger to which this country is expoſed?——Is it generous, becauſe we are in a ſink, to endeavour to draw them into it? Ought we not rather to wiſh earneſtly, that there may at leaſt be ONE FREE COUNTRY left upon earth, to which we may fly, when venality, luxury, and vice have completed the ruin of liberty here?

It is, however, by no means true, that *America* has no more right to be exempted from taxation by the *Britiſh* parliament, than *Britain* itſelf.——*Here*, all freeholders, and burgeſſes in boroughs, are repreſented. *There*, not one *Freeholder*, or any other perſon, is repreſented.—— *Here*, the *aids* granted by the repreſented part of the kingdom muſt be proportionably *paid* by themſelves; and the laws they make for *others*, they at the ſame time make for *themſelves*. *There*, the aids they would grant would not be *paid*, but *received*, by themſelves; and the laws they made would be made for *others only*.—In ſhort. The relation of one country to another country, whoſe repreſentatives have the power of taxing it (and of appropriating the money raiſed by the taxes) is much the ſame with the relation of a country to a ſingle deſpot, or a body of deſpots, within itſelf, inveſted with the like power. In both caſes, the people taxed and thoſe who tax have ſeparate intereſts; nor can there be any thing to check oppreſſion, beſides either the abilities of the people taxed, or the humanity of the *taxers*.—But indeed I can never hope to convince that perſon of any thing, who does not ſee an eſſential difference (*a*) between the two caſes now

(*a*) It gives me pleaſure to ſind, that the author of the *Remarks on the Principal Acts of the 13th Parliament of Great Britain*, &c. acknowledges this difference.———It has, however, been at the ſame time mortifying to me to find ſo able a writer adopting ſuch principles of government, as are contained in this work. According to him, a people have no property or rights, except ſuch as their *Civil Governors* are pleaſed not to take from them. Taxes, therefore, he aſſerts, are in no ſenſe the *gifts*, much leſs the *free gifts* of the people. See p. 58. and 191.

mentioned; or between the circumſtances of individuals, and claſſes of men, making parts of a community imperfectly repreſented in the legiſlature that governs it; and the circumſtances of a whole community, in a diſtant world, not at all repreſented.

But enough has been ſaid by others on this point; nor is it poſſible for me to throw any new light upon it. To finiſh, therefore, what I meant to offer under this head, I muſt beg that the following conſiderations may be particularly attended to..

The queſtion now between us and the Colonies is, Whether, in reſpect of taxation and internal legiſlation, they are bound to be ſubject to the juriſdiction of this kingdom: Or, in other words, Whether the *Britiſh* parliament has or has not of right, a power to diſpoſe of their property, and to model as it pleaſes their governments?—— To this ſupremacy over them, we ſay, we are entitled; and in order to maintain it, we have begun the preſent war.——Let me here enquire,

1ſt. Whether, if we have now this ſupremacy, we ſhall not be equally entitled to it in any future time?——They are now but little ſhort of half our number. To this number they have grown, from a ſmall body of original ſettlers, by a very rapid increaſe. The probability is, that they will go on to increaſe; and that, in 50 or 60 years, they will be *double* our number; (*a*) and form a mighty Empire, conſiſting of a variety of ſtates, all equal or ſuperior to ourſelves in all the arts and accompliſhments, which give dignity and happineſs to human life. In that period, will they be ſtill bound to acknowledge that ſupremacy over them which we now claim? Can there be any perſon who will aſſert this; or whoſe mind does not revolt at the idea of a vaſt continent, holding all that is valuable to it, at the diſcretion of a handful of people on the other ſide the *Atlantic?*——But if, at that period, this would be unreaſonable; what makes it otherwiſe *now?*—Draw the line, if you can.—But there is a ſtill greater difficulty.

Britain is now, I will ſuppoſe, the ſeat of Liberty and Virtue; and its legiſlature conſiſts of a body of able and independent men, who govern with wiſdom and juſtice. The time may come when all will be reverſed: When its excellent conſtitution of government will be ſubverted: When, preſſed by debts and taxes, it will be greedy to draw to itſelf an increaſe of revenue from every diſtant Province, in order to eaſe its own burdens: When the influence of the crown, ſtrengthened by luxury and an univerſal profligacy of manners, will have tainted every heart, broken down every fence

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(*a*) See Obſervations on Reverſionary Payments, page 207, &c.

of Liberty, and rendered us a nation of tame and contented vaſſals: When a General *Election* will be nothing but a General *Auction* of *Boroughs*: And when the PARLIAMENT, the Grand Council of the nation, and once the faithful guardian of the ſtate, and a terror to evil miniſters, will be degenerated into a body of *Sycophants*, dependent and venal, always ready to confirm *any* meaſures; and little more than a public court for regiſtering royal edicts.——Such, it is poſſible, may, ſome time or other, be the ſtate of *Great Britain*.——What will, at that period, be the duty of the Colonies? Will they be ſtill bound to unconditional ſubmiſſion? Muſt they always continue an appendage to our government; and follow it implicitly through every change that can happen to it?——Wretched condition, indeed, of millions of freemen as good as ourſelves.——Will you ſay that we now govern equitably; and that there is no danger of any ſuch revolution?—Would to God this were true.——But will you not always ſay the ſame? Who ſhall judge whether we govern equitably or not? Can you give the Colonies any *ſecurity* that ſuch a period will never come? Once more.

If we have indeed that power which we claim over the legiſlations, and internal rights of the Colonies, may we not, whenever we pleaſe, ſubject them to the arbitrary power of the crown?——I do not mean, that this would be a diſadvantageous change: For I have before obſerved, that if a people are to be ſubject to an external power over which they have no command, it is better that power ſhould be lodged in the hands of one man than of a multitude. But many perſons think otherwiſe; and ſuch ought to conſider that, if this would be a calamity, the condition of the Colonies muſt be deplorable.——"A government by King, Lords, and Commons, (it has been ſaid) is the perfection of government;" and ſo it is, when the Commons are a juſt repreſentation of the people; and when alſo, it is not extended to any diſtant people, or communities, not repreſented. But if this is the *beſt*, a government by a king only muſt be the *worſt*; and every claim implying a right to eſtabliſh ſuch a government among any people muſt be unjuſt and cruel.——It is ſelf-evident, that by claiming a right to alter the conſtitutions of the Colonies, according to our diſcretion, we claim this power: And it is a power that we have thought fit to exerciſe in *one* of our Colonies; and that we have attempted to exerciſe in *another.*——*Canada*, according to the late extenſion of its limits, is a country almoſt as large as half *Europe*; and it may poſſibly come in time to be filled with Britiſh ſubjects. The *Quebec* act makes the king of *Great Britain* a deſpot over all that country.——In the Province of *Maſſachuſet's Bay* the ſame thing has been attempted and begun.

The act for BETTER *regulating their government*, paſſed at the ſame time with the *Quebec* act, gives the king the right of appointing, and removing at his pleaſure, the members of one part of the legiſlature; alters the mode of chuſing juries, on purpoſe to bring it more under the influence of the king; and takes away from the province the power of calling any meetings of the people without the king's conſent. (*a*)——The judges, likewiſe, have been made dependent on the king, for their nomination and pay, and continuance in office.—If all this is no more than we have a right to do; may we not go on to aboliſh the houſe of repreſentatives, to deſtroy all trials by juries, and to give up the province abſolutely and totally to the will of the king?——May we not even eſtabliſh popery in the province, as has been lately done in *Canada*, leaving the ſupport of proteſtantiſm to the king's diſcretion?——Can there be any Engliſhman who, were it his own caſe, would not ſooner loſe his heart's blood than yield to claims ſo pregnant with evils, and deſtructive to every thing that can diſtinguiſh a *Freeman* from a *Slave?*

I will take this opportunity to add, that what I have now ſaid, ſuggeſts a conſideration that demonſtrates, on how different a footing the Colonies are with reſpect to our government, from particular bodies of men *within* the kingdom, who hap-

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(*a*) See page 22.

pen not to be repreſented. Here, it is impoſſible that the repreſented part ſhould ſubject the unrepreſented part to arbitrary power, without including themſelves. But in the Colonies it is *not* impoſſible. We know that it *has* been done.

S E C T. II.

Whether the War with America *is juſtified by the Principles of the Conſtitution.*

I Have propoſed, in the next place, to examine the war with the Colonies by the principles of the conſtitution.—I know, that it is common to ſay that we are now maintaining the conſtitution in *America*. If this means that we are endeavouring to eſtabliſh our own conſtitution of government there; it is by no means true; nor, were it true, would it be right. They have chartered governments of their own, with which they are pleaſed; and which, if any power on earth may change without their conſent, that power may likewiſe, if it thinks proper, deliver them over to the *Grand Seignior*.——Suppoſe the Colonies of *France* and *Spain* had, by compacts, enjoyed for near a century and a half, free governments open to all the world, and under which they had grown and flouriſhed; what ſhould we think of thoſe kingdoms, were they to attempt to deſtroy their governments, and to force upon them their own mode of government? Should we not applaud any zeal they diſcovered in repelling ſuch an injury?—— But the truth is, in the preſent inſtance, that we are not maintaining but violating our own conſtitution in *America*. The eſſence of our conſtitution conſiſts in its independency. There is in this caſe no difference between *ſubjection* and *annihilation*. Did, therefore, the Colonies poſſeſs governments perfectly the ſame with ours, the attempt to ſubject them to ours would be an attempt to ruin them. A free government loſes its nature from the moment it becomes liable to be commanded or altered by any ſuperior power.

But I intended here principally to make the following obſervation.

The fundamental principle of our government is, " The right of a people to give and grant their " own money."——It is of no conſequence, in this caſe, whether we enjoy this right in a proper manner or not. Moſt certainly we do not. It is, however, the *principle* on which our government, as a *free* government, is founded. The *ſpirit* of the conſtitution gives it us; and, however imperfectly enjoyed, we glory in it as our firſt and greateſt bleſſing. It was an attempt to encroach upon this right, in a trifling inſtance, that produced the civil war in the reign of *Charles* the Firſt.—Ought not our brethren in *America* to enjoy this right as well as ourſelves? Do the principles of the conſtitution give it us, but deny it to them?

Or can we, with any decency, pretend that when we give to the king *their* money, we give him *our own?* (*a*)——What difference does it make, that in the time of *Charles the Firſt* the attempt to take away this right was made by *one man*: but that, in the caſe of *America*, it is made by a body of men?

In a word. This is a war undertaken not only againſt the principles of our own conſtitution; but on purpoſe to deſtroy other ſimilar conſtitutions in *America*; and to ſubſtitute in their room a military force. See page 23, 24.——It is, therefore, a groſs and flagrant violation of the conſtitution.

S E C T. III.

Of the Policy of the War with America.

IN writing the preſent Section, I have entered upon a ſubject of the laſt importance, on which much has been ſaid by other writers with great force, and in the ableſt manner (*b*). But I am not

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(*a*) The author of *Taxation no Tyranny* will undoubtedly aſſert this without heſitation, for in page 69 he compares our preſent ſituation with reſpect to the Colonies to that of the antient *Scythians*, who, upon returning from a war, *found themſelves ſhut out of their own* HOUSES *by their* SLAVES.

(*b*) See particularly, a ſpeech intended to have been ſpoken on the bill for altering the Charter of the Colony of Maſſachuſet's Bay; the *Conſiderations on the Meaſures carrying on with reſpect to the Britiſh Colonies*; and the *Two Appeals to the Juſtice and Intereſts of the People.*

willing to omit any topic which I think of great conſequence, merely becauſe it has already been diſcuſſed: And, with reſpect to this in particular, it will, I believe, be found that ſome of the obſervations on which I ſhall inſiſt, have not been ſufficiently attended to.

The object of this war has been often enough declared to be "maintaining the ſupremacy of this "country over the colonies." I have already enquired how far reaſon and juſtice, the principles of Liberty, and the rights of humanity, entitle us to this ſupremacy. Setting aſide, therefore, now all conſiderations of this kind, I would obſerve, that this ſupremacy is to be maintained, either merely *for its own ſake*, or for the ſake of ſome public intereſt connected with it and dependent upon it.——If *for its own ſake*; the only object of the war is the extenſion of dominion; and its only motive is the luſt of power.——All government, even *within* a ſtate, becomes tyrannical, as far as it is a needleſs and wanton exerciſe of power; or is carried farther than is abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve the peace and to ſecure the ſafety of the ſtate. This is what an excellent writer calls GOVERNING TOO MUCH; and its effect muſt always be, weakening government by rendering it contemptible and odious.—Nothing can be of more importance, in governing diſtant provinces and adjuſting the claſhing intereſts of different ſocieties, than attention to this remark. In theſe circumſtances it is *particularly* neceſſary to make a ſparing uſe of power, in order to preſerve power.——Happy would it have been for *Great Britain*, had this been remembered by thoſe who have lately conducted its affairs. But our policy has been of another kind. At the period when our authority ſhould have been moſt concealed, it has been brought moſt in view; and, by a progreſſion of violent meaſures, every one of which has increaſed diſtreſs, we have given the world reaſon to conclude, that we are acquainted with no other method of governing than *by force.*—What a ſhocking miſtake?—If our object is power, we ſhould have known better how to uſe it; and our rulers ſhould have conſidered, that freemen will always revolt at the ſight of a naked ſword; and that the complicated affairs of a great kingdom, holding in ſubordination to it a multitude of diſtant communities, all jealous of their rights, and warmed with ſpirits as high as our own, require not only the moſt ſkilful, but the moſt cautious and tender management. The conſequences of a different management we are now feeling. We ſee ourſelves driven among rocks, and in danger of being loſt.

There are the following reaſons which ſeem to make it too probable; that the preſent conteſt with

America is a conteſt for power only (*a*), abſtracted from all the advantages connected with it.

1*ſt*. There is a love of power for its own ſake inherent in human nature; and it cannot be uncharitable to ſuppoſe that the nation in general, and the cabinet in particular, are too likely to be influenced by it. What can be more flattering than to look acroſs the *Atlantic*, and to ſee in the boundleſs continent of *America*, increaſing MILLIONS, whom we have a right to order as we pleaſe, who hold their property at our diſpoſal, and who have no other law than our will. With what complacency have we been uſed to talk of them as OUR ſubjects?——Is it not the interruption they now give to this pleaſure: Is it not the oppoſition they make to our pride; and not any injury they have done us, that is the ſecret ſpring of our preſent animoſity againſt them?———I wiſh all in this kingdom would examine themſelves carefully on this point. Perhaps, they might find, that they have not known what ſpirit they are of.—Perhaps, they would become ſenſible, that it was a ſpirit of domination, more than a regard to the true intereſt of

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(*a*) I have heard it ſaid by a perſon in one of the firſt departments of the ſtate, that the preſent conteſt is for DOMINION on the ſide of the Colonies, as well as on ours: And ſo it is, indeed; but with this eſſential difference. *We* are ſtruggling for dominion over OTHERS. *They* are ſtruggling for SELF-dominion: The nobleſt of all bleſſings.

this country, that lately led ſo many of them, with ſuch ſavage folly, to addreſs the throne for the ſlaughter of their brethren in *America*, if they will not ſubmit to them; and to make offers of their lives and fortunes for that purpoſe.——Indeed, I am perſuaded, that, were pride and the luſt of dominion exterminated from every heart among us, and the humility of Chriſtians infuſed in their room, this quarrel would be ſoon ended.

2dly. Another reaſon for believing that this is a conteſt for power only is, that our miniſters have frequently declared, that their object is not to draw a revenue from *America*; and that many of thoſe who are warmeſt for continuing it, repreſent the *American trade* as of no great conſequence.

But what deſerves particular conſideration here is, that this is a conteſt from which no advantages can poſſibly be derived.——Not a revenue: For the provinces of America, when deſolated will afford no revenue; or if they ſhould, the expence of ſubduing them and keeping them in ſubjection will much exceed that revenue.——Not any of the advantages of trade: For it is a folly, next to inſanity, to think trade can be promoted by impoveriſhing our cuſtomers, and fixing in their minds an everlaſting abhorrence of us.—It remains, therefore, that this war can have no other object than the extenſion of power.——Miſerable

ſerable reflection!——To ſheath our ſwords in the bowels of our brethren, and ſpread miſery and ruin among a happy people, for no other end than to oblige them to acknowledge our ſupremacy. How horrid!—This is the curſed ambition that led a *Cæſar* and an *Alexander*, and many other mad conquerors, to attack peaceful communities, and to lay waſte the earth.

But a worſe principle than even this, influences ſome among us. Pride and the love of dominion are principles hateful enough; but blind reſentment and the deſire of revenge are infernal principles. And theſe, I am afraid, have no ſmall ſhare at preſent in guiding our public conduct.——One cannot help indeed being aſtoniſhed at the virulence, with which ſome ſpeak on the preſent occaſion againſt the Colonies.—— For, what have they done?—Have they croſſed the ocean and invaded us? Have they attempted to take from us the fruits of our labour, and to overturn that form of government which we hold ſo ſacred?—This cannot be pretended.—On the contrary. This is what we have done to them.——We have tranſported ourſelves to their peaceful retreats, and employed our fleets and armies to ſtop up their ports, to deſtroy their commerce, to ſeize their effects, and to burn their towns. Would we but let them alone, and ſuffer them to enjoy in ſecurity their property and governments, inſtead of diſturbing us, they would thank and bleſs us. And yet it is WE who imagine ourſelves ill-uſed. ———The truth is, we expected to find them a cowardly rabble who would lie quietly at our feet; and they have diſappointed us. They have riſen in their own defence, and repelled force by force. They deny the plentitude of our power over them; and inſiſt upon being treated as free communities.———It is THIS that has provoked us; and kindled our governors into rage.

I hope I ſhall not here be underſtood to intimate, that *all* who promote this war are actuated by theſe principles. Some, I doubt not, are influenced by no other principle, than a regard to what they think the juſt authority of this country over its colonies, and to the unity and indiviſibility of the Britiſh Empire. I wiſh ſuch could be engaged to enter thoroughly into the enquiry, which has been the ſubject of the firſt part of this pamphlet; and to conſider, particularly, how different a thing maintaining the authority of government *within* a ſtate is from maintaining the authority of one people over another, already happy in the enjoyment of a government of their own. I wiſh farther they would conſider, that the deſire of maintaining authority is warrantable, only as far as it is the means of promoting ſome end, and doing ſome good; and that, before we reſolve to ſpread famine and fire through a country in order to make it acknowledge our authority, we ought to be aſſured that great advantages will ariſe not only to ourſelves, but to the country we wiſh to conquer.——That from the preſent conteſt no advantage to ourſelves can ariſe, has been already ſhewn, and will preſently be ſhewn more at large.——That no advantage to the Colonies can ariſe from it, need not, I hope, be ſhewn. It has however been aſſerted, that even *their* good is intended by this war. Many of us are perſuaded, that they will be much happier under our government, than under any government of their own; and that their liberties will be ſafer when held for them by us, than when truſted in their own hands.——How kind is it thus to take upon us the trouble of judging for them what is moſt for their happineſs? Nothing can be kinder except the reſolution we have formed to exterminate them, if they will not ſubmit to our judgment.——What ſtrange language have I ſometimes heard? By an armed force we are now endeavouring to deſtroy the laws and governments of America; and yet I have heard it ſaid, that we are endeavouring to ſupport law and government there. We are inſiſting upon our right to leavy contributions upon them; and to maintain this right, we are bringing upon them all the miſeries a people can endure; and yet it is aſſerted, that we mean nothing but their ſecurity and happineſs.

But I have wandered a little from the point I intended principally to inſiſt upon in this ſection, which is, "the folly, in reſpect of policy, of the "meaſures which have brought on this conteſt; "and its pernicious and fatal tendency."

The following obſervations will, I believe, abundantly prove this.

1ſt. There are points which are likely always to ſuffer by diſcuſſion. Of this kind are moſt points of authority and prerogative; and the beſt policy is to avoid, as much as poſſible, giving any occaſion for calling them into queſtion.

The Colonies were at the beginning of this reign in the habit of acknowledging our authority, and of allowing us as much power over them as our intereſt required; and more, in ſome inſtances, than we could reaſonably claim. This habit they would have retained: and had we, inſtead of impoſing new burdens upon them, and increaſing their reſtraints, ſtudied to promote their commerce, and to grant them new indulgences, they would have been always growing more attached to us. Luxury, and, together with it, their dependence upon us, and our influence (*a*) in their aſſemblies, would have increaſed, till in time perhaps they would have become as corrupt as our-

ſelves;

(*a*) This has been our policy with reſpect to the people of *Ireland*; and the conſequence is, that we now ſee their parliament as obedient as we can wiſh.

ſelves; and we might have ſucceeded to our wiſhes in eſtabliſhing our authority over them.——But, happily for them, we have choſen a different courſe. By exertions of authority which have alarmed them, they have been put upon examining into the grounds of all our claims, and forced to give up their luxuries, and to ſeek all their reſources within themſelves: And the iſſue is likely to prove the loſs of *all* our authority over them, and of all the advantages connected with it. So little do men in power ſometimes know how to preſerve power; and ſo remarkably does the deſire of extending dominion ſometimes deſtroy it.——Mankind are naturally diſpoſed to continue in ſubjection to that mode of government, be it what it will, under which they have been born and educated. Nothing rouſes them into reſiſtance but groſs abuſes, or ſome particular oppreſſions out of the road to which they have been uſed. And he who will examine the hiſtory of the world will find, there has generally been more reaſon for complaining that they have been too patient, than that they have been turbulent and rebellious.

Our governors, ever ſince I can remember, have been jealous that the Colonies, ſome time or other, would throw off their dependence. This jealouſy was not founded on any of their acts or declarations. They have always, while at *peace* with us, diſclaimed any ſuch deſign; and they have continued to diſclaim it ſince they have been at *war* with us. I have reaſon, indeed, to believe, that independency is, even at this moment, generally dreaded among them as a calamity to which they are in danger of being driven, in order to avoid a greater.——The jealouſy I have mentioned, was, however, natural; and betrayed a ſecret opinion, that the ſubjection in which they were held was more than we could expect them always to endure. In ſuch circumſtances, all poſſible care ſhould have been taken to give them no reaſon for diſcontent; and to preſerve them in ſubjection, by keeping in that line of conduct to which cuſtom had reconciled them, or at leaſt never deviating from it, except with great caution; and particularly, by avoiding all direct attacks on their property and legiſlations. Had we done this, the different intereſts of ſo many ſtates ſcattered over a vaſt continent, joined to our own prudence and moderation, would have enabled us to maintain them in dependence for ages to come.——But inſtead of this, how have we acted?——It is in truth too evident, that our whole conduct, inſtead of being directed by that ſound policy and foreſight which in ſuch circumſtances were abſolutely neceſſary, has been nothing (to ſay the beſt of it) but a ſeries of the blindeſt rigour followed by retractation; of violence followed by conceſſion; of miſtake, weakneſs and inconſiſtency.——A recital of a few facts, within every body's recollection, will fully prove this.

In the 6th of *George the Second*, an act was paſſed for impoſing certain duties on all foreign ſpirits, molaſſes and ſugars imported into the plantations. In this act, the duties impoſed are ſaid to be GIVEN and GRANTED by the Parliament to the King; and this is the firſt *American* act in which theſe words have been uſed. But notwithſtanding this, as the act had the appearance of being only a regulation of trade, the colonies ſubmitted to it; and a ſmall direct revenue was drawn by it from them.——In the 4th of the preſent reign, many alterations were made in this act, with the declared purpoſe of making proviſion for raiſing a revenue in America. This alarmed the Colonies; and produced diſcontents and remonſtrances, which might have convinced our rulers this was tender ground, on which it became them to tread very gently.——There is, however, no reaſon to doubt but in time they would have ſunk into a quiet ſubmiſſion to this revenue act, as being at worſt only the exerciſe of a power which then they ſeem not to have thought much of conteſting; I mean, the power of taxing them EXTERNALLY.——But before they had time to cool, a worſe provocation was given them; and the STAMP-ACT was paſſed. This being an attempt to tax them INTERNALLY; and a direct attack on their property, by a power which would not ſuffer itſelf to be queſtioned; which eaſed *itſelf* by loading *them*; and to which it was impoſſible to fix any bounds; they were thrown at once, from one end of the continent to the other, into reſiſtance and rage.——Government, dreading the conſequences, gave way; and the Parliament (upon a change of miniſtry) repealed the *Stamp-Act*, without requiring from them any recognition of its authority, or doing any more to preſerve its dignity, than aſſerting, by the declaratory law, that it was poſſeſſed of full power and authority to make laws to bind them in all caſes whatever.——Upon this, peace was reſtored; and, had no farther attempts of the ſame kind been made, they would undoubtedly have ſuffered us (as the people of *Ireland* have done) to enjoy quietly our declaratory law. They would have recovered their former habits of ſubjection; and our connexion with them might have continued an increaſing ſource of our wealth and glory.——But the ſpirit of deſpotiſm and avarice, always blind and reſtleſs, ſoon broke forth again. The ſcheme for drawing a revenue from *America*, by parliamentary taxation, was reſumed; and in a little more than a year after the repeal of the *Stamp-Act*, when all was peace, a third act was paſſed, impoſing duties payable in *America* on tea, paper, glaſs, painters colours, &c.——

——This, as might have been expected, revived all the former heats; and the Empire was a ſecond time threatened with the moſt dangerous commotions.——Government receded again; and the Parliament (under another change of miniſtry) repealed all the obnoxious duties, EXCEPT that upon tea. This exception was made in order to maintain a ſhew of dignity. But it was, in reality, ſacrificing ſafety to pride; and leaving a ſplinter in the wound to produce a gangrene. ——For ſome time, however, this relaxation anſwered its intended purpoſes. Our commercial intercourſe with the Colonies was again recovered; and they avoided nothing but that tea which we had excepted in our repeal. In this ſtate would things have remained, and even tea would perhaps in time have been gradually admitted, had not the evil genius of *Britain* ſtepped forth once more to embroil the Empire.

The *Eaſt India* company having fallen under difficulties, partly in conſequence of the loſs of the *American* market for tea, a ſcheme was formed for aſſiſting them by an attempt to recover that market. With this view an act was paſſed to enable them to export their tea to *America* free of all duties here, and ſubject only to 3d. per pound duty, payable in *America*. By this expedient they were enabled to offer it at a low price; and it was expected the conſequence would prove that the

Colonies would be tempted by it; a precedent gained for taxing them, and at the ſame time the company relieved. Ships were, therefore, fitted out; and large cargoes ſent. The ſnare was too groſs to eſcape the notice of the Colonies: They ſaw it, and ſpurned at it. They refuſed to admit the tea; and at BOSTON ſome perſons in diſguiſe buried it in the ſea.——Had our governors in this caſe ſatisfied themſelves with requiring a compenſation from the province for the damage done, there is no doubt but it would have been granted. Or had they proceeded no farther in the infliction of puniſhment, than ſtopping up the port and deſtroying the trade of Boſton, till compenſation was made, the province might poſſibly have ſubmitted, and a ſufficient ſaving would have been gained for the honour of the nation. But having hitherto proceeded without wiſdom, they obſerved now no bounds in their reſentment. To the Boſton port bill was added a bill which deſtroyed the chartered government of the province; a bill which withdrew from the juriſdiction of the province, perſons who in particular caſes ſhould commit murder; and the *Quebec* bill. At the ſame time a ſtrong body of troops was ſtationed at *Boſton* to enforce obedience to theſe bills.

(*a*) All who knew any thing of the temper of the Colonies ſaw that the effect of all this ſudden accu-

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(*a*) See the Appendix.

mulation of vengeance, would probably be not intimidating but exaſperating them, and driving them into a general revolt. But our miniſters had different apprehenſions. They believed that the malecontents in the Colony of *Maſſachuſett's* were a ſmall party, headed by a few factious men; that the majority of the people would take the ſide of government, as ſoon as they ſaw a force among them capable of ſupporting them; that, at worſt, the Colonies in general would never make a common cauſe with this province; and that, the iſſue would prove, in a few months, order, tranquility and ſubmiſſion.——Every one of theſe apprehenſions was falſified by the events that followed.

When the bills I have mentioned came to be carried into execution, the whole Province was thrown into confuſion. Their courts of juſtice were ſhut up, and all government was diſſolved. The commander in chief found it neceſſary to fortify himſelf in BOSTON; and the other Colonies immediately reſolved to make a common cauſe with this Colony.

So ſtrangely miſinformed were our miniſters, that this was all a ſurpriſe upon them. They took fright, therefore; and once more made an effort to retreat; but indeed the moſt ungracious one that can well be imagined. A propoſal was ſent to the Colonies, called Conciliatory; and the ſubſtance of which was, that if any of them would raiſe ſuch ſums as ſhould be demanded of them by taxing themſelves, the Parliament would forbear to tax them.——It will be ſcarcely believed, hereafter, that ſuch a propoſal could be thought conciliatory. It was only telling them; "If "you will tax yourſelves BY OUR ORDER, we will "ſave ourſelves the trouble of taxing you."——They received the propoſal as an inſult; and rejected it with diſdain.

At the time this conceſſion was tranſmitted to *America*, open hoſtilities were not begun. In the ſword our miniſters thought they had ſtill a reſource which would immediately ſettle all diſputes. They conſidered the people of *New-England* as nothing but a mob, who would be ſoon routed and forced into obedience. It was even believed, that a few thouſands of our army might march through all *America*, and make all quiet whereever they went. Under this conviction our miniſters did not dread urging the Province of *Maſſachuſett's Bay* into rebellion, by ordering the army to ſeize their ſtores, and to take up ſome of their leading men.——The attempt was made.——The people fled immediately to arms, and repelled the attack.——A conſiderable part of the flower of the Britiſh army has been deſtroyed.——Some of our beſt Generals, and the braveſt of our troops, are now diſgracefully and miſerably impriſoned at *Boſton.*——A horrid civil war is commenced;——And the Empire is diſtracted and convulſed.

Can it be poſſible to think with patience of the policy that has brought us into theſe circumſtances? Did ever Heaven puniſh the vices of a people more ſeverely by darkening their counſels? How great would be our happineſs could we now recal former times, and return to the policy of the laſt reigns?—But thoſe times are gone.——I will, however, beg leave for a few moments to look back to them; and to compare the ground we have left with that on which we find ourſelves. This muſt be done with deep regret; but it forms a neceſſary part of my preſent deſign.

In thoſe times our Colonies, foregoing every advantage which they might derive from trading with foreign nations, conſented to ſend only to us whatever it was for our intereſt to receive from them; and to receive only from us whatever it was for our intereſt to ſend to them. They gave up the power of making ſumptuary laws, and expoſed themſelves to all the evils of an increaſing and waſteful luxury, becauſe we were benefited by vending among them the materials of it. The iron with which providence had bleſſed their country, they were required by laws, in which they acquieſced, to tranſport hither, that our people might be maintained by working it for them into nails, ploughs, axes, &c. And, in ſeveral inſtances, even one Colony was not allowed to ſupply any neighbouring Colonies with commodities, which could be conveyed to them from hence.——But they yielded much farther. They conſented that we ſhould have the appointment of one branch of their legiſlature. By recognizing as their King, a King reſident among us and under our influence, they gave us a negative on all their laws. By allowing an appeal to us in their civil diſputes, they gave us likewiſe the ultimate determination of all civil cauſes among them. ——In ſhort. They allowed us every power we could deſire, except that of taxing them, and interfering in their internal legiſlations: And they had admitted precedents which, even in theſe inſtances, gave us no inconſiderable authority over them. By purchaſing our goods they paid our taxes; and, by allowing us to regulate their trade in any manner we thought moſt for our advantage, they enriched our merchants, and helped us to bear our growing burdens. They fought our battles with us. They gloried in their relation to us. All their gains centered among us; and they always ſpoke of this country and looked to it as their home.

Such WAS the ſtate of things.——What is it now?

Not contented with a degree of power, ſufficient to ſatisfy any reaſonable ambition, we have attempted to extend it.——Not contented with drawing from them a large revenue *indirectly*, we have endeavoured to procure one *directly* by an authoritative ſeizure; and, in order to gain a pepper-corn in this way, have choſen to hazard millions, acquired by the peaceable intercourſe of trade.——Vile policy! What a ſcourge is government ſo conducted? ——Had we never deſerted our old ground: Had we nouriſhed and favoured *America*, with a view to commerce, inſtead of conſidering it as a country to be governed: Had we, like a liberal and wiſe people, rejoiced to ſee a multitude of free ſtates branched forth from ourſelves, all enjoying independent legiſlatures ſimilar to our own: Had we aimed at binding them to us only by the tyes of affection and intereſt; and contented ourſelves with a moderate power rendered durable by being lenient and friendly, an umpire in their differences, an aid to them in improving their own free governments, and their common bulwark againſt the aſſaults of foreign enemies: Had this, I ſay, been our policy and temper; there is nothing ſo great or happy that we might not have expected. With their increaſe our ſtrength would have increaſed. A growing ſurplus in the revenue might have been gained, which, invariably applied to the gradual diſcharge of the national debt, would have delivered us from the ruin with which it threatens us.

The Liberty of *America* might have preſerved our Liberty; and, under the direction of a patriot king or wiſe miniſter, proved the means of reſtoring to us our almoſt loſt conſtitution. Perhaps, in time, we might alſo have been brought to ſee the neceſſity of carefully watching and reſtricting our paper-credit: And thus we might have regained ſafety; and, in union with our Colonies, have been more than a match for every enemy, and riſen to a ſituation of honour and dignity never before known amongſt mankind.—— But I am forgetting myſelf.——Our Colonies are likely to be loſt for ever. Their love is turned into hatred; and their reſpect for our government into reſentment and abhorrence.——We ſhall ſee more diſtinctly what a calamity this is, and the obſervations I have now made will be confirmed, by attending to the following facts.

Our American Colonies, particularly the Northern ones, have been for ſome time in the very happieſt ſtate of ſociety; or, in that middle ſtate of civilization, between its firſt rude and its laſt refined and corrupt ſtate. Old countries conſiſt, generally, of three claſſes of people; a GENTRY; a YEOMANRY; and a PEASANTRY. The Colonies conſiſt only of a body of YEOMANRY (*a*) ſupported by

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(*a*) Excepting the *Negroes* in the Southern Colonies, who probably will now either ſoon become extinct, or have their condition by agriculture, and all independent, and nearly upon a level; in conſequence of which, joined to a boundleſs extent of country, the means of ſubſiſtence are procured without difficulty, and the temptations to wickedneſs are ſo inconſiderable, that executions (*b*) are ſeldom known among them. From hence ariſes an encouragement to population ſo great, that in ſome of the Colonies they double their own number in fifteen years; in others, in eighteen years; and in all, taken one with another, in twenty-five years.——Such an increaſe was, I believe, never before known. It demonſtrates that they muſt live at their eaſe; and be free from thoſe cares, oppreſſions, and diſeaſes which depopulate and ravage luxurious ſtates.

With the population of the Colonies has increaſed their trade; but much faſter, on account of the gradual introduction of luxury among them.——In 1723 the exports to *Penſylvania* were 16,000 l.—In 1742 they were 75,295 l.——In 1757 they

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condition changed into that of *Freemen*.——It is not the fault of the Colonies that they have among them ſo many of theſe unhappy people. They have made laws to prohibit the importation of them; but theſe laws have always had a negative put upon them here, becauſe of their tendency to hurt our Negro trade.

(*b*) In the Province of Maſſachuſett's Bay there has not been, I am informed, more than one execution theſe 18 years.

were increaſed to 268,426 l. and in 1773 to half a million.

The exports to all the Colonies in 1744 were 640,114 l.——In 1758, they were increaſed to 1,832,948 l. and in 1773, to three millions. (*a*) And the probability is, that, had it not been for the diſcontents among the Colonies ſince the year 1764, our trade with them would have been this year double to what it was in 1773; and that in a few years more, it would not have been poſſible for the whole kingdom, though conſiſting only of manufacturers, to ſupply the American demand.

This trade, it ſhould be conſidered, was not only thus an increaſing trade; but it was a trade in which we had no rivals; a trade certain, conſtant, and uninterrupted; and which, by the ſhipping employed in it, and the naval ſtores ſupplied by it, contributed greatly to the ſupport of that navy which is our chief national ſtrength.——Viewed in theſe lights it was an object unſpeakably important. But it will appear ſtill more ſo if we view it in its connexions and dependencies. It is well known, that our trade with *Africa* and the *Weſt-Indies* cannot eaſily ſubſiſt without it. And, upon the whole, it is undeniable, that it has been one of the

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(*a*) Mr. Burke (in his excellent and admirable Speech on moving his reſolutions for conciliation with the Colonies, P. 9, &c.) has ſhewn, that our trade to the Colonies, including that to *Africa* and the *Weſt-Indies*, was in 1772 nearly equal to the trade which we carried on with the whole world at the beginning of this Century.

main ſprings of our opulence and ſplendour; and that we have, in a great meaſure, been indebted to it for our ability to bear a debt ſo much heavier, than that which, fifty years ago, the wiſeſt men thought would neceſſarily ſink us.

This ineſtimable prize, and all the advantages connected with *America*, we are now throwing away. Experience alone can ſhew what calamities muſt follow. It will indeed be aſtoniſhing if this kingdom can bear ſuch a loſs without dreadful conſequences.——Theſe conſequences have been amply repreſented by others; and it is needleſs to enter into any account of them——At the time we ſhall be feeling them——The Empire diſmembered; the blood of thouſands ſhed in an unrighteous quarrel; our ſtrength exhauſted; our merchants breaking; our manufacturers ſtarving; our debts increaſing; the revenue ſinking; the funds tottering; and all the miſeries of a public bankruptcy impending——At ſuch a *criſis* ſhould our natural enemies, eager for our ruin, ſeize the opportunity——The apprehenſion is too diſtreſſing. ——Let us view this ſubject in another light.

On this occaſion, particular attention ſhould be given to the preſent SINGULAR ſituation of this kingdom. This is a circumſtance of the utmoſt importance; and as I am afraid it is not much conſidered, I will beg leave to give a diſtinct account of it.

At the REVOLUTION, the *ſpecie* of the kingdom amounted, according to *(a) Davenant*'s account, to eighteen millions and a half.——From the ACCESSION to the year 1772, there were coined at the mint, near 29 millions of gold; and in ten years only of this time, or from January 1759 to January 1769, there were coined eight millions and a half. (*b*) But it has appeared lately, that the gold ſpecie now left in the kingdom is no more than about twelve millions and a half.——Not ſo much as half a million of *Silver ſpecie* has been coined theſe ſixty years; and it cannot be ſuppoſed, that the quantity of it now in circulation exceeds two or three millions. The whole ſpecie of the kingdom, therefore, is probably at this time about (*c*) fourteen or fifteen millions. Of this ſeveral millions muſt be hoarded at the *Bank*.——Our circulating *ſpecie*, therefore, appears to be greatly decreaſed. But our wealth, or the quantity of money in the kingdom, is greatly increaſed. This is paper to a vaſt amount, iſſued in almoſt every corner of the kingdom; and, particularly, by the BANK OF ENGLAND. While this paper maintains its credit

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(*a*) See Dr. Davenant's works, collected and reviſed by Sir Charles Whitworth, Vol. I. Page 363, &c. 443, &c.

(*b*) See Conſiderations on Money, Bullion, &c. Page 2 and 11.

(*c*) Or nearly the ſame that it was in *Cromwell's* time. See Dr. Davenant's works, Vol. I. Page 365.

it anſwers all the purpoſes of ſpecie, and is in all reſpects the ſame with money.

Specie repreſents ſome real value in goods or commodities. On the contrary; paper repreſents immediately nothing but ſpecie. It is a promiſe or obligation, which the emitter brings himſelf under to pay a given ſum in coin; and it owes its currency to the credit of the emitter; or to an opinion that he is able to make good his engagement; and that the ſum ſpecified may be received upon being demanded.—Paper, therefore, repreſents coin; and coin repreſents real value. That is, the one is a *ſign* of wealth. The other is the *ſign* of that *ſign*.——But farther. Coin is an *univerſal* ſign of wealth, and will procure it every where. It will bear any alarm, and ſtand any ſhock.——On the contrary. Paper, owing its currency to opinion, has only a local and imaginary value. It can ſtand no ſhock. It is deſtroyed by the approach of danger; or even the *ſuſpicion* of danger.

In ſhort. Coin is the baſis of our paper-credit; and were it either all deſtroyed, or were only the quantity of it reduced beyond a certain limit, the paper circulation of the kingdom would ſink at once. But, were our paper deſtroyed, the coin would not only remain, but riſe in value, in proportion to the quantity of paper deſtroyed.

From this account it follows, that as far as, in any circumſtances, ſpecie is not to be procured in exchange for paper, it repreſents *nothing*, and is worth *nothing*.——The ſpecie of this kingdom is inconſiderable, compared with the amount of the paper circulating in it. This is generally believed; and, therefore, it is natural to enquire how its currency is ſupported.——The anſwer is eaſy. It is ſupported in the ſame manner with all other bubbles. Were all to demand ſpecie in exchange for their notes, payment could not be made; but, at the ſame time that this is known, every one truſts, that no alarm producing ſuch a demand will happen, while he holds the paper he is poſſeſſed of; and that if it ſhould happen, he will ſtand a chance for being firſt paid; and this makes him eaſy. And it alſo makes all with whom he traffics eaſy. —But let any events happen which threaten danger; and every one will become diffident. A run will take place; and a bankruptcy follow.

This is an account of what *has* often happened in *private* credit. And it is alſo an account of what *will* (if no change of meaſures takes place) happen ſome time or other in *public* credit. The deſcription I have given of our paper-circulation implies, that nothing can be more delicate or hazardous. It is an immenſe fabrick, with its head in the clouds, that is continually trembling with every adverſe blaſt and every fluctuation of trade;

and which, like the baſeleſs fabrick of a viſion, may in a moment vaniſh, and leave no wreck behind.——The deſtruction of a few books at the *Bank*; an improvement in the art of forgery; the landing of a body of *French* troops on our coaſts; inſurrections threatening a revolution in government; or any events that ſhould produce a general panic, however groundleſs, would at once annihilate it, and leave us without any other medium of traffic, than a quantity of *ſpecie* ſcarcely equal in amount to the money now drawn from the public by the taxes. It would, therefore, become impoſſible to pay the taxes. The revenue would fail. Near a hundred and forty millions of property would be deſtroyed. The whole frame of government would fall to pieces; and a ſtate of nature would take place.——What a dreadful ſituation? It has never had a parallel among mankind, except at one time in *France* after the eſtabliſhment there of the Royal *Miſſiſſippi* Bank. In 1720 this bank broke; (*a*) and, after involving for ſome time the whole kingdom in a golden dream, ſpread through it in one day, deſolation and ruin.——The diſtreſs attending ſuch an event, in this free country, would be greater than it was in *France*. Happily for that kingdom, they have ſhot this gulph. Paper-credit has never ſince recovered itſelf

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(*a*) See Sir James Steuart's Enquiry into the Principles of political Oeconomy, Vol. II. Book 4, Chap. 32.

ſelf there; and their circulating caſh conſiſts now all of ſolid coin, amounting, I am informed, to no leſs a ſum than 1500 millions of *Livres*; or near 67 millions of pounds ſterling. This gives them unſpeakable advantages; and, joined to that quick reduction of their debts which is inſeparable (*a*) from their nature, places them on a ground of ſafety which we have reaſon to admire and envy.

Theſe are ſubjects on which I ſhould have choſen to be ſilent, did I not think it neceſſary, that this country ſhould be apprized and warned of the danger which threatens it. This danger is created chiefly by the national debt. High taxes are neceſſary to ſupport a great public debt; and a large ſupply of caſh is neceſſary to ſupport high taxes. This caſh we owe to our paper; and, in proportion to our paper, muſt be the productiveneſs of our taxes.——King William's wars drained the

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(*a*) Their debts conſiſt chiefly of money raiſed by annuities on lives, ſhort annuities, anticipations of taxes for ſhort terms, &c. During the whole laſt war they added to their *perpetual* annuities only 12 millions ſterling, according to Sir James Steuart's account; whereas we added to theſe annuities near 60 millions. In conſequence therefore of the nature of their debts, as well as of the management they are now uſing for haſtening the reduction of them, they muſt in a few years, if peace continues, be freed from moſt of their incumbrances; while we probably (if no event comes ſoon that will unburthen us at once) ſhall continue with them all upon us.

kingdom of its ſpecie. This ſunk the revenue, and diſtreſſed government. In 1694 the BANK was eſtabliſhed; and the kingdom was provided with a ſubſtitute for ſpecie. The taxes became again productive. The revenue roſe; and government was relieved.——Ever ſince that period our paper and taxes have been increaſing together, and ſupporting one another; and one reaſon, undoubtedly, of the late increaſe in the productiveneſs of our taxes has been the increaſe of our paper.

Was there no public debt, there would be no occaſion for half the preſent taxes. Our paper-circulation might be reduced. The balance of trade would turn in our favour. Specie would flow in upon us. The quantity of property deſtroyed by a failure of paper-credit (ſhould it in ſuch circumſtances happen) would be 140 millions leſs; and, therefore, the ſhock attending it would be *tolerable.* But, in the preſent ſtate of things, whenever any calamity or panic ſhall produce ſuch a failure, the ſhock attending it will be *intolerable.*——May heaven ſoon raiſe up for us ſome great ſtateſman who ſhall ſee theſe things; and enter into effectual meaſures, if not now too late, for extricating and preſerving us.

Public banks are, undoubtedly, attended with great conveniencies. But they alſo do great harm; and, if their emiſſions are not reſtrained, and conducted with great wiſdom, they may prove the moſt pernicious of all inſtitutions; not only, by ſubſtituting *fictitious* for *real* wealth; by increaſing luxury; by raiſing the prices of proviſions; by concealing an unfavourable balance of trade; and by rendering a kingdom incapable of bearing any *internal* tumults or *external* attacks, without the danger of a dreadful convulſion: But, particularly, by becoming inſtruments in the hands of miniſters of ſtate to increaſe their influence, to leſſen their dependence on the people, and to keep up a deluſive ſhew of public proſperity, when perhaps, ruin may be near. There is, in truth, nothing that a government may not do with ſuch a mine at its command as a public Bank, while it can maintain its credit; nor, therefore, is there any thing more likely to be IMPROPERLY and DANGEROUSLY uſed.——But to return to what may be more applicable to our own ſtate at preſent.

Among the cauſes that may produce a failure of paper-credit, there are two which the preſent quarrel with *America* calls upon us particularly to conſider.——The firſt is, "An unfavourable balance of trade." This, in proportion to the degree in which it takes place, muſt turn the courſe of foreign exchange againſt us; raiſe the price of bullion; and carry off our ſpecie. The danger to which this would expoſe us is obvious; and it has

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been much increaſed by the new coinage of the gold ſpecie which begun in 1772. Before this coinage, the greateſt part of our gold coin being light, but the ſame in currency as if it had been heavy, always remained in the kingdom. But, being now full weight, whenever a wrong balance of foreign trade alters the courſe of exchange, and gold in *coin* becomes of leſs value than in *bullion*, there is reaſon to fear, that it will be melted down in ſuch great quantities, and exported ſo faſt, as in a little time to leave none behind; (*a*) the conſequence of which muſt prove, that the whole ſuper-

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(*a*) Mr. *Lowndes* in the diſpute between him and Mr. *Locke*, contended for a reduction of the ſtandard of ſilver. One of his reaſons was, that it would render the ſilver-coin more commenſurate to the wants of the nation; and CHECK HAZARDOUS PAPER-CREDIT.—Mr. CONDUIT, Sir ISAAC NEWTON's ſucceſſor in the mint, has propoſed, in direct contradiction to the laws now in being, that all the bullion imported into the kingdom ſhould be carried into the mint to be coined; and only coin allowed to be exported. "The height, he ſays, of Paper-credit is the ſtrongeſt argument for trying this and *every other* method that is likely to increaſe the coinage. For whilſt Paper-credit does in a great meaſure the buſineſs of money at home, Merchants and Bankers are not under a neceſſity, as they were formerly, of coining a quantity of ſpecie for their home trade; and as Paper-credit brings money to the Merchants to be exported, the money may go away inſenſibly, and NOT BE MISSED TILL IT BE TOO LATE: And where Paper-credit is large and increaſing, if the money be exported and the coinage decreaſe, THAT CREDIT MAY SINK AT ONCE; for want of a proportionable quanſuperſtructure of paper-credit, now ſupported by it, will break down.——The only remedy, in ſuch circumſtances, is an increaſe of coinage at the mint. But this will operate too ſlowly; and, by raiſing the price of bullion, will only increaſe the evil.—It is the *Bank* that at ſuch a time muſt be the immediate ſufferer: For it is from thence that thoſe who want coin for any purpoſe will always draw it.

For many years before 1772, the price of gold in *bullion* had been, from 2 to 3 or 4 *per cent.* higher than in *coin*. This was a temptation to melt down and export the coin, which could not be reſiſted. Hence aroſe a demand for it on the BANK; and, conſequently, the neceſſity of purchaſing bullion at a loſs for a new coinage. But the more coin the Bank procured in this way, the lower its price became in compariſon with that of bullion, and the faſter it vaniſhed; and, conſequently, the more neceſſary it became to coin again, and the greater loſs fell upon the Bank.—— Had things continued much longer in this train, the conſequences might have proved very ſerious. I am by no means ſufficiently informed to be able to aſſign the cauſes which have produced the change that happened in 1772. But, without doubt, the ſtate of things that took place before that year muſt be expected

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"tity of *Specie*, which alone can ſupport it in a time of diſ-" treſs."——See Mr. *Conduit's* Obſervations on the ſtate of our Gold and Silver Coins in 1730, Page 36 to 46.

to return. The fluctuations of trade, in its beſt ſtate, render this unavoidable. But the conteſt with our Colonies has a tendency to bring it on ſoon; and to increaſe unſpeakably the diſtreſs attending it.

All know that the balance of trade with them is greatly in our favour; (*a*) and that this balance is paid partly by direct remittances of bullion; and partly by circuitous remittances through *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Italy*, &c. which diminiſh the balance againſt us with theſe countries.——During the laſt year they have been employed in paying their debts, without adding to them; and their exportations and remittances for that purpoſe have contributed to render the general balance of trade more favourable to us, and, alſo, (in conjunction with the late operations of the Bank) to keep up our funds. Theſe remittances are now ceaſed; and a year or two will determine, if this conteſt goes on, how far we can ſuſtain ſuch a loſs without ſuffering the conſequences I have deſcribed.

The ſecond event, ruinous to our paper-circulation, which may ariſe from our rupture with *America*, is a deficiency in the revenue. As a failure of our paper would deſtroy the revenue, ſo a

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(*a*) According to the accounts of the exports to, and imports from the North-American Colonies, laid before Parliament; the balance in our favour appears to have been, for 11 years before 1774, near a *million and a half* annually.

failure of the revenue, or any conſiderable diminution of it, would deſtroy our paper. The BANK is the ſupport of our paper; and the ſupport of the BANK is the credit of government. Its principal ſecurities, are a capital of near eleven millions lent to government; and money continually advanced to a vaſt amount on the Land-tax, Sinking fund, Exchequer Bills, Navy Bills, &c. Should, therefore, deficiencies in the revenue bring government under any difficulties, all theſe ſecurities would loſe their value, and the *Bank* and Government, and all private and public credit, would fall together.—— Let any one here imagine, what would probably follow, were it but ſuſpected by the public in general, that the taxes were ſo fallen, as not to produce enough to pay the intereſt of the public debts, beſides bearing the *ordinary* expences of the nation; and that, in order to ſupply the deficiency and to hide the calamity, it had been neceſſary in any one year to anticipate the taxes, and to borrow of the Bank.——In ſuch circumſtances I can ſcarcely doubt, but an alarm would ſpread of the moſt dangerous tendency.——The next foreign war, ſhould it prove *half* as expenſive as the laſt, will probably occaſion ſuch a deficiency; and bring our affairs to that criſis towards which they have been long tending.——But the war with *America* has a greater tendency to do this; and the reaſon is, that it affects our reſources more; and is attended more with the danger of internal diſturbances.

Some have made the proportion of our trade depending on *North America* to be near ONE HALF. A moderate computation makes it a THIRD. (*a*) Let it, however, be ſuppoſed to be only a FOURTH. I will venture to ſay, this is a proportion of our foreign trade, the loſs of which, when it comes to be felt, will be found inſupportable.——In the article of *Tobacco* alone it will cauſe a deduction from the *Cuſtoms* of at leaſt 300,000 *l. per ann.* (*b*) including the duties paid on foreign commodities purchaſed by the exportation of tobacco. Let the whole deduction from the revenue be ſuppoſed to be only half a million. This alone is more than the kingdom can at preſent bear, without having recourſe

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(*a*) See the ſubſtance of the evidence on the petition preſented by the *Weſt-India* Planters and Merchants to the Houſe of Commons, as it was introduced at the BAR, and ſummed up by Mr. GLOVER.

(*b*) The annual average of the payments into the Exchequer, on account of the duties on tobacco, was for five years, from 1770 to 1774, 219,117 l. excluſive of the payments from *Scotland*.——Near one half of the *tobacco* trade is carried on from *Scotland*; and above *four fifths* of the tobacco imported is afterwards exported to *France*, *Germany* and other countries. From *France* alone it brings annually into the Kingdom, I am informed, about 150,000 l. in money.

In 1775, being, alas! the *parting* year, the duties on tobacco in ENGLAND brought into the *Exchequer* no leſs a ſum than 298,202 l.

to additional taxes in order to defray the common and neceſſary expences of peace. But to this muſt be added a deduction from the produce of the *Exciſes*, in conſequence of the increaſe of the poor, of the difficulties of our merchants and manufacturers, of leſs national wealth, and a retrenchment of luxury. There is no poſſibility of knowing to what theſe deductions may amount. When the evils producing them begin, they will proceed rapidly; and they may end in a general wreck before we are aware of any danger.

In order to give a clearer view of this ſubject, I will in an Appendix, ſtate particularly the national expenditure and income for ten years, from 1764 to 1774. From that account it will appear, that the money drawn every year from the public by the taxes, falls but little ſhort of a ſum equal to the whole *ſpecie* of the kingdom; and that, notwithſtanding the late increaſe in the productiveneſs of the taxes, the whole ſurplus of the national income has not exceeded 320,000 l. *per ann.* This is a ſurplus ſo inconſiderable as to be ſcarcely ſufficient to guard againſt the deficiencies ariſing from the common fluctuations of foreign trade, and of home conſumption. It is NOTHING when conſidered as the only fund we have for paying off a debt of near 140 millions.——Had we continued in a ſtate of profound peace, it could not have admitted of any diminution. What then muſt follow, when one of the moſt profitable branches of our trade is deſtroyed; when a THIRD of the Empire is loſt; when an addition of many millions is made to the public debt; and when, at the ſame time, perhaps, ſome millions are taken away from the revenue? ——I ſhudder at this proſpect.——A KINGDOM, ON AN EDGE SO PERILOUS, SHOULD THINK OF NOTHING BUT A RETREAT.

SECT. IV.

Of the Honour of the Nation as affected by the War with America.

ONE of the pleas for continuing the conteſt with *America* is, "That our honour is engaged; and that we cannot now recede without the moſt humiliating conceſſions."

With reſpect to this, it is proper to obſerve, that a diſtinction ſhould be made between the nation, and its rulers. It is melancholy that there ſhould be ever any reaſon for making ſuch a diſtinction. A government is, or ought to be, nothing but an inſtitution for collecting and for carrying into execution the will of the people. But ſo far is this from being in general the fact, that the meaſures of government, and the ſenſe of the people, are ſometimes in direct oppoſition to one another; nor does it *often* happen that any certain concluſion can be drawn from the one to the other.——I will not pretend to determine, whether, in the preſent inſtance, the diſhonour attending a retreat would belong to the nation at large, or only to the perſons in power who guide its affairs. Let it be granted, though probably far from true, that the majority of the kingdom favour the preſent meaſures. No good argument could be drawn from hence againſt receding. The diſgrace to which a kingdom muſt ſubmit by making conceſſions, is nothing to that of being the aggreſſors in an unrighteous quarrel; and dignity, in ſuch circumſtances, conſiſts in retracting freely, ſpeedily, and magnanimouſly.——For, (to adopt, on this occaſion, words which I have heard applied to this very purpoſe, in a great aſſembly, by a peer to whom this kingdom has often looked as its deliverer, and whoſe ill ſtate of health at this awful moment of public danger every friend to *Britain* muſt deplore) to adopt, I ſay, the words of this great man——"RECTITUDE IS DIGNITY. OPPRESSION ONLY IS MEANNESS; AND JUSTICE, HONOUR."

I will add, that PRUDENCE, no leſs than true HONOUR, requires us to retract. For the time may come when, if it is not done voluntarily, we may be *obliged* to do it; and find ourſelves under a neceſſity of granting that to our diſtreſſes, which we now deny to equity and humanity, and the prayers of *America*. The poſſibility of this appears plainly from the preceding pages; and ſhould it happen, it will bring upon us diſgrace indeed, diſgrace greater than the worſt rancour can wiſh to ſee accumulated on a kingdom already too much diſhonoured.——Let the reader think here what we are doing.——A nation, once the protector of Liberty in diſtant countries, and the ſcourge of tyranny, changed into an enemy to Liberty, and engaged in endeavouring to reduce to ſervitude its own brethren.——A great and enlightened nation, not content with a controuling power over millions of people which gave it every reaſonable advantage, inſiſting upon ſuch a ſupremacy over them as would leave them nothing they could call their own, and carrying deſolation and death among them for diſputing it. ——What can be more ignominious?——How have we felt for the brave *Corſicans*, in their ſtruggle with the *Genoeſe*, and afterwards with the *French* government? Did GENOA or FRANCE want more than an abſolute command over their property and legiſlations; or the power of binding them in all caſes whatſoever?——The *Corſicans* had been ſubject to the *Genoeſe*; but, finding it difficult to keep them in ſubjection, they CEDED them to the *French*.——All ſuch ceſſions of one people by another are diſgraceful to human nature. But if our claims are juſt, may not we alſo, if we pleaſe, CEDE the Colonies to *France*?

——There is, in truth, no other difference between theſe two caſes than that the *Corſicans* were not deſcended from the people who governed them, but that the *Americans* are.

There are ſome who ſeem to be ſenſible, that the authority of one country over another, cannot be diſtinguiſhed from the ſervitude of one country to another; and that unleſs different communities, as well as different parts of the ſame community, are united by an equal repreſentation, all ſuch authority is inconſiſtent with the principles of Civil Liberty. But they except the caſe of the Colonies and *Great Britain*; becauſe the Colonies are communities which have branched forth from, and which, therefore, as they think, belong to *Britain*. Had the colonies been communities of *foreigners*, over whom we wanted to acquire dominion, or even to extend a dominion before acquired, they are ready to admit that their reſiſtance would have been juſt.——In my opinion, this is the ſame with ſaying, that the Colonies ought to be worſe off than the reſt of mankind, becauſe they are our own *Brethren*.

Again. The United Provinces of *Holland* were once ſubject to the *Spaniſh* monarchy; but, provoked by the violation of their charters; by levies of money, without their conſent; by the introduction of Spaniſh troops among them; by innovations in their antient modes of government; and the rejection of their petitions, they were driven to that reſiſtance which we and all the world have ever ſince admired; and which has given birth to one of the greateſt and happieſt Republics that ever exiſted.———Let any one read alſo, the hiſtory of the war which the *Athenians*, from a thirſt of Empire, made on the *Syracuſans* in *Sicily*, a people derived from the ſame origin with them; and let him, if he can, avoid rejoicing in the defeat of the *Athenians*.

Let him, likewiſe, read the account of the ſocial war among the Romans. The allied ſtates of *Italy* had fought the battles of *Rome*, and contributed by their valour and treaſure to its conqueſts and grandeur. They claimed, therefore, the rights of Roman citizens, and a ſhare with them in legiſlation. The Romans, diſdaining to make thoſe their *fellow-citizens*, whom they had always looked upon as their *ſubjects*, would not comply; and a war followed, the moſt horrible in the annals of mankind, which ended in the ruin of the Roman Republic. The feelings of every *Briton* in this caſe muſt force him to approve the conduct of the Allies, and to condemn the proud and ungrateful Romans.

But not only is the preſent conteſt with *America* thus diſgraceful to us, becauſe inconſiſtent with our own feelings in ſimilar caſes; but alſo becauſe condemned by our own practice in former, times,

times. The Colonies are perſuaded that they are fighting for Liberty. We ſee them ſacrificing to this perſuaſion every private advantage. If miſtaken, and though guilty of irregularities, they ſhould be pardoned by a people whoſe anceſtors have given them ſo many examples of ſimilar conduct. **England** ſhould venerate the attachment to Liberty amidſt all its exceſſes; and, inſtead of indignation or ſcorn, it would be moſt becoming them, in the preſent inſtance, to declare their applauſe, and to ſay to the Colonies——"We excuſe your miſtakes. We admire your ſpirit. "It is the ſpirit that has more than once ſaved "*ourſelves.* We aſpire to no dominion over you. "We underſtand the rights of men too well to "think of taking from you the ineſtimable pri"vilege of governing yourſelves; and, inſtead of "employing our power for any ſuch purpoſe, "we offer it to you as a friendly and guardian "power, to be a mediator in your quarrels; a "protection againſt your enemies; and an aid "to you in eſtabliſhing a plan of Liberty that ſhall "make you great and happy. In return, we "aſk nothing but your gratitude and your com"merce."

This would be a language worthy of a brave and enlightened nation. But alas! it often happens in the *Political World* as it does in *Religion*, that the people who cry out moſt vehemently for

Liberty to themſelves are the moſt unwilling to grant it to others.

One of the moſt violent enemies of the Colonies has pronounced them "all Mr. Locke's diſci-"ples."——Glorious title!——How ſhameful is it to make war againſt them for that reaſon?

But farther. This war is diſgraceful on account of the perſuaſion which led to it, and under which it has been undertaken. The general cry was laſt winter, that the people of New-England were a body of cowards, who would at once be tumbled into ſubmiſſion by a hoſtile look from our troops. In this light were they held up to public deriſion in both Houſes of Parliament; and it was this perſuaſion that, probably, induced a Nobleman of the firſt weight in the ſtate to recommend, at the paſſing of the *Boſton Port Bill*, coercive meaſures; hinting at the ſame time, that the *appearance* of hoſtilities would be ſufficient, and that all would be ſoon over, sine clade.——Indeed no one can doubt, but that had it been believed ſome time ago, that the people of *America* were brave, more care would have been taken not to provoke them.

Again. The manner in which this war has been hitherto conducted, renders it ſtill more diſgraceful.——Engliſh valour being thought inſufficient to ſubue the Colonies, the laws and religion of *France* were eſtabliſhed in *Canada*, on purpoſe to obtain the power of bringing upon them from thence an army of *French Papiſts.* The wild *Indians* and their own Slaves have been inſtigated to attack them; and attempts have been made to gain the aſſiſtance of a large body of *Ruſſians.*—— With like views, *German* troops have been hired; and the defence of our Forts and Garriſons truſted in their hands.

These are meaſures which need no comment. The laſt of them, in particular, having been carried into execution without the conſent of parliament, threatens us with imminent danger; and ſhews that we are in the way to loſe even the *Forms* of the conſtitution. —— If, indeed, our miniſters can at any time, without leave, not only ſend away the national troops, but introduce *foreign* troops in their room, we lie entirely at mercy; and we have every thing to dread.

SECT. V.

Of the Probability of Succeeding in the War with America.

LET us next conſider how far there is a poſſibility of ſucceeding in the preſent war.

Our own people, being unwilling to enliſt, and the attempts to procure armies of *Ruſſians*, *Indians*, and *Canadians* having miſcarried; the utmoſt force we can employ, including foreigners, does not exceed,

ceed, if I am rightly informed, 30,000 effective men. Let it, however, be called 40,000. This is the force that is to conquer half a million *at leaſt* (a) of determined men fighting on their own ground, within ſight of their houſes and families, and for that ſacred bleſſing of Liberty, without which man is a beaſt, and government a curſe. All hiſtory proves, that in ſuch a ſituation, a handful is a match for millions.

In the *Netherlands*, a few ſtates thus circumſtanced, withſtood, *for* thirty years, the whole force of the Spaniſh monarchy, when at its zenith; and at laſt humbled its pride, and emancipated themſelves from its tyranny.——The citizens of SYRACUSE alſo, thus circumſtanced, withſtood the whole power of the *Athenians*, and almoſt ruined them.——The ſame happened in the conteſt between the houſe of *Auſtria*, and the cantons (b) of *Switzerland*.——There is in this caſe an infinite difference between attacking and being attacked; between fighting to *deſtroy*, and fighting to *preſerve*, or *acquire* Liberty.——Were we, therefore, capable of employing a *land* force againſt *America* equal to its own, there would be little probability of ſucceſs. But to think of conquering that whole continent with 30,000 or 40,000 men to be tranſported acroſs the *Atlantic*, and fed from hence, and incapable of being recruited after any defeat ——This is indeed a folly ſo great, that language does not afford a name for it.

(a) A quarter of the inhabitants of every country are fighting men.——If, therefore, the Colonies conſiſt only of two millions of inhabitants, the number of fighting men in them will be half a million.

(b) See the Appendix to Dr. Zubly's Sermon, preached at the opening of the Provincial Congreſs of *Georgia*.

With reſpect to our naval force, could it ſail at land as it does at ſea, much might be done with it; but as that is impoſſible, *little* or *nothing* can be done with it, which will not hurt *ourſelves* more than the *Coloniſts*.——Such of their maritime towns as they cannot guard againſt our fleets, and have not been already deſtroyed, they are determined either to give up to our reſentment, or (*a*) deſtroy themſelves: The conſequence of which will be, that theſe towns will be rebuilt in ſafer ſituations; and that we ſhall loſe ſome of the principal pledges by which we have hitherto held them in ſubjection.——As to their trade; having all the neceſſaries and the chief conveniencies of life within themſelves, they have no dependence upon it; and the loſs of it will do them unſpeakable good, by preſerving them from the evils of luxury and the temptations of wealth; and keeping them in that ſtate of virtuous ſimplicity which is the greateſt happineſs. I know that I am now ſpeaking

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(*a*) NEW YORK has been long deſerted by the greateſt part of the inhabitants; and they are determined to burn it themſelves, rather than ſuffer us to burn it.

the ſenſe of ſome of the wiſeſt men in America. It has been long their wiſh that *Britain* would ſhut up all their ports. They will rejoice, particularly, in the laſt reſtraining act. It might have happened, that the people would have grown weary of their agreements not to export or import. But this act will oblige them to keep theſe agreements; and confirm their unanimity and zeal. It will alſo furniſh them with a reaſon for confiſcating the eſtates of all the friends of our government among them, and for employing their ſailors, who would have been otherwiſe idle, in making repriſals on Britiſh property. Their ſhips, before uſeleſs, and conſiſting of many hundreds, will be turned into ſhips of war; and all that attention, which they have hitherto confined to trade, will be employed in fitting out a naval force for their own defence; and thus the way will be prepared for their becoming, much ſooner than they would otherwiſe have been, a great maritime power. This act of parliament, therefore, crowns the folly of all our late meaſures.—None who know me, can believe me to be diſpoſed to ſuperſtition. Perhaps, however, I am not in the preſent inſtance; free from this weakneſs.——I fancy I ſee in theſe meaſures ſomething that cannot be accounted for merely by human ignorance. I am inclined to think, that the hand of Providence is in them working to bring about ſome great ends.—But this leads me to one conſideration more, which I

cannot

cannot help offering to the public, and which appears to me in the higheſt degree important.

In this hour of tremendous danger, it would become us to turn our thoughts to Heaven. This is what our brethren in the Colonies are doing. From one end of *North-America* to the other, they are FASTING and PRAYING. But what are we doing?—Shocking thought! we are ridiculing them as *Fanatics*, and ſcoffing at religion.——We are running wild after pleaſure, and forgetting every thing ſerious and decent at *Maſquerades*.—We are gambling in gaming houſes; trafficking for Boroughs; perjuring ourſelves at Elections; and ſelling ourſelves for places.—Which ſide then is Providence likely to favour?

In *America* we ſee a number of riſing ſtates in the vigour of youth, inſpired by the nobleſt of all paſſions, the paſſion for being free; and animated by piety.——*Here* we ſee an old ſtate, great indeed, but inflated and irreligious; enervated by luxury; encumbered with debts; and hanging by a thread.——Can any one look without pain to the iſſue? May we not expect calamities that ſhall recover to *reflection* (perhaps to *devotion*) our *Libertines* and *Atheiſts*?

Is our cauſe ſuch as gives us reaſon to aſk God to bleſs it?——Can we in the face of Heaven declare, "that we are not the aggreſſors in this war; "and that we mean by it, not to acquire or even "preſerve dominion for its own ſake; not con-

"queſt, or Empire, or the gratification of reſent-"ment; but ſolely to deliver ourſelves from op-"preſſion; to gain reparation for injury; and "to defend ourſelves againſt men who would plun-"der or kill us?"—Remember, reader, whoever thou art, that there are no other juſt cauſes of war; and that blood ſpilled, with any other views, muſt ſome time or other be accounted for.——But not to expoſe myſelf by ſaying more in this way, I will now beg leave to recapitulate ſome of the arguments I have uſed; and to deliver the feelings of my heart in a brief, but earneſt addreſs to my countrymen.

I am hearing it continually urged——"Are "they not our ſubjects."——The plain anſwer is, they are not your ſubjects. The people of *America* are no more the ſubjects of the people of *Britain*, than the people of *Yorkſhire* are the ſubjects of the people of *Middleſex*. They are your *fellow-ſubjects*.

"But *we* are taxed; and why ſhould not *they* be taxed?"——*You* are taxed by yourſelves. They inſiſt on the ſame privilege.——They are taxed to ſupport their own governments; and they help alſo to pay your taxes by purchaſing your manufactures, and giving you a monopoly of their trade. Muſt they maintain *two* governments? Muſt they ſubmit to be *triple* taxed?—Has your moderation in taxing yourſelves, been ſuch as encourages them to truſt you with the power of taxing them?

“ But they will not obey the *Parliament* and the *Laws*.”——Say rather, they will not obey *your* parliament and *your* laws. Their reaſon is: They have no voice in your parliament. They have no ſhare in making (a) your laws.——“ Neither have *moſt* of us.”——Then you ſo far want Liberty; and your language is, “ *We* are not free, Why will *they* be free?”——But *many* of you have a voice in parliament: *None* of them have. *All* your freehold land is repreſented: But not a foot of *their* land is repreſented. At worſt, therefore, you can be only enſlaved *partially*.—They would be enſlaved *totally*.——They are governed by parliaments choſen by themſelves, and by legiſlatures ſimilar to yours. Why will you diſturb them in the enjoyment of a bleſſing ſo invaluable? Is it reaſonable to inſiſt, that your diſcretion alone ſhall be their law; that they ſhall have no conſtitutions of government, except ſuch as you ſhall be pleaſed to give them; and no property except ſuch as your parliament ſhall be pleaſed to leave them?—What is your parliament?—Powerful indeed and reſpectable: But is there not a growing intercourſe between it and the court? Does it awe miniſters of ſtate as it once did?—Inſtead of contending for a controuling power over the governments of *America*, ſhould you not think more of watching and reforming your own?—Suppoſe the worſt. Suppoſe, in oppoſition to all their own declarations, that the Coloniſts are now aiming at independence.—"If they can ſubſiſt without you;" is it to be wondered at? Did there ever exiſt a *community*, or even an *individual*, that would not do the ſame?—"If they *cannot* ſubſiſt without you;" let them alone. They will ſoon come back. ——— "If you cannot ſubſiſt without them;" reclaim them by (*a*) kind-

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(a) “ I have no other notion of ſlavery, but being bound “ by a law to which I do not conſent.” See the caſe of *Ireland*'s being bound by acts of Parliament in *England*, ſtated by William Molyneux, Eſq; Dublin.——In arguing againſt the authority of Communities, and all people not incorporated, over one another; I have confined my views to taxation and internal legiſlation. Mr. Molyneux carried his views much farther; and denied the right of *England* to make any laws even to regulate the trade of *Ireland*. He was the intimate friend of Mr. Locke; and writ his book in 1698, ſoon after the publication of Mr. Locke's Treatiſe on Government.

What I have ſaid, in Part 1ſt. Sect. 3d, of ſubjecting a number of ſtates to a general council repreſenting them all, I ſuppoſe every one muſt conſider as entirely theoretical; and not a propoſal of any thing I wiſh, may take place under the Britiſh Empire.

(*a*) Some perſons, convinced of the *folly* as well as *barbarity* of attempting to keep the Colonies by ſlaughtering them, have very humanely propoſed giving them up. But the higheſt authority has informed us, with great reaſon, "That "they are too important to be given up."—Dr. TUCKER has inſiſted on the depopulation, produced by migrations from this country to the Colonies, as a reaſon for this meaſure. But, unleſs

143139 → [illegible]

neſs; engage them by moderation and equity. It is madneſs to reſolve to butcher them. This will make them deteſt and avoid you for ever. Freemen are not to be governed by force; or dragooned into compliance. If capable of bearing to be ſo treated, it is a diſgrace to be connected with them.

"If *they* can ſubſiſt without you; and alſo *you* without them," the attempt to ſubjugate them by confiſcating their effects, burning their towns, and ravaging their territories, is a wanton exertion of cruel ambition, which, however common it has been among mankind, deſerves to be called by harder names than I chuſe to apply to it.—Suppoſe ſuch an attempt was to be ſucceeded: Would it not be a fatal preparation for ſubduing yourſelves? Would not the diſpoſal of *American* places, and the diſtribution of an *American* revenue, render that influence of the crown irreſiſtible, which has already ſtabbed your liberties?

unleſs the kingdom is made a priſon to its inhabitants, theſe migrations cannot be prevented; nor do I think that they have any great tendency to produce depopulation. When a number of people quit a country, there is more employment and greater plenty of the means of ſubſiſtence left for thoſe who remain; and the vacancy is ſoon filled up. The grand cauſes of depopulation are, not migrations, or even famines and plagues, or any other *temporary* evils; but the permanent and ſlowly working evils of debauchery, luxury, high taxes, and oppreſſion.

Turn your eyes to *India*: There more has been done than is now attempted in *America*. There ENGLISHMEN, actuated by the love of plunder and the ſpirit of conqueſt, have depopulated whole kingdoms, and ruined millions of innocent people by the moſt infamous oppreſſion and rapacity.—The juſtice of the nation has ſlept over theſe enormities. Will the juſtice of heaven ſleep?——Are we not now execrated on both ſides of the globe?

With reſpect to the Coloniſts; it would be folly to pretend they are faultleſs. They were running faſt into our vices. But this quarrel gives them a ſalutary check: And it may be permitted on purpoſe to favour them, and in them the reſt of mankind; by making way for the eſtabliſhment, in an extenſive country poſſeſſed of every advantage, a plan of government, and a growing power that ſhall aſtoniſh the world, and under which every ſubject of human enquiry ſhall be open to free diſcuſſion, and the friends of Liberty, in every quarter of the globe, find a ſafe retreat from civil and ſpiritual tyranny.——I hope, therefore, our brethren in *America* will forgive their enemies. It is certain that *they know not what thy are doing.*

CONCLUSION.

HAVING ſaid ſo much of the war with America, and particularly of the danger with which it threatens us, it may be expected that I ſhould propoſe ſome method of eſcaping from this danger, and of reſtoring this once happy Empire to a ſtate of peace and ſecurity.—Various plans of pacification have been propoſed; and ſome of them, by perſons ſo diſtinguiſhed by their rank and merit, as to be above my applauſe. But till there is more of a diſpoſition to attend to ſuch plans; they cannot, I am afraid, be of any great ſervice. And there is too much reaſon to apprehend, that nothing but calamity will bring us to repentance and wiſdom.——In order, however, to complete my deſign in theſe obſervations, I will take the liberty to lay before the public the following ſketch of one of the plans juſt referred to, as it was opened before the holidays to the houſe of Lords by the *Earl of Shelburne*; who while he held the ſeals of the Southern Department, with the buſineſs of the Colonies annexed, poſſeſſed their confidence, without ever compromiſing the authority of this country; a confidence which diſcovered itſelf by peace among themſelves, and duty and ſubmiſſion to the Mother-country. I hope I ſhall not take an unwarrantable liberty, if, on this occaſion, I uſe his Lordſhips own words, as nearly as I have been able to collect them.

" Meet the Colonies on their own ground, in
" the laſt petition from the Congreſs to the king.
" The ſureſt, as well as the moſt dignified
" mode of proceeding for this country.—Suſpend
" all hoſtilities——Repeal the acts which imme-
" diately diſtreſs America, namely, the laſt re-
" ſtraining act,—the charter act,—the act for the
" more impartial adminiſtration of juſtice;—and
" the Quebec act.—All the other acts (the cuſtom
" houſe act, the poſt office act, &c.) leave to a tem-
" perate reviſal.——There will be found much
" matter which both countries may wiſh repealed.
" *Some* which can never be given up, the prin-
" ciple being that regulation of trade for the
" common good of the Empire, which forms our
" *Palladium*. *Other* matter which is fair ſubject of
" mutual accommodation.——Preſcribe the moſt
" explicit acknowledgment of your right of regu-
" lating commerce in its moſt extenſive ſenſe; if
" the petition and other public acts of the Colonies
" have not already, by their declarations and ac-
" knowledgments, left it upon a ſufficiently ſecure
" foundation.—Beſides the power of regulating the
" general commerce of the Empire, ſomething
" further might be expected; provided a due and

"tender regard were had to the means and abilities of the ſeveral provinces, as well as to thoſe "fundamental, unalienable rights of *Engliſhmen*, "which no father can ſurrender on the part of his "ſon, no repreſentative on the part of his elector, "no generation on the part of the ſucceeding one; "the right of judging not only of the *mode* of "raiſing, but the *quantum*, and the appropriation "of ſuch aids as they ſhall grant.——To be more "explicit; the debt of *England*, without entering "into invidious diſtinctions how it came to be "contracted, might be acknowledged the debt of "every individual part of the whole Empire, "Aſia, as well as America, included.——Provided, that full ſecurity were held forth to them, "that ſuch free aids, together with the Sinking "Fund (Great Britain contributing her ſuperior "ſhare) ſhould not be left as the privy purſe of "the miniſter, but be unalienably appropriated to "the original intention of that fund, the diſcharge "of the debt;—and that by an honeſt application "of the *whole* fund, the taxes might in time be leſſened, and the price of our manufactures conſequently reduced, ſo that every contributory part "might feel the returning benefit—always ſuppoſing the laws of trade duly obſerved and enforced.

"The time *was*, I am confident—and perhaps *is*, when theſe points might be obtained upon the eaſy, the conſtitutional, and, "therefore, the indiſpenſible terms of an exemp-

"tion from parliamentary taxation, and an ad"miſſion of the ſacredneſs of their charters; inſtead "of ſacrificing their good humour, their affec"tion, their effectual aids, and the act of NAVI"GATION itſelf, (which you are now in the direct "road to do) for a commercial quit-rent, *(a)* or a "barren metaphyſical chimæra.—— How long "theſe ends may continue attainable, no man can "tell.——But if no words are to be relied on ex"cept ſuch as make againſt the Colonies—If "nothing is acceptable, except what is attainable "by force; it only remains to apply, what has "been ſo often remarked of unhappy periods, "——*Quos deus vult, &c.*"

Theſe are ſentiments and propoſals of the laſt importance; and I am very happy in being able to give them to the public from ſo reſpectable an authority, as that of the diſtinguiſhed Peer I have mentioned; to whom, I know, this kingdom, as well

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(a) See the Reſolutions on the *Nova-Scotia* petition reported to the Houſe of Commons, November 29, 1775, by Lord North, Lord George Germaine, &c. and a bill ordered to be brought in upon the ſaid Reſolutions.——There is indeed, as Lord Shelburne has hinted, ſomething very aſtoniſhing in theſe Reſolutions. They offer a relaxation of the authority of this country, in points to which the Colonies have always conſented, and by which we are great gainers; at the ſame time, that, with a rigour which hazards the Empire, we are maintaining its authority in points to which they will never conſent; and by which nothing can be gained.

well as America, is much indebted for his zeal to promote thoſe grand public points on which the preſervation of Liberty among us depends; and for the firm oppoſition which, jointly with many others (Noblemen and Commoners of the firſt character and abilities,) he has made to the preſent meaſures.

Had ſuch a plan as that now propoſed been adopted a few months ago, I have little doubt but that a pacification would have taken place, on terms highly advantageous to this kingdom.—— In particular. It is probable, that the Colonies would have conſented to grant an annual ſupply, which, increaſed by a ſaving of the money now ſpent in maintaining troops among them, and by contributions which might have been gained from other parts of the Empire, would have formed a fund conſiderable enough, if unalienably applied, (a) to redeem the greateſt part of the public debt; in conſequence of which, agreeably to Lord Shelburne's ideas, ſome of our worſt taxes might be taken off, and the Colonies would receive our manufactures cheaper; our paper-currency might be reſtrained; our whole force would be free to meet at any time foreign danger; the influence of the Crown would be reduced; our Parliament would become more independent; and the kingdom might, perhaps, be reſtored to a ſituation of permanent ſafety and proſperity.

(a) See the Appendix.

To conclude.——An important revolution in the affairs of this kingdom ſeems to be approaching. If ruin is not to be our lot, all that has been lately done muſt be undone, and new meaſures adopted. At that period, an opportunity (never perhaps to be recovered, if loſt) will offer itſelf for ſerving eſſentially *this country*, as well as *America*; by putting the national debt into *a fixed* courſe of payment; by ſubjecting to new regulations, the adminiſtration of the finances; and eſtabliſhing meaſures for exterminating corruption and reſtoring the conſtitution.——For my own part; if this is not to be the conſequence of any future changes in the miniſtry, and the ſyſtem of corruption, lately ſo much improved, is to go on; I think it totally indifferent to the kingdom who are *in*, or who are *out* of power.

APPENDIX.

Amount of the NATIONAL DEBT *at Midſummer*, 1775.

	Principal.	Intereſt.
The amount of the capitals at the Bank, South Sea, and India Houſes was (in January 1775) 125,056,454 l. See the particulars in an account by R. Helm, at the *Stock Exchange*, corrected for January 5th, 1775. Deduct 424,500 l. Conſol. Annuit. 246,300 l. Reduced; 161,650 l. Old S. S. Annuit. 124,200 l. New S. S. Annuit. and 43,350 l. Annuit. 1751, making in all a million of the 3 *per cents*, paid off in 1775; and the remainder will be	124.056,454	4.317,87[illegible]
Annuities for 99, 96, and 89 years, from various dates in King William's and Queen Ann's time. Suppoſing 18 years to come of theſe Annui-		

	Principal.	Intereſt.
	£.	£.
ties, their value will be (reckoning intereſt at 3½ *per cent.*) 13⅕ years purchaſe, or nearly —	1.801,179	136,453
Annuities for lives, with benefit of ſurvivorſhip, in King William's time, ſuppoſed worth Four years purchaſe.——— N. B. The benefit of ſurvivorſhip is to be continued till the Annuitants are reduced to Seven; and they are not yet reduced to this number —— —	30,268	7,567
Annuities on lives, with benefit of Survivorſhip, granted Anno 1765,— valued at 20 years purchaſe — —	10,800	540
Annuities for two or three lives granted in 1693. Alſo annuities on ſingle lives 1745, 1746, 1757. The original amount of theſe annuities, taken all together, was 123,883 l. They are now reduced by deaths to about 80,000 l. I have valued them at 10 years purchaſe —	800,000	80,000
Total £.	126.698,701	4.542,430

Long

	Principal. £.	Intereſt. £.
Brought over ——	126.698,701	4.542,430
Long annuity for 99 years 1761——The value of this annuity is in the *Alley* about 25½ years purchaſe; but the remaining term is really worth 27 years purchaſe	6.702,750	248,250
UNFUNDED DEBT, conſiſting of Exchequer Bills (1,250,000 l.) Navy debt (1,850,000 l.) and Civil liſt debt, ſuppoſed 500,000 l. The intereſt is reckoned at no more than 2½ *per cent.*	3.600,000	90,000
Total of the National debt in 1775 —	137.001,451	4.880,680

I have given the *Navy Debt* as it was about a year ago. It muſt be now greatly increaſed.—— The *Civil Liſt Debt* has been given by gueſs. It is generally reckoned not to be leſs than the ſum I have ſpecified; and it is alſo expected, that the Civil Liſt income will be raiſed to 900,000 l. *per annum*——In 1769 the ſum of 513,511 l. was granted by parliament towards diſcharging the arrears and debts then due on the Civil Liſt.

By an act of the firſt of George II., the Civil Liſt was to be made up 800,000 l. whenever, in any year, the duties and revenues appropriated to it fell ſhort of that ſum. The clear produce of theſe duties for 33 years, or from Midſummer 1727, to Midſummer 1760, was, according to a particular account in my poſſeſſion, 26.182,981 l. 17 s. 6 d. or 793,423 l. *per ann.* They fell ſhort, therefore, taking one year with another, *more* than they exceeded.——In 1747, they had been deficient for ſeven years together; and the whole deficiency amounted to 456,733 l. 16 s.—which, in conformity to the act I have mentioned, was made good to his majeſty out of the ſupplies for that year.——In 1729 alſo, 115,000 l. was granted out of the ſupplies for the like reaſon.—This is all the money, received by his late majeſty from parliament, towards ſupporting his houſhold and the dignity of his civil government; or 810,749 l. *per ann.*—I have thought proper to ſtate this matter ſo particularly here; becauſe accounts groſsly wrong have been given of it.

The amount of the National Debt, it has appeared, was laſt year 137 millions.—The great deficiencies of laſt year, added to the extraordinary expences of the preſent year, will increaſe this debt conſiderably.——Drawing out, embodying, and maintaining the militia in the laſt war, coſt the nation near half a million *per ann.*— We cannot reckon upon a leſs expence in doing this now. Add to it, pay for foreign troops, and all the extraordinary expences of our increaſed Navy and Army, tranſport ſervice, recruiting ſervice, ordnance, &c. and it will be evident that the whole expence of this unhappy year muſt be enormous. —But I expect that care will be taken to hide it, by funding as little as poſſible, and that for this reaſon it will not be known in its full magnitude; till it comes to appear another year under the articles of Navy debt, extraordinaries of the army; tranſport bills, ordnance debentures, &c. making up a vaſt unfunded debt which may bear down all public credit.

State of the NATIONAL ACCOUNT *in* 1775.

ANNUAL INCOME.

	£.
CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the medium of the payments into the Exchequer, for 3 years ending in 1773 — —	2.528,275
Amount of the EXCISES in ENGLAND, including the malt tax, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 —	4.649,892
Land Tax at 3s. — —	1.300,000
SALT DUTIES, being the medium of the years 1765 and 1766 —	218,739
Duties on Stamps, Cards, Dice, Advertiſements, Bonds, Leaſes, Indentures, News-papers, Almanacks, &c. —	280,788
Duties on houſes and windows, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1771 — —	385,369

	£.
Poſt Office, Seizures, Wine Licences, Hackney Coaches, (*a*) Tenths of the Clergy, &c. ——	250,000
EXCISES in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773	95,229
CUSTOMS in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 —— ——	68,369
Inland taxes in SCOTLAND, deduction of 6d. in the pound on all Penſions, Salaries, &c. caſual revenues, ſuch as the duties on Gum-Senega, American revenue, &c.—Theſe are little articles, (*b*) and I have ſuppoſed them to amount to as much as will make the whole revenue ten millions *per ann.* —— —	222,339
Total £.	10.000,000

(*a*) Theſe branches of the revenue produced in 1754 210,243 l. I do not know how much they have produced lately; but I believe I have eſtimated them at the higheſt.

(*b*) I believe no articles have been overlooked in this account, which can raiſe the permanent annual revenue above TEN MILLIONS. But ſhould there be any ſuch articles, they will be more than balanced by an article which I have neglected to charge, in the account of the national debt: I mean, the expences of management at the Bank, South Sea Houſe, India Houſe, and Exchequer, amounting to 81,593 l.

The annual medium of the payments into the Exchequer from the CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, for the laſt five years, has been 2.521,769 l. —— In 1774 this payment was 2.547,717 l.—In 1775, it was 2.476,302 l. — The produce of the CUSTOMS, therefore, has been given rather too high.

The produce of the EXCISES in England has been higher in 1772 and 1775 than in any other two years; but the average of any three ſucceſſive years, or of all the five years ſince 1770, will not differ much from the ſum I have given.—In 1754, or the year before the laſt war, the CUSTOMS produced only 1.558,254 l.——The Exciſes produced 2.819,702 l. —— And the whole revenue, excluſive of the Malt-tax and Land-tax at 2s. was 5.097,617 l.

ANNUAL EXPENDITURE.

	£.
Intereſt of the National Debt in 1775 —— —	4.880,680
Peace Eſtabliſhment for the Navy and Army, including all miſcellaneous and incidental expences	3.700,000
Annual Increaſe of the Navy and Civil Liſt Debts — —	350,000
Civil Liſt — ——	800,000
	9.730,680
SURPLUS of the Revenue	269,320
	£. 10.000,000

The eſtimate for the peace eſtabliſhment, including miſcellaneous expences, amounted in 1775 to 3.703,476 l.——In 1774 it amounted to 3.804,452l. excluſive of 250,000l. raiſed by Exchequer Bills, towards defraying the expence of calling in the gold coin.. And the medium for eleven years, from 1765, has been nearly 3.700,000l. —According to the accounts which I have collected, the expence of the peace eſtabliſhment (including miſcellaneous expences) was in 1765, 1766, and 1767, 3.540,000l. *per ann.*—In 1768, 1769, and 1770, it was 3.354,000 l. *per ann.*—In 1771, 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1775, the average has been nearly four millions *per ann.* excluſive of the expence of calling in the coin.

The parliament votes for the ſea ſervice 4 l. *per* month *per* man, including wages, wear and tear, victuals and ordnance. This allowance is inſufficient, and falls ſhort every year more or leſs, in proportion to the number of men voted. From hence, in a great meaſure, ariſes that annual increaſe of the navy debt, mentioned in the third article of the *National Expenditure.* This increaſe in 1772 and 1773 was 669,996 l. or 335,000l. *per ann.* The number of men voted in thoſe two years, was 20,000. I have ſuppoſed them reduced to 16,000, and the annual increaſe of the Navy Debt to be only 250,000 l. ——Add 100,000l.

for the annual increaſe of the Civil Liſt Debt (*ſee page* 113.) and the total will be 350,000 l.

A Second Method of DEDUCING *the* SURPLUS *of the* REVENUE.

UNAPPROPRIATED REVENUE.

NETT PRODUCE of the Sinking Fund, for the laſt five years, including caſual ſurpluſſes, and reckoning to *Chriſtmas* in every year; being the annual medium, after deducing from it about 45,000 l. always carried to it from the ſupplies, in order to replace ſo much taken from it every year to make good a deficiency in a Fund eſtabliſhed in 1758. —— ——	2.610,759
Nett annual produce of Land Tax at 3s. militia deducted; and of the Malt Tax —— —	1,800,000
(N. B. Theſe two taxes in 1773, brought in only 1.665,475 l.)	
There are ſome caſual Receipts, not included in the Sinking Fund, ſuch as duties on Gum Senega, American Revenue, &c. But they are ſo uncertain and inconſiderable, that it is ſcarcely proper to give them as a part of the permanent Re-	

venue. Add however on this account ——— ——— £. 50,000

Total of unappropriated (*a*) Revenue £. 4.460,759

Produce of the SINKING FUND, *reckoned to* Chriſtmas *in every Year.*

	£.
1770	2.486,836
1771	2.553,505
1772	2.683,831
1773	2,823,150
1774	2.731,476

In 1775 the ſinking Fund was taken for 2.900,000 l. including an extraordinary charge of 100,000 l. on the *Aggregate* Fund. It produced for a year to *Michaelmas* 1775, 2.855,718 l. including 45,446 l. carried to it from the ſupplies. It has not, probably, produced more for a year to *Chriſtmas*; and the deficiency is a debt contracted laſt year, which muſt be added to other debts (referred to in Page 114) ariſing from deficiencies in the proviſion made for the expences of laſt year. This proviſion amounted to 3.703,476 l; but it is ſaid to have fallen ſhort above a million.

(*a*) The greateſt part of this Revenue is borrowed of the Bank, and ſpent before it comes into the Exchequer. It is, therefore, in reality ſo much debt conſtantly due to the Bank, for which intereſt is paid.

ANNU-

ANNUAL EXPENDITURE.

	£.
Peace Eſtabliſhment, including the annual increaſe of the Navy and Civil Liſt Debts (ſee the former account) — — —	4.050,000
Intereſt at 2½ of 3,600,000l. unfunded debt, which muſt be paid out of the unappropriated Revenue —	90,000
Total	4.140,000
SURPLUS	320,759
Annual income £.	4.460,759

These two methods of deducing the Surplus of the Revenue confirm one another, as nearly as could have been expected. They cannot agree exactly, unleſs the mean produce of the Sinking Fund, and of all the taxes, are taken for the ſame years, and from the ſame quarter in every year.

There is a *third* method of proving that the permanent ſurplus of the revenue cannot exceed the ſum now ſtated.

I have learnt from the higheſt authority, that the national debt, about a year ago, had been diminiſhed near 9 millions and a half, ſince the peace in 1763; including a million of the 3 *per cents* diſcharged laſt year.——The money employed in making this reduction, muſt have been derived from the ſurplus of the *ordinary* and ſtated revenue, added to the *extraordinary* receipts. Theſe *extraordinary* receipts have conſiſted of the following articles.——1. The Land Tax at 4 s. in the pound in 1764, 1765, 1766, and 1771; or 1 s. in the pound *extraordinary* for four years, making 1.750,000 l. — 2. The profits of Nine Lotteries, making (at 150,000 l. each lottery) 1.350,000 l. —— 3. A contribution of 400,000 l. *per ann.* from the *India* company for five years, making 2.000,000 l.——4. 110,000 l. paid by the Bank in 1764 for the privilege of excluſive banking. Alſo the money paid by *France* for maintaining their priſoners; and the money ariſing from the ſale of *French* prizes, taken before the declaration of war; from ſaving on particular grants at the end of the war, &c, &c.—which, all together, (*a*) I will ſuppoſe a million. Add 3.300,000 l. ariſing from a ſurplus of 300,000 l. for eleven years; and the total will be 9.400,000 l. which is a ſum much more than ſufficient to diſcharge 9 millions and a half of the public debt.

(*a*) The Author of the *Preſent State of the Nation*, publiſhed in 1768, makes all theſe *extraordinary* Receipts to amount to above two millions and a half. But the greateſt part of them were applied to ſatisfy *German* claims, and ſome other debts, not properly included in the current national expenditure.

Sketch of an Account of the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes.

	£.
Nett Revenue — —	10.000,000
EXPENCE of collecting the EXCISES in ENGLAND, being the average of the years 1767 and 1768, when their produce was 4.531,075 l. *per ann.* 6 *per cent.* of the groſs produce --	297,887
EXPENCE of collecting the Exciſes in SCOTLAND, being the medium of the years 1772 and 1773, and the difference between the groſs and nett produce——31 *per cent.* of the groſs produce —	43,254
EXPENCE of collecting the CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the average of 1771 and 1772; bounties included—15 *per cent.* of the groſs produce, excluſive of drawbacks and over-entries — ——	468,703

N. B. The bounties for 1771 were 202,840 l. for 1772, 172,468 l.

The charges of management for 1771, were 276,434 l.

For 1772, 285,764 l. or 10 *per cent.* nearly.

	£.
Perquiſites, &c. to Cuſtom-houſe officers, &c. ſuppoſed to be —	250,000
Expence of collecting the Salt-duties in England, 10$\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* —	27,000
Bounties on fiſh exported — —	18,000
Expence of collecting the duties on Stamps, Cards, Advertiſements, &c. 5$\frac{1}{4}$ *per cent.* ——	18,000
Expence of collecting the Land Tax at 3 s.—2$\frac{9}{10}$ *per cent.* of the nominal produce — —	43,500
Total £.	11.166,344

It muſt be ſeen, that this account is imperfect. It is, however, ſufficient to prove, that the whole money raiſed DIRECTLY by the taxes, exceeds conſiderably ELEVEN MILLIONS. But as the increaſed price of one commodity has a tendency to raiſe the price of other commodities; and as alſo dealers generally add more than the value of a tax to the price of a commodity, beſides charging intereſt for the money they advance on the taxes; for theſe reaſons, it ſeems certain, that the taxes have an INDIRECT effect of great conſequence; and that a larger ſum is drawn by them from the public, than their *groſs* produce.——It is farther to be conſidered, that many of the perſons who are now ſupported by collecting the taxes, would have ſupported themſelves by commerce or agriculture;

and, therefore, inſtead of taking away from the public ſtock, would have been employed in increaſing it.——Some have reckoned, that on all theſe accounts the expence of the taxes is *doubled*; but this muſt be extravagant. Let us ſuppoſe a *quarter* only added; and it will follow, that the money drawn from the public by the taxes (excluſive of thoſe which maintain the poor) is near 14 millions *per ann*; a ſum almoſt equal to the whole ſpecie of the kingdom; which, therefore, had we no paper currency, would be totally inadequate to the wants of the kingdom.

Without all doubt ſuch a ſtate of things, in a great commercial nation, is moſt dangerous, and frightful; but it admits of no remedy, while the public debt continues what it is.——With a view, therefore, to the quick reduction of this debt, I will throw away, after all I have ſaid on this ſubject on former occaſions, the following propoſals.——It has appeared, that, ſuppoſing the taxes not to become leſs productive, and the current national expence to continue the ſame that it had been for ten years before 1775, a ſurplus may be expected in the revenue of about 300,000 l. *per ann.*—With a ſurplus ſo trifling, nothing can be done; but it might be increaſed, firſt of all; By keeping the LAND TAX for the future at 4 s. in the pound.—As rents have been almoſt doubled, this will not be much more to the preſent proprietors of land, than 2 s. in the pound was formerly.

'Tis, therefore, equitable; and it will add to the national income near 450,000 l.

Secondly, All the money now ſpent in maintaining troops in America might be ſaved. —— The Colonies are able to defend themſelves. They wiſh to be allowed to do it. Should they ever want the aid of our troops, they will certainly be very willing to pay us for them. Indeed I am of opinion, they will never be willing to make peace with us, without ſtipulating that we ſhall withdraw our troops from them. Were there any external power that claimed and exerciſed a right of ſtationing troops in this country, without our conſent, we ſhould certainly think ourſelves entirely undone.——I will eſtimate this ſaving at no more than 200,000 l. *per ann.*

Thirdly, I do not ſee why the peace-eſtabliſhment might not be reduced to what it was, at an average, in 1768, 1769 and 1770. This would produce a ſaving of 350,000 *l.* *per ann.*——I might here propoſe reducing the peace-eſtabliſhment for the *Navy* to what it always was before the laſt war, or from 16,000 to 10,000 men. But it would be infinitely better to reduce the ARMY; and this might produce a farther ſaving of great conſequence.——But waving this, I ſhall only mention,

Fourthly, That contributions might be obtained from *North-America* and other parts of the Britiſh Empire, on the principles ſtated, from the EARL of SHELBURNE's authority, in page 105.—I will eſtimate theſe at no more than 400,000 *l. per ann.*—(*a*) Add the *Surplus* now in our poſſeſſion; and the total will be 1.700,000.——In the *Introduction* to the third edition of the Treatiſe on *Reverſionary Payments*, I have explained a method of paying off, with a ſinking Fund of a million *per ann.* (*b*), a hundred millions of the national debt in forty years. What then might not be done with ſuch a Fund as this?

In five years 18.986,300 l. will fall from an intereſt of 4 *per cent.* to 3 *per cent.*———Alſo, 4.500,000l. 3½ *per cent.* 1758, will fall, in ſix years, to an intereſt of 3 *per cent.*——The long Annuities granted in King WILLIAM's time, will, in 20 years, become extinct; as will alſo the greateſt part of

---

(*a*) We drew, ſome years ago, this contribution from ASIA only; and it cannot be unreaſonable to expect, that the greateſt part of it may be again drawn from thence after the expiration, in 1780, of the charter of the EAST-INDIA company. At that period alſo, it is much to be wiſhed that ſome effectual meaſures may be eſtabliſhed for making amends to the inhabitants of BENGAL for the ſhocking injuries they have ſuffered; and for ſkreening them from all farther injuries.

(*b*) At the time of writing the introduction here referred to, above three years ago, I *thought*, or rather *hoped*, that the ſurplus of the revenue might be taken at 900,000l. *per ann.* But it muſt be conſidered, that the nation was then in poſſeſſion of a contribution of 400,000 l. *per ann.* from the India Company, which has been ſince loſt.—See the Additional Preface to the 2d Edition *of the Appeal to the Public on the Subject of the National Debt.*

ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS

On the NATURE and VALUE of

CIVIL LIBERTY,

AND THE

WAR WITH AMERICA:

ALSO

OBSERVATIONS on Schemes for raiſing Money
by PUBLIC LOANS;

An Hiſtorical Deduction and Analyſis of the
NATIONAL DEBT;

And a brief Account of the DEBTS and RESOURCES
of FRANCE.

> Should the morals of the Engliſh be perverted by luxury;—ſhould they loſe their Colonies by reſtraining them, &c.—they will be enſlaved; they will become inſignificant and contemptible; and *Europe* will not be able to ſhew the world one nation in which ſhe can pride herſelf.
>
> ABBE′ RAYNAL.

By RICHARD PRICE, D.D. F.R.S.

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TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE LORD MAYOR,

THE ALDERMEN, AND THE COMMONS

OF THE

CITY OF LONDON,

THIS TRACT,

Containing ADDITIONS to thoſe OBSERVATIONS
on CIVIL LIBERTY,

which they have honoured with their Approbation,

Is, with the greateſt Reſpect and Gratitude,

INSCRIBED,

BY

Their moſt obedient

and humble Servant,

RICHARD PRICE.

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INTRODUCTION.

BEFORE the reader enters on the following tract, I ſhall beg leave to detain him while I give a general account of the contents of it, and make a few introductory obſervations.

In the firſt part of the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, publiſhed laſt winter, I gave a brief account of the nature of Liberty in general, and of *Civil Liberty* in particular. That account appears to me, after carefully reconſidering it, to be juſt; nor do I think it in my power to improve it. In order, however, to be as explicit as poſſible on this ſubject, and to remove thoſe miſapprehenſions of my ſentiments into which ſome have fallen, I have thought proper to add the *ſupplemental* and *explanatory* obſervations, which will be found in the FIRST part of this pamphlet.——In writing with this view, I have been led to refer often to my former pamphlet, and to repeat ſome of the obſervations in it. But as this could not have been avoided, it will, I hope, be excuſed.

The remarks in the SECOND part, I offer to the public with all the deference due to the high ſtation and abilities of the noble Lord, whoſe ſpeech at opening the Budget in *April* laſt, has occaſioned them.——Theſe remarks, having been promiſed long ago, ſhould have been publiſhed ſooner. The reaſons which have produced this delay are of little conſequence to the public; and, therefore, need not be mentioned.

In the firſt ſection of this *ſecond* part, it will, I think, appear, that I went upon as good grounds as the nature of the caſe admitted, when I ſtated the gold coin (*a*) of the kingdom at about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF. It appears now, indeed, to be ſome millions more. But this is a diſcovery made by the call of laſt ſummer; which, I find, has brought in near double the ſum that the beſt judges expected. Nothing, however, very encouraging can be inferred from hence. It only ſhews that a great deal of gold has been hoarded; and will, probably, be again hoarded. This is the natural conſequence of public diffidence; and it is a circumſtance which may, hereafter, greatly increaſe diſtreſs. Before the REVOLUTION, according to Dr. *Davenant*, near half the coin was hoarded; and the ſame, undoubtedly, will be done again, whenever the nation comes to be thoroughly alarmed.

In the next ſection of this part, I have made ſome further obſervations on the conteſt with *America*.——I cannot expect any other than a tragical and deplorable iſſue to this conteſt. But let events turn out as they will, I ſhall always

reflect

(*a*) See Obſervations on Civil Liberty, page 74.

reflect with ſatisfaction, that I have, though a private perſon of little conſequence, bore my teſtimony, from deep-felt conviction, againſt a war which muſt ſhock the feelings and the reaſon of every conſiderate perſon; a war in which rivers of blood muſt be ſhed, not to repel the attacks of enemies, or to maintain the authority of government *within* the realm, but to maintain ſovereignty and dominion in another world (*a*).—I wiſh the advocates for the meaſures againſt *America* would attend to the diſtinction now intimated.—The ſupport of juſt government *within* the realm is always neceſſary, and therefore right. But to maintain, by fire and ſword, dominion over the perſons and the property of a people *out* of the realm, who have no ſhare in its legiſlature, contradicts every principle of liberty and humanity.—Legitimate government, let it be remembered, as oppoſed to oppreſſion and tyranny, conſiſts "only in the dominion of "EQUAL LAWS made with COMMON CONSENT, or of "men over THEMSELVES; and not in the dominion "of communities over communities, or of ANY "MEN OVER OTHER MEN."—This is the great truth I have endeavoured to explain and defend; and

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(*a*) Of all the writers againſt this war, the learned Dr. TUCKER is the ſevereſt. For if, as he maintains, contrary to repeated declarations from the throne, a ſeparation from the Colonies would be an advantage to us, the attempt to keep them, by invaſion and bloodſhed, deſerves a harſher cenſure than words can convey.

happy would the world be, were a due conviction of it impreſſed on every human heart.

The repreſentation I have given in this ſection and elſewhere, of the ſtate of this kingdom, is, without doubt, gloomy. But it is not the effect, as ſome have intimated, of either a natural diſpoſition to gloomineſs, or of ſiniſter views. Few, who know me, will entertain ſuch a ſuſpicion. Valuing *moſt* what politicians and ſtateſmen generally value *leaſt*, I feel myſelf perfectly eaſy with reſpect to my intereſt as a citizen of this world; nor is there any change of ſituation that can make me happier, except a return to privacy and obſcurity. The opinion I have entertained of the preſent danger of the kingdom is, therefore, the effect of evidence which appears to me irreſiſtible. This evidence I have ſtated to the public; and every one may judge of it as he pleaſes. I am ſenſible of my own liableneſs to error. The meaſures which I condemn as the worſt that ever diſgraced and hazarded a great kingdom, others, whoſe integrity I cannot queſtion, approve; and that very ſituation of our affairs which I think alarming, others think proſperous. Time will determine which of theſe opinions is right. But ſuppoſing the latter to be ſo, no harm can ariſe from any repreſentations which have a tendency to put us on our guard.

I have beſtowed particular attention on the obſervations in the third ſection of this ſecond part;

and I think the ſubject of this ſection ſo important, that it is probable, I ſhould not have reſolved on the preſent publication, had it not been for the opportunity it gives me to lay the obſervations it contains before the public.——An intimation of them was given in the Introduction to the third edition of the Treatiſe on *Reverſionary Payments.* The nation being now once more got into a courſe of borrowing; and our firſt ſtep having been a return to a mode of borrowing, which had appeared to me abſurd and detrimental, I was induced to reſume the ſubject, and to examine it with more care. And the reſult of an examination of only a *part* of the public loans, will be found to be, "that a capital of more than "TWENTY MILLIONS has been a needleſs addition "to the public debt, for which no money, or any "ſort of equivalent has been received; and which "might have been avoided, together with a great "expence of intereſt, by only forming differently "the ſchemes of the public loans."

The intention of the firſt ſection of the THIRD PART is to give, in as ſhort a compaſs as poſſible, a view of the progreſs of our *foreign trade*, and its effect on the nation, from the beginning of this century; and, particularly, to point out an unfavourable change which ſeems to have taken place ſince 1764.

In the ſecond ſection of this part, an explanation and analyſis are given of all the different articles of the national debt, which will probably inform every perſon of moſt that he can wiſh to know concerning them.—I have added a general account of the debts and reſources of France. This is a ſubject at preſent particularly intereſting to this country; and, having been informed of ſome important facts relating to it, I have thought proper to lay them before the public, with ſuch reflexions as have offered themſelves in mentioning them.

The laſt ſection contains ſuch of the calculations in the APPENDIX to the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty* as were neceſſary to be reprinted, in order to introduce the remarks I have added on ſome particulars in the ſtate of the *public income and expenditure*, publiſhed not long ago by the *Earl of Stair*. I have alſo meant to accommodate the purchaſers of the different editions of the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, who will be enabled, by this ſection, to poſſeſs themſelves of all the material alterations and improvements which were made in that pamphlet after its firſt publication.—The accounts, in the latter part of this tract, are ſo various and extenſive, that it is ſcarcely poſſible there ſhould not be ſome incorrectneſſes in them. But the pains I have taken, and the means of information which I have poſſeſſed have been ſuch, that I cannot ſuſpect that I have fallen into any miſtakes of conſequence. Should, however, any ſuch have eſcaped me, it will be kind in any perſon to point them out with candour; and to aſſiſt in making thoſe accounts ſo correct and perfect, as that they may ſerve for a baſis to all future accounts of the ſame kind.—The whole concludes with an account of a reſolution drawn up in a Committee of the *American* Congreſs in 1775, diſclaiming Independence, and offering an annual contribution to *Britain* for diſcharging its debts.

Such will be found to be the contents of the following work.——Throughout the whole of it, I have avoided entering into any controverſy with the crowd of writers who have publiſhed remarks on my former pamphlet. I am, however, unwilling to overlook them entirely; and therefore, ſhall in this place, once for all, ſettle my accounts with them.

In the firſt place. Thoſe friends (all unknown to me) who have publiſhed Vindications of me, whether in ſeparate pamphlets, or in any of the periodical publications, will, I hope, accept my gratitude; and believe, that, though I have been ſilent, I have not been inattentive to their arguments, or inſenſible of their candour.

Secondly. Thoſe writers of oppoſite ſentiments, who have anſwered me without abuſe or rancour, will alſo, I hope, accept my acknowledgments.—In this number I rank the writers of the pieces enumerated below (*a*)——Theſe pieces contain, I believe, all of moſt importance which has been urged againſt me in the way of argument; and I leave every one who has read them, or ſhall read them, to decide for himſelf how far they have ſucceeded; only deſiring the public [illegible] done me, not to receive too eaſily the miſrepreſentations made in them of my ſentiments. I have had, in this reſpect, ſome reaſon to complain of the faireſt of my adverſaries.

Thirdly. I muſt farther acknowledge myſelf indebted to thoſe writers, who, under the name of Anſwers, have publiſhed virulent invectives againſt me. It has been ſome gratification to me to obſerve, the alarm theſe writers have taken, and the folly they have diſcovered, by ſuffering themſelves to forget, that abuſe and ſcurrility always defeat their own ends, and hurt the cauſe they are employed to ſerve. I will not attempt to give any liſt of them. They are without number. But there is *one* who, being the ableſt, it is proper I ſhould mention. I mean, the author of the three Letters

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(*a*) *Experience preferable to Theory*, printed for Payne.——*Remarks on a pamphlet lately publiſhed, in a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country to a Member of Parliament.* Mr. GOODRICKE's Obſervations, &c. and Mr. HEY's; all printed for Mr. Cadell——Alſo Mr. *Weſley*'s and Mr. *Fletcher*'s Anſwers.——There may, perhaps, be ſome other Anſwers of the ſame kind; but they have not happened to fall into my hands.

to Dr. *Price*, publiſhed for Mr. *Payne.*——This writer is likewiſe the author of the *Letters on the Preſent State of Poland*; and of the *Remarks on the Acts of the thirteenth Parliament of Great Britain*; but he has been lately more known as a writer in ~~the~~ news-papers, under the ſignature of ATTILIUS; and alſo, as the ſuppoſed author of the *Anſwer to the American Declaration of Independence.*——The following particulars will enable thoſe, who may not yet know him ſufficiently, to judge of his principles and temper.

Civil liberty, he inſiſts, is nothing poſitive. It is, an *Abſence.* The abſence of *coercion*; or of *con*ſtraint and *re*ſtraint.—Not from civil governors, (they are OMNIPOTENT, and there can be no liberty (*a*) againſt them.)——But from ſuch little deſpots and plunderers as common pick-pockets, thieves, houſe-breakers, &c.

Again. Having had occaſion, in my *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, page 42, to take ſome notice of him, I ſtudied to mention him with reſpect. In return for this civility he has, in his three letters

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(*a*) Their power is, however, acknowledged to be a TRUST; but not from the *people.* It muſt then be a truſt from GOD; like the power of the proprietor of an eſtate over his tenants and cattle——Charming doctrine this for *Ruſſia* and *Turkey!* And yet ſuch is the doctrine, which this good Barriſter, Mr. *Weſley*, Dr. *Cooper*, and others, are now propagating in this country. See *Three Letters*, page 66, &c. See likewiſe page 23 and 31, of the following tract.

letters juſt mentioned, made me the object of an abuſe, which would have been inexcuſable had I offered him the groſſeſt affront.

Further. Such is the rage into which he has been thrown, that, imagining my notions of liberty and government have been drawn from the writings of the philoſophers of antient GREECE and ROME, he laments "that the *Goths* and "*Vandals*, ſparing their vaſes and urns, did not "deſtroy all their books of philoſophy and po"litics." (*a*)—I am much miſtaken if he does not wiſh likewiſe, that all ſuch writings were deſtroyed as thoſe of *Sidney*, *Locke*, *Monteſquieu*, *Blackſtone*, &c.

I have only to add, that I am truly aſhamed of having, in this introduction, had occaſion to ſay ſo much about myſelf. But, I hope, candid allowances will be made for it, when it is conſidered how much, for ſome time, has been ſaid and writ about me. I now leave an open field to all who ſhall pleaſe to take any farther notice of me. Wiſhing them the ſame ſatisfaction that I have felt in *meaning* to promote peace and juſtice, and looking higher than this world of ſtrife and tumult—I withdraw from politics.

(*a*) *Three Letters*, p. 48.

PART

PART I.

SUPPLEMENTAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE and VALUE of CIVIL LIBERTY and FREE GOVERNMENT.

SECT. I.

Of the Nature of Civil Liberty, and the Eſſentials of a Free Government.

WITH reſpect to Liberty in general there are two queſtions to be conſidered: Firſt, What it is?—And Secondly, How far it is of value?

There is no difficulty in anſwering the firſt of theſe queſtions.—To be FREE, is "to be able to act or to forbear acting, as we think beſt;" or "to be maſters of our own reſolutions and conduct."——It may be pretended, that it is not deſirable to be thus free; but, without doubt, this it is to be *free*; and this is what all mean when they ſay of themſelves or others that they are *free.*

I have obſerved, that all the different kinds of Liberty run up into the general idea of ſelf-government (*a*).——The Liberty of men as *agents* is that power of ſelf-determination which all agents, as ſuch, poſſeſs.—Their Liberty as *moral* agents is their power of ſelf-government in their *moral* conduct.—Their Liberty as *religious* agents is their power of ſelf-government in *religion.*—— And their Liberty, as members of communities aſſociated for the purpoſes of civil government, is their power of ſelf-government in all their civil concerns. It is Liberty, in the laſt of theſe views of it, that is the ſubject of my preſent enquiry; and it may, in other words, be defined to be "the power of a ſtate to govern itſelf by its own "will."——In order, therefore, to determine whether a ſtate is free, no more is neceſſary than to determine whether there is any will, different from its own, to which it is ſubject.

When we ſpeak of a ſtate, we mean the *whole* ſtate, and not any *part* of it; and the will of the ſtate, therefore, is the will of the whole.—— There are two ways in which this will may be expreſſed. Firſt, by the ſuffrages of all the members given in perſon. Or ſecondly, by the ſuffrages

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(*a*) See Obſervations on Civil Liberty, Part I. Sect. 1.

frages of a body of Repreſentatives, in appointing whom all the members have voices.——A ſtate governed by its own will in the firſt of theſe ways enjoys the moſt complete and perfect Liberty; but ſuch a government being impracticable, except in very ſmall ſtates, it is neceſſary that civil communities in general ſhould ſatisfy themſelves with that degree of Liberty which can be obtained in the laſt of theſe ways; and Liberty ſo obtained may be ſufficiently ample, and at the ſame time is capable of being extended to the largeſt ſtates (*a*).

But here, before I proceed, I muſt deſire, that an obſervation may be attended to, which appears to me of conſiderable conſequence.——A diſtinction ſhould be made between the *Liberty* of a ſtate, and its not ſuffering oppreſſion; or between a free government, and a government under which freedom is enjoyed. Under the moſt deſpotic government liberty may happen to be enjoyed. But being derived from a will over which the ſtate has no controul, and not from its own will; or from an accidental mildneſs in the *adminiſtration*, and not from a *conſtitution* of government; it is nothing but an indulgence of a precarious nature, and of little importance.——Individuals in pri-

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(*a*) See Obſervations, Part I. ſect. 2.

vate life, while held under the power of maſters, cannot be denominated free, however equitably and kindly they may be treated. This is ſtrictly true of *communities* as well as of *individuals.*——Civil Liberty (it ſhould be remembered) muſt be enjoyed as a right derived from the Author of nature only, or it cannot be the bleſſing which merits this name. If there is any human power which is conſidered as *giving* it, on which it depends, and which can invade or recall it at pleaſure, it changes its nature, and becomes a ſpecies of ſlavery.

But to return——The force ſuperſeding ſelf-government in a ſtate, or the power deſtroying its Liberty, is of two kinds. It may be either a power *without* itſelf, or a power *within* itſelf. The former conſtitutes what may be properly called *external*, and the latter *internal* ſlavery.—Were there any diſtant ſtate which had acquired a ſovereignty over this country, and exerciſed the power of making its laws and diſpoſing its property, we ſhould be in the firſt kind of ſlavery; and, if not totally depraved by a habit of ſubjection to ſuch a power, we ſhould think ourſelves in a miſerable condition; and an advocate for ſuch a power would be conſidered as inſulting us, who ſhould attempt to reconcile us to it by telling us, that we were *one* community with that diſtant ſtate, though deſtitute of a ſingle voice in its legiſlature; and, on this ground, ſhould maintain, that all reſiſtance to it was no leſs criminal than any reſiſtance *within* a ſtate to the authority of that ſtate.—In ſhort, every ſtate, not incorporated with another by an equal repreſentation, and yet ſubject to its dominion, is enſlaved in this ſenſe.—Such was the ſlavery of the provinces ſubject to antient *Rome*; and ſuch is the ſlavery of every community, as far as any other community is maſter of it; or as far as, in reſpect of taxation and internal legiſlation, it is not independent of every other community. Nor does it make any difference to ſuch a community, that it enjoys within itſelf a free conſtitution of government, if that conſtitution is itſelf liable to be altered, ſuſpended or over-ruled at the diſcretion of the ſtate which poſſeſſes the ſovereignty over it.

But the ſlavery moſt prevalent in the world has been internal ſlavery.——In order better to explain this, it is proper to obſerve, that all civil government being either the government of a *whole* by *itſelf*, or of a *whole* by a *power extraneous* to it, or of a *whole* by a *part*; the firſt *alone* is LIBERTY, and the two laſt are TYRANNY, producing the two ſorts of ſlavery which I have mentioned. Internal ſlavery, therefore, takes place wherever a whole community is governed by a *part*; and this, perhaps, is the moſt conciſe and comprehenſive account that can be given of it.—The part that governs may be either a *ſingle* man, as in *abſolute Monarchies*; or, a body of grandees, as in *Ariſtocracies.* In both theſe caſes the powers of government are commonly held for life without delegation, and deſcend from father to ſon; and the people governed are in the ſame ſituation with cattle upon an eſtate, which deſcends by inheritance from one owner to another.——But farther. A community may be governed by a body of delegates, and yet be enſlaved.——Though government by repreſentation alone is free, unleſs when carried on by the perſonal ſuffrages of all the members of a ſtate, yet *all* ſuch government is by no means free. In order to render it ſo, the following requiſites are neceſſary.

Firſt, The repreſentation muſt be *complete.* No ſtate, a *part* of which only is repreſented in the Legiſlature that governs it, is *ſelf*-governed. Had *Scotland* no repreſentatives in the Parliament of *Britain*, it would not be free; nor would it be proper to call *Britain* free, though *England*, its other part, were adequately repreſented. The like is true, in general, of every country ſubject to a Legiſlature in which *ſome* of its parts, or ſome claſſes of men in it, are repreſented, and others not.

Secondly, The repreſentatives of a free ſtate muſt be *freely* choſen. If this is not the caſe, they are not at all repreſentatives; and government by them degenerates into government by a junto of men in the community, who happen to have power or wealth enough to command or purchaſe their offices.

Thirdly, After being *freely* choſen, they muſt be themſelves *free*. If there is any higher will which directs their reſolutions, and on which they are dependent, they become the inſtruments of that will; and it is that will alone that in reality governs the ſtate.

Fourthly, They muſt be choſen for ſhort terms; and, in all their acts, be accountable to their conſtituents. Without this a people will have no controul over their repreſentatives; and, in chuſing them, they will give up entirely their Liberty; and only enjoy the poor privilege of naming, at certain intervals, a ſet of men whom they are to *ſerve*, and who are to diſpoſe, at their diſcretion, of their property and lives.

The cauſes of internal ſlavery now mentioned prevail, ſome of them more and others leſs, in different communities. With reſpect, in particular, to a government by repreſentation; it is evident, that it deviates more or leſs from Liberty, in proportion as the repreſentation is more or leſs imperfect. And, if imperfect in every one of the inſtances I have recited; that is, if inadequate and partial; ſubject to no controul from the people; corruptly choſen for long terms; and, after being choſen, venal and dependent;—in theſe circumſtances, a repreſentation becomes an impoſition and a nuſance; and government by it is as inconſiſtent with true Liberty as the moſt arbitrary and deſpotic government.

I have been ſo much miſunderſtood (*a*) on this ſubject, that it is neceſſary I ſhould particularly obſerve here, that my intention in this account has been merely to ſhew what is requiſite to conſtitute a ſtate or a government free, and not at all to define the beſt form of government. Theſe are two very different points. The firſt is attended with few difficulties. A free ſtate is a ſtate ſelf-governed in the manner I have deſcribed. But it may be free, and yet not enjoy the beſt conſtitution of government. Liberty, though the moſt eſſential requiſite in government, is not the only one. Wiſdom, union, diſpatch, ſecreſy, and vigour are likewiſe requiſite; and that is the beſt form of government which beſt unites all theſe qualities; or which, to an equal and perfect Liberty, adds the greateſt

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(*a*) The greateſt part of Mr. *Goodricke's* remarks are founded on this miſunderſtanding. He is ſo candid that I know he did not mean to miſrepreſent me; and yet I cannot help thinking it hard, after repeated declarations of my preference of ſuch a conſtitution as our own, to be conſidered as an advocate for a pure Democracy. See *Obſervations on Dr. Price's Theory and Principles of Civil Liberty and Government*, by Mr. GOODRICKE.

wiſdom in deliberating and reſolving, and the greateſt union, force and expedition in executing *(a)*.

In ſhort, my whole meaning is, that the will of the Community alone ought to govern; but that there are different methods of obtaining and executing this will; of which thoſe are the beſt which collect into it moſt of the knowledge and experience of the community, and at the ſame time carry it into execution with moſt diſpatch and vigour.

It has been the employment of the wiſeſt men in all ages to contrive plans for this purpoſe; and the happineſs of ſociety depends ſo much on civil government, that it is not poſſible the human underſtanding ſhould be better employed.

I have ſaid in the Obſervations on Civil Liberty, that "in a free ſtate every man is his own legiſlator."—I have been happy in ſince finding the *(b)* ſame aſſertion in *Monteſquieu*, and alſo in

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(*a*) One of the beſt plans of this kind has been with much ability, deſcribed by Mr. De Lolme, in his account of the Conſtitution of England.

(*b*) "As in a free ſtate, every man who is ſuppoſed a free "agent, ought to be his own governor; ſo the legiſlative "power ſhould reſide in the whole body of the people." *Spirit of Laws*, Book XI. chap. vi. See likewiſe Juſtice Blackſtone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, page 158. 1ſt Vol. oct. edition.——*Demoſthenes* ſpeaking in his firſt Philippic, ſect. 3d. of certain free ſtates, calls them *their own legiſlators*, αυτονομουμενα καὶ ελευθερα.

Mr. Juſtice *Blackſtone*'s Commentaries. It expreſſes the fundamental principle of our conſtitution; and the meaning of it is plainly, that every independent agent in a free ſtate ought to have a ſhare in the government of it, either by himſelf *perſonally*, or by a body of repreſentatives, in chuſing whom he has a free vote, and therefore all the concern and weight which are poſſible, and conſiſtent with the equal rights of every other member of the ſtate.——But though the meaning of this aſſertion is ſo obvious, and the truth of it undeniable, it has been much exclaimed againſt, and occaſioned no ſmall part of the oppoſition which has been made to the principles advanced in the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty.*——One even of the moſt candid, as well as the ableſt of my opponents, (whoſe difference of opinion from me I ſincerely lament) has intimated, that it implies, that, in a free ſtate, *(a) thieves and pick-pockets have a right to make laws for themſelves.*——The public will not, I hope, wonder that I chuſe to take little notice of ſuch objections.

It has been ſaid, that the liberty for which I have pleaded, is " a right or power in every one

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(*a*) See *Remarks*, printed for Mr. Cadell, *on a pamphlet publiſhed by Dr. Price. In a letter from a gentleman in the country to a member of parliament*, page 10.

" to act as he likes without any reſtraint."—— However unfairly this repreſentation has been given of my account of liberty, I am ready to adopt it, provided it is underſtood with a few limitations.——MORAL LIBERTY, in particular, cannot be better defined than by calling it " a " power in every one to do as he likes." My opponents in general ſeem to be greatly puzzled with this; and I am afraid it will ſignify little to attempt explaining it to them by ſaying, that every man's will, if perfectly free from reſtraint, would carry him invariably to rectitude and virtue; and that no one who acts wickedly acts as he *likes*, but is conſcious of a tyranny within him overpowering his judgment, and carrying him into a conduct, for which he condemns and hates himſelf. *The things that he would he does not*; (a) *and the things that he would not, thoſe he does.* He is, therefore, a ſlave in the properest ſenſe.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, likewiſe, is a power of acting as we *like* in religion; or of profeſſing and practiſing that mode of religious worſhip which we think moſt acceptable to the Deity.——But here the limitation to which I have referred muſt be attended to. ALL have the ſame unalienable right to this Liberty; and conſequently, no one has a right to ſuch a uſe of it as ſhall take it from others.

(a) Rom. vii.

Within this limit, or as far as he does not encroach on the equal liberty of others, every one has a right to do as he pleaſes in religion.——That the right to religious Liberty goes as far as this every one muſt allow, who is not a friend to perſecution; and that it cannot go farther, is ſelf-evident; for if it did, there would be a contradiction in the natures of things; and it would be true, that every one had a right to enjoy what every one had a right to deſtroy.——If, therefore, the religious faith of any perſon leads him to hurt another becauſe he profeſſes a different faith; or if it carries him, in any inſtances, to intolerance, Liberty itſelf requires he ſhould be reſtrained, and that, in ſuch inſtances, he ſhould loſe his liberty.

All this is equally applicable to the Liberty of man in his *civil* capacity; and it is a maxim true univerſally, "that as far as any one does not "moleſt *others*, others ought not to moleſt *him*."——All have a right to the free and undiſturbed poſſeſſion of their good names, properties and lives; and it is the right all have to this that gives the right to eſtabliſh civil government, which is or ought to be nothing but an inſtitution (by laws and proviſions made with *common* conſent) for guarding this right againſt invaſion; for giving to every one, in *temporals* and *ſpirituals*, the power of commanding his own conduct; or, of acting as he pleaſes, and going where he will, provided he does not run foul of others.——Juſt government, therefore, does not *infringe* liberty, but *eſtabliſh* it.——It does not *take away* the rights of mankind, but *protect* and *confirm* them.——I will add, that it does not even create any new ſubordinations of particular men to one another, but only gives ſecurity in thoſe ſeveral ſtations, whether of authority and pre-eminence, or of ſubordination and dependence, which nature has eſtabliſhed, and which muſt have ariſen among mankind whether civil government had been inſtituted or not. But this goes beyond my purpoſe in this place, and more will be ſaid of it preſently.

To ſum up the whole—Our ideas of Civil Liberty will be rendered more diſtinct by conſidering it under the three following views:—The Liberty of the *citizen*—The liberty of the *government*—And the liberty of the *community*.——A *citizen* is free when the power of commanding his own conduct and the quiet poſſeſſion of his life, perſon, property and good name are *ſecured* to him by being his own legiſlator in the ſenſe explained in page 10 (*a*).——A *government* is free when conſtituted

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(*a*) Dr. **Priestly**, in his Eſſay on the *firſt principles of Government*, makes a diſtinction between *civil* Liberty and *political* Liberty; the former of which he defines to be " the power conſtituted in ſuch a manner as to give this *ſecurity.*——And the freedom of a community or nation is the ſame among nations, that the freedom of a citizen is among his fellow-citizens.——It is not, therefore, as obſerved in page 3, the mere poſſeſſion of Liberty that denominates a citizen or a community free; but that *ſecurity* for the poſſeſſion of it which ariſes from ſuch a free government as I have deſcribed; and which takes place, when there exiſts no power that can take it away.——It is in the ſame ſenſe that the mere performance of virtuous actions is not what denominates an agent virtuous; but the temper and habits from whence they ſpring; or that *inward conſtitution*, and right balance of the affections, which *ſecure* the practice of virtue, produce ſtability of conduct, and conſtitute a *character.*

I cannot imagine how it can be diſputed whether this is a juſt account of the nature of Liberty. It has been already given more briefly in the Obſervations on Civil Liberty; and it is with reluctance I have repeated ſo much of what

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" power which the members of a ſtate ought to enjoy over " their actions;" and the latter, " their power of arriving at " public offices, or, at leaſt, of having votes in the nomina- " tion of thoſe who fill them."—This diſtinction forms a very proper ſubdiviſion of *the liberty of the citizen* here mentioned; and it may be accommodated to all I have ſaid on this ſubject, by only giving ſome leſs general name to that which Dr. Prieſtly calls *civil* Liberty.

has been there ſaid. But the wrong apprehenſions which have been entertained of my ſentiments have rendered this neceſſary. And, for the ſame reaſon, I am obliged to go on to the ſubject of the next ſection.

SECT. II.

Of the VALUE *of Liberty, and the* EXCELLENCE *of a Free Government.*

HAVING ſhewn in the preceding ſection "what Liberty is;" the next queſtion to be conſidered is, "how far it is valuable."

Nothing need be ſaid to ſhew the value of the three kinds of liberty which I have diſtinguiſhed under the names of *Phyſical*, *Moral*, and *Religious* Liberty. They are, without doubt, the foundation of all the happineſs and dignity of men, as reaſonable and moral agents, and the ſubjects of the Deity.—It is, in like manner, true of *Civil* Liberty, that it is the foundation of the whole happineſs and dignity of men as members of civil ſociety, and the ſubjects of civil government.

Firſt. It is Civil Liberty, or ſuch free government as I have deſcribed, that alone can give juſt ſecurity againſt oppreſſion. One government is better than another in proportion as it gives more of this ſecurity. It is, on this account, that the ſupreme government of the Deity is perfect.

There is not a poſſibility of being oppreſſed or aggrieved by it. Subjection to it is the ſame with complete freedom.

Were there any men on whoſe ſuperior wiſdom and goodneſs we might abſolutely depend, they could not poſſeſs too much power; and the love of liberty itſelf would engage us to fly to them, and to put ourſelves under their direction. But ſuch are the principles that govern human nature; ſuch the weakneſs and folly of men; ſuch their love of domination, ſelfiſhneſs, and depravity; that none of them can be raiſed to an elevation above others without the utmoſt danger. The conſtant experience of the world has verified this; and proved, that nothing intoxicates the human mind ſo much as power, and that men, when they have got poſſeſſion of it, have ſeldom failed to employ it in grinding their fellow-men, and gratifying the vileſt paſſions.—In the eſtabliſhment, therefore, of civil government, it would be prepoſterous to rely on the diſcretion of any men. If a people would obtain ſecurity againſt oppreſſion, they muſt ſeek it in *themſelves*, and never part with the powers of government out *of their own* hands. It is there only they can be ſafe.—A people will never oppreſs themſelves, or invade their own rights. But if they truſt the arbitrary will of any body or ſucceſſion of men, they truſt

ENEMIES, and it may be depended on that the worſt evils will follow.

It follows from hence, that a free government is the only government which is conſiſtent with the ends of government.——Men combine into communities and inſtitute government to obtain the peaceable enjoyment of their rights, and to defend themſelves againſt injuſtice and violence: And when they endeavour to ſecure theſe ends by ſuch a free government as I have deſcribed, improved by ſuch arrangements as may have a tendency to preſerve it from confuſion, and to concentrate in it as much as poſſible of the wiſdom and force of the community; In this caſe, it is a moſt rational and important inſtitution.——But when the contrary is done; and the benefits of government are ſought by eſtabliſhing a government of *men*, and not of *laws* made with common conſent; it becomes a moſt abſurd inſtitution.— It is ſeeking a remedy for oppreſſion in *one* quarter, by eſtabliſhing it in *another*; and avoiding the outrages of *little* plunderers, by conſtituting a ſet of *great* plunderers.——It is, in ſhort, the folly of *giving up* liberty in order to *maintain* Liberty; and, in the very act of endeavouring to ſecure the moſt valuable rights, to arm a body of enemies with power to deſtroy them.

I can eaſily believe, that mankind, in the firſt and rude ſtate of ſociety, might act thus irrationally. Abſolute governments, being the ſimpleſt forms of government, might be the firſt that were eſtabliſhed. A people having experienced the happy effects of the wiſdom or the valour of particular men, might be led to truſt them with unlimited power as their rulers and legiſlators. But they would ſoon find reaſon to repent: And the time, I hope, may come, when mankind in general, taught by long and dear experience, and *weary* of the abuſes of power under *ſlaviſh* governments, will learn to deteſt them, and never to give up that SELF-GOVERNMENT, which, whether we conſider men in their private or collective capacities, is the firſt of all the bleſſings they can poſſeſs.

Again. Free governments are the only governments which give ſcope to the exertion of the powers of men, and are favourable to their improvement.——The members of free ſtates, knowing their rights to be ſecure, and that they ſhall enjoy without moleſtation the fruits of every acquiſition they can make, are encouraged and incited to induſtry. Being at liberty to puſh their reſearches as far as they can into all ſubjects, and to guide themſelves by their own judgments in all their religious and civil concerns, while they allow others to do the ſame; error and ſuperſtition muſt loſe ground. Conſcious of being their own governors, bound to obey no laws except ſuch as they have given their conſent to, and ſubject to no controul from the arbitrary will of any of their fellow-citizens; they poſſeſs an elevation and force of mind which muſt make them great and happy.——How different is the ſituation of the vaſſals of deſpotic power?——Like cattle inured to the yoke, they are driven on in one track, afraid of ſpeaking or even thinking on the moſt intereſting points; looking up continually to a poor creature who is their maſter; their powers fettered; and ſome of the nobleſt ſprings of action in human nature rendered uſeleſs within them. There is nothing indeed more humiliating than that debaſement of mankind which takes place in ſuch ſituations.

It has been obſerved of free governments, that they are often torn by violent conteſts, which render them dreadful ſcenes of diſtreſs and anarchy. But it ought to be conſidered, that this has not been owing to the *nature* of ſuch governments; but to their having been ill-modelled, and wanted thoſe arrangements and ſupplemental checks which are neceſſary to conſtitute a wiſe form of government.——There is no reaſon to doubt, but that free governments may be ſo contrived, as to exclude the greateſt part of the ſtruggles and tumults which have ariſen in free ſtates; and, as far as they cannot be excluded, they will do more good than harm. They will occaſion the diſplay of powers, and produce exertions which can never be ſeen in the *ſtill* ſcenes of life. They are the active efforts of health and vigour; and always tend to preſerve and purify. Whereas, on the contrary, the *quiet* which prevails under ſlaviſh governments, and which may ſeem to be a recommendation of them, proceeds from an ignominious tameneſs, and ſtagnation of the human faculties. It is the ſame with the *ſtillneſs* of midnight, or the *ſilence* and torpor of death.

Further. Free governments are the only governments which are conſiſtent with the natural equality of mankind. This is a principle which, in my opinion, has been aſſumed, with the greateſt reaſon, by ſome of the beſt writers on government. But the meaning of it is not, that all the ſubordinations in human life owe their exiſtence to the inſtitution of civil government. The ſuperiorities and diſtinctions ariſing from the relation of parents to their children; from the differences in the perſonal qualities and abilities of men; and from ſervitudes founded on voluntary compacts, muſt have exiſted in a ſtate of nature, and would now take place were all men ſo virtuous as to leave no occaſion for civil government.——The maxim, therefore, "that all men are naturally equal," refers to their ſtate when grown up to maturity, and become independent agents, capable of acquiring property, and of directing their own conduct. And the ſenſe of it is, that no one of them is conſtituted by the author of nature the vaſſal or ſubject of another, or has any right to give law to him, or, without his conſent, to take away any part of his property, or to abridge him of his liberty.——In a ſtate of nature, one man may have received benefits from another; and this would lay the perſon obliged under an obligation of gratitude, but it would not make his *benefactor* his *maſter*; or give him a right to judge for him what grateful returns he ought to make, and to extort theſe from him.——In a ſtate of nature, alſo, one man may poſſeſs more ſtrength, or more knowledge, or more property than another; and this would give him weight and influence; but it would not give him any degree of authority. There would not be one human being who would be bound to *obey* him.——A perſon likewiſe, in a ſtate of nature, might let out his labour, or give up to another, on certain ſtipulated terms, the direction of his conduct; and this would ſo far bring him into the ſtation of a *ſervant*; but being done by himſelf, and on ſuch terms only as he chuſes to conſent to, it is an *inſtance* of his liberty;

and he will always have it in his power to quit the ſervice he has choſen, or to enter into another.

This equality or independence of men is one of their eſſential rights. (*a*) It is the ſame with that equality or independence which now actually takes place among the different ſtates or kingdoms of the World with reſpect to one another. Mankind came with this right from the hands of their Maker.——But all governments, which are not free, are totally inconſiſtent with it. They imply, that there are ſome of mankind who are born with an inherent right of dominion; and that the reſt are born under an obligation to ſubjection; and that civil government, instead of being founded on any compact, is nothing but the exerciſe of this right. Some ſuch ſentiments ſeem to be now reviving in this country, and even to be growing faſhionable. Moſt of the writers againſt the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty* argue on the ſuppoſition of a right in the *few* to govern the *many* (*b*), independently

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(*a*) See on this Subject an excellent Sermon entitled, *The Principles of the* REVOLUTION *vindicated.* By Dr. Watſon, Regius Profeſſor of Divinity, at Cambridge.

(*b*) Some who maintain this doctrine concerning government, overthrow their own ſyſtem by acknowledging "the right of reſiſtance in certain caſes." For, if there is ſuch a right, the people muſt be judges *when* it ought to be exerciſed; a right to reſiſt only when civil governors *think* there is reaſon, being a groſs abſurdity and nullity.——The right of reſiſtance, pendently of their own choice. Some of theſe writers have gone ſo far as to aſſert, in plain language, that civil governors derive their power immediately from the Deity; and are *his* agents or repreſentatives, accountable to him only. And one courtly writer, in particular, has honoured them with the appellation of OUR POLITICAL GODS. ——Probably, this is the idea of civil governors entertained by the author of the *Remarks on the Acts of the Thirteenth Parliament of Great Britain*: for it is not eaſy to imagine on what other ground he can aſſert, that *property* and *civil rights* are derived from civil governors, and their *gifts* to mankind (*a*).

ſiſtance, therefore, cannot mean leſs than a right in the people, whenever they think it neceſſary, to change their governors, and to limit their power. And from the moment this is done, government becomes the work of the people, and governors become their truſtees or agents.

(*a*) It has been commonly reckoned, that it is the end of civil government and civil laws to protect the *property* and *rights* of men; but, according to this writer, civil government and civil laws create *property* and *rights*. It follows therefore, that, antecedently to civil laws, men could have no *property* or *rights*; and that civil governors, being the makers of civil laws, it is a contradiction to ſuppoſe, that mankind can have any property or rights which are valid againſt the claims of their governors. See Three Letters to Dr. *Price*, p. 21, &c. And Remarks on the principal Acts of the 13th Parliament of Great-Britain, p. 58, &c. and p. 191.

If theſe ſentiments are juſt, civil governors are indeed an awful order of beings; and it becomes us to enquire with anxiety who they are, and how we may diſtinguiſh them from the reſt of mankind.——Shall we take for ſuch all, whether *men* or *women*, whom we find in actual poſſeſſion of civil power, whatever may be their characters; or however they may have acquired their power?—This is too extravagant to be aſſerted. It would legalize the *American* Congreſs.——There muſt then be ſome *pretenders* among civil governors; and it is neceſſary we ſhould know how to diſcover them. It is incredible, that the Deity ſhould not have made this eaſy to us, by ſome particular marks and diſtinctions, which point out to our notice his *real* vicegerents; juſt as he has pointed out man, by his figure and ſuperior powers, to be the governor of the lower creatures.——In particular, theſe perſons muſt be poſſeſſed of wiſdom and goodneſs ſuperior to thoſe of the reſt of mankind (*n*); for, without this, a grant of the powers they are ſuppoſed to poſſeſs would be nothing but a grant of power to injure and oppreſs, without remedy and without bounds. But this is a teſt by which they cannot be tryed. It would leave but few of them in poſſeſſion of the places they hold

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(*n*) This has been done in a lower inſtance. Parents have been furniſhed with a particular affection for their children, in order to prevent any abuſe of their power over them.

hold and the rights they claim. It is not in the high ranks of life, or among the great and mighty, that we are to ſeek wiſdom and goodneſs. Theſe love the ſhade, and fly from obſervation. They are to be found chiefly in the middle ranks of life, and among the contemplative and philoſophical, who decline public employments, and look down with pity on the ſcramble for power among mankind, and the reſtleſſneſs and miſery of ambition.——It is proper to add, that it has never been hitherto underſtood that any ſuperiority in intellectual and moral qualifications lays the foundation of a claim to *dominion*.

It is not then, by their ſuperior endowments, that the Deity intended to point out to us the *few* whom he has deſtined to command the *many*. —But in what other manner could they be diſtinguiſhed?——Muſt we embrace Sir *Robert Filmer's Patriarchal* ſcheme? One would have thought, that Mr. *Locke* has ſaid more than enough to expoſe this ſtupid ſcheme. One of my opponents, however, has adopted it; and the neceſſary inference from it is that, as there is but now one lineal deſcendent from Adam's eldeſt ſon, there can be but one rightful monarch of the world.— But I will not abuſe my reader's patience by ſaying more on this ſubject. I am ſorry that in this country there ſhould be any occaſion for taking notice of principles ſo abſurd, and at the ſame time ſo pernicious (a). I ſay, PERNICIOUS; for they imply, that King *James* the Second was depoſed at the Revolution unlawfully and impiouſly; that the preſent King is an uſurper; and that the preſent government, being derived from rebellion and treaſon, has no right to our allegiance.

Without all doubt, it is the choice of the people that makes civil governors.—The people are the ſpring of all civil power, and they have a right to modify it as they pleaſe.

(a) "In ages of darkneſs, and too often alſo in thoſe of
" greater knowledge, by the perfidious arts of deſigning
" princes, and by the baſe ſervility of too many eccleſiaſtics,
" who managed the ſuperſtition of the populace, by the vio-
" lent reſtraints put upon divulging any juſter ſentiments
" about the rights of mankind, the natural notions of polity
" were erazed out of the minds of men; and they were filled
" with ſome confuſed imaginations of ſomething adorable in
" monarchs, ſome repreſentation of the Divinity; and that
" even in the worſt of them; and of ſome certain Divine
" claims in certain families.——No wonder this! that mil-
" lions thus look upon themſelves as a piece of property to
" one of their fellows as ſilly and worthleſs as the meaneſt
" of them; when the like arts of ſuperſtition have made mil-
" lions, nay, the very artificers themſelves, fall down before
" the block or ſtone they had ſet up; or adore monkies, cats,
" and crocodiles, as the ſovereign diſpoſers of their fortunes."
See Dr. HUTCHESON's Syſtem of Moral Philoſophy. Vol. ii.

Mankind being naturally equal according to the foregoing explanation, civil government, *in its genuine intention*, is an inſtitution for maintaining that equality, by defending it againſt the encroachments of violence and tyranny. All the ſubordinations and diſtinctions in ſociety previous to its eſtabliſhment, it leaves as it found them, only confirming and protecting them. It makes no man *maſter* of another. It elevates no perſon above his fellow citizens. On the contrary, it levels all by fixing all in a ſtate of ſubjection to one common authority.—The authority of the laws.—The will of the community.—TAXES are *given*; not *impoſed*. LAWS are regulations of common choice; not injunctions of ſuperior power.—The authority of magiſtrates is the authority of the State; and their ſalaries are wages paid by the State for executing its will and doing its buſineſs. *They* do not govern the *State*. It is the *State* governs *them*; and had they juſt ideas of their own ſtations, they would conſider themſelves as no leſs properly *ſervants* of the Public, than the labourers who work upon its roads, or the ſoldiers who fight its battles.—A KING, in particular, is only the firſt executive officer; the creature of the law; and as much accountable and ſubject to the law as the meaneſt peaſant (*a*). And were Kings properly attentive

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(*a*) "Let not, therefore, theſe *pretended maſters* of the "people be allowed even to do good againſt the general "conſent.

to their duty, and as anxious as they ſhould be about performing it, they could not eaſily avoid ſinking under the weight of their charge.

The account now given is, I am fully perſuaded, in every particular, a true account of what civil government *ought* to be; and it teaches us plainly the great importance and excellence of FREE Government.——It is this only that anſwers the deſcription I have given of government; that ſecures againſt oppreſſion; that gives room for that elevation of ſpirit and that exertion of the human powers which is neceſſary to human improvement; or that is conſiſtent with the ends of government, with the rights of mankind, and their natural equality and independence. *Free* Government, therefore, only, is *juſt* and *legitimate* government.

It follows farther from the preceding account, that no people can lawfully ſurrender or cede their Liberty. This muſt appear to any one who

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" conſent.——Let it be conſidered, that the condition of " rulers is exactly the ſame as that of the Cacique, who being " aſked whether he had any ſlaves, anſwered; *Slaves? I* " *know but one ſlave in all my diſtrict, and that is myſelf.*" See the Philoſophical and Political Hiſtory of the Settlements and Trade of the *Europeans* in the EAST AND WEST INDIES. Tranſlated from the French of the Abbe *Raynal*, by Mr. *Juſtamond*. Vol. v. page 414.

who will conſider, that when a people make ſuch a ceſſion, and the extenſive powers of government are truſted to the diſcretion of any man or body of men, they part with the powers of life and death, and give themſelves up a prey to oppreſſion; that they make themſelves the inſtruments of any injuſtice in which their rulers may chuſe to employ them, by arming them againſt neighbouring ſtates; and alſo, that they do this not only for *themſelves*, but for their *poſterity*.——I will add, that if ſuch a ceſſion has been made; or if through any cauſes, a people have loſt their Liberty, they muſt have a right to emancipate themſelves as ſoon as they can (*a*). In attempting this, indeed, they ought to conſider the ſufferings which may attend the ſtruggle, and the evils which may ariſe from a defeat. But at the ſame time, it will be proper to conſider, that the ſufferings attending ſuch a ſtruggle muſt be temporary, whereas the evils to be avoided are permanent; and that Liberty is a bleſſing ſo ineſtimable, "that whenever there appears any probability of recovering it, a people ſhould be "willing to run many hazards, and even not to

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(*a*) See Obſ. p. 25. "The rights of mankind are ſo ſacred "that no preſcription of tyranny or arbitrary power can have "authority enough to aboliſh them." Mr. *Hume's* Eſſays, vol. iii. Eſſay on the Coalition of Parties.

"repine at the greateſt expence of blood or trea-"ſure." (*a*)

I am very ſenſible, that civil government, as it actually exiſts in the world, by no means anſwers to the account I have given of it.——Inſtead of being an inſtitution for guarding the weak againſt the ſtrong, we find it an inſtitution which makes the ſtrong yet ſtronger, and gives them a ſyſtematical power of oppreſſing. Inſtead of promoting virtue and reſtraining vice, encouraging free enquiry, eſtabliſhing Liberty, and protecting alike all peaceable perſons in the enjoyment of their civil and religious rights; we ſee a ſavage deſpotiſm, under its name, laying waſte the earth, unreaſonably elevating ſome and depreſſing others, diſcouraging improvement, and trampling upon every human right. That force of ſtates, which ought to be applied only to their own defence, we ſee continually applied to the purpoſe of attack, and uſed to extend dominion by conquering neighbouring communities.——Civil governors conſider not themſelves as *ſervants* but as *maſters*. Their ſtations they think they hold in their own right. The people they reckon their property;

(*a*) "Mankind have been generally a great deal too tract-"able; and hence ſo many wretched forms of power have "always enſlaved nine tenths of the nations of the world, "where they have the fulleſt right to make all efforts for a "change." Dr. *Hutcheſon's* Moral Philoſophy. Vol. ii. p. 280.

and their poſſeſſions, a common *ſtock* from which they have a right to take what (*a*) they will, and of which no more belongs to any individual than they are pleaſed to *leave* him.

What a miſerable perverſion is this of a moſt important inſtitution? What a grievance is government ſo degenerated?——But this perverſion furniſhes no juſt argument againſt the truth of the account I have given. Similar degeneracies have prevailed in other inſtances of no leſs importance.

Reaſon in man, like the will of the community in the political world, was intended to give law to his whole conduct, and to be the ſupreme controuling power within him. The paſſions are ſubordinate powers, or an *executive force*, under the direction of reaſon, kindly given to be, as it were, wind and tide to the veſſel of life in its courſe through this world to future honour and felicity.——How different from this is the *actual* ſtate of man?——Thoſe powers which were deſtined to *govern* are made to *ſerve*; and thoſe powers which were deſtined to *ſerve*, are allowed to *govern*. Paſſion guides human life; and moſt

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(*a*) See Remarks on the Acts of the Thirteenth Parliament of *Great Britain*. P. 34. &c.——"Is not the ſame reaſoning "applicable to taxes paid for the ſupport of civil government? "Are not theſe too the property of the civil magiſtrate?" Ibid. p. 56.——If I underſtand this writer, his meaning is, not only that the taxes which the civil magiſtrate *has* impoſed are his property; but alſo, *any* which he ſhall pleaſe to impoſe.

men make no other uſe of their reaſon than to juſtify whatever their intereſt or their inclinations determine them to do.

RELIGION likewiſe (the perfection of REASON) is, in its true nature, the inſpirer of humanity and joy, and the ſpring of all that can be great and worthy in a character; and were we to ſee its genuine effects among mankind, we ſhould ſee nothing but peace and hope and juſtice and kindneſs, founded on that regard to God and to his will, which is the nobleſt principle of action.—But how different an aſpect does religion actually wear? What is it, too generally, in the practice of mankind, but a gloomy and cruel ſuperſtition, rendering them ſevere and ſour; teaching them to compound for wickedneſs by punctuality in religious forms; and prompting them to harraſs, perſecute and exterminate one another?

The ſame perverſion has taken place ſtill more remarkably in CHRISTIANITY; the perfection of RELIGION.—JESUS CHRIST has eſtabliſhed among Chriſtians an abſolute equality. He has declared, that they have but *one* maſter, even himſelf; and that they are all *brethren*; and, therefore, has commanded them not to be called *maſters*; and, inſtead of aſſuming authority over one another, to be ready to *waſh one another's feet* (a). The princes of the Gentiles, he ſays, exerciſe lordſhip over them, and are flattered with (*a*) high titles; but he has ordained, that it ſhall not be ſo amongſt his followers; and that if any one of them would be *chief*, he muſt be the *ſervant* of all.——The clergy in his church are, by his appointment, no more than a body of men, choſen by the different ſocieties of Chriſtians, to conduct their worſhip, and to promote their ſpiritual improvement, without any other powers than thoſe of perſuaſion and inſtruction. It is expreſsly directed, that they ſhall not make themſelves Lords of *God's heritage*, or exerciſe dominion over the faith of Chriſtians, but be *helpers of their joy* (*b*).——Who can, without aſtoniſhment, compare theſe appointments of Chriſtianity, with the events which have happened in the Chriſtian church?——That religion which thus inculcates humility and forbids all domination, and the end of which was to produce *peace on earth, and good-will among men*, has been turned into an occaſion of animoſities the moſt dreadful, and of ambition the moſt deſtructive. Notwithſtanding its mildneſs and benignity, and the tendency it has to extinguiſh in the human breaſt pride and malevolence; it has been the means of arming the ſpirits of men with unrelenting fury

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(a) Matth. xxiii. 8—12.——John xiii. 14.

(*a*) Luke xxii. 25, &c. (*b*) 1 Pet. v. 3.——2 Cor. i. 24.

againſt one another. Inſtead of *peace*, it has brought a *ſword*; and its profeſſors, inſtead of waſhing one another's feet, have endeavoured to tread on one another's necks.——The miniſters, in particular, of Chriſtianity, became, ſoon after its eſtabliſhment, an independent body of ſpiritual rulers, nominating one another in perpetual ſucceſſion; claiming, by divine right, the higheſt powers; and forming a HIERARCHY, which by degrees produced a deſpotiſm more extravagant than any that ever before exiſted on this earth.

A conſiderate perſon muſt find difficulties in enquiring into the cauſes and reaſons of that depravity of human nature which has produced theſe evils, and rendered the beſt inſtitutions liable to be ſo corrupted. This enquiry is much the ſame with the enquiry into the origin of moral evil, which has in all ages puzzled human wiſdom. I have at preſent nothing to do with it. It is enough for my purpoſe in theſe obſervations, that the facts I have mentioned prove undeniably, that the ſtate of civil government in the world affords no reaſon for concluding, that I have not given a juſt account of its true nature and origin.

I have ſhewn at the beginning of this ſection, that it is free government alone that can preſerve from oppreſſion, give ſecurity to the rights of a people, and anſwer the ends of government. It is neceſſary I ſhould here obſerve, that I would not be underſtood to mean, that there can be no *kind* or *degree* of ſecurity for the rights of a people, under any government which cannot be denominated free. Even under an abſolute Monarchy or an Ariſtrocracy, there may be laws and cuſtoms which, having gained ſacredneſs by time, may reſtrain oppreſſion, and afford ſome important ſecurities.——Under governments by repreſentation, there muſt be ſtill greater checks on oppreſſion, provided the repreſentation, though partial, is uncorrupt, and alſo frequently changed. In theſe circumſtances, there may be ſo much of a common intereſt between the body of repreſentatives and the people; and they may ſtand ſo much on one ground, that there will be no temptations to oppreſſion.——The taxes which the repreſentative body impoſe, they will be obliged themſelves to pay; and the laws they make, they will make with the proſpect of ſoon returning to the ſituation of thoſe for whom they make them, and of being themſelves governed by them.

It ſeems particularly worth notice here, that as far as there are any ſuch checks under any government, they are the conſequence of its partaking ſo far of Liberty, and that the ſecurity attending them is more or leſs in proportion as a government partakes more or leſs of Liberty.

If, under an abſolute government, fundamental laws and long eſtabliſhed inſtitutions give ſecurity in any inſtances, it is becauſe they are held ſo ſacred that a deſpot is afraid to violate them; or, in other words, becauſe a people, not being completely ſubdued, have ſtill ſome controul over the government.——The like is more evidently true under mixed governments of which a houſe of repreſentatives, fairly choſen and freely deliberating and reſolving, forms a part; and it is one of the higheſt recommendations of ſuch governments that, even when the repreſentation is moſt imperfect, they have a tendency to give more ſecurity than any other governments.——Under other governments, it is the fear of exciting inſurrections, by contradicting eſtabliſhed maxims, that reſtrains oppreſſion. But, as, in general, a people will bear much, and are ſeldom driven to reſiſtance till grievances become intolerable, their rulers can venture far without danger; and therefore, under ſuch governments, are very imperfectly reſtrained. On the contrary; If there is an honeſt repreſentation, veſted with powers like to thoſe of our *Houſe of Commons*, the redreſs of grievances, as ſoon as they appear, will be always eaſily attainable, and the rulers of a ſtate will be under a neceſſity of regarding the firſt beginnings of diſcontent.—Such, and greater than can be eaſily deſcribed, are the advantages of even an *imperfect repreſentation* in a government. How great then muſt be the bleſſing of a COMPLETE REPRESENTATION?——(a) It is this only gives full ſecurity; and that can properly denominate a people free.

It deſerves to be added here, that as there can be no private character ſo abandoned as to want *all* virtue; ſo there can be no government ſo ſlaviſh, as to exclude *every* reſtraint upon oppreſſion.——The moſt ſlaviſh and, therefore, the worſt governments are thoſe under which there is nothing to ſet bounds to oppreſſion, beſides the *diſcretion* and *humanity* of thoſe who govern.——Of this kind are the following governments.

Firſt, All governments *purely* deſpotic. Theſe may be either monarchical, or ariſtocratical. The latter are the worſt, agreeably to a common obſervation, that it is better to have *one* maſter than *many*. The appetites of a ſingle deſpot may be eaſily ſatiated; but this may be impoſſible where there is a multitude.

Secondly, All provincial governments.——The hiſtory of mankind proves theſe to be the worſt of all governments; and that no oppreſſion is equal to that which one people are capable of exerciſing, towards another. I have mentioned ſome of the reaſons of this in the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, Part I. ſect. 3. Bodies of men do not feel for one another as individuals do. The *odium* of a cruel action, when ſhared among many, is not regarded. The maſter of ſlaves working on a plantation, though he may keep them down to prevent their becoming ſtrong enough to emancipate themſelves, yet is led by *intereſt*, as well as *humanity*, to govern them with ſuch moderation, as to preſerve their uſe: But theſe cauſes will produce more of this good effect, when the ſlaves are under the eye of their proprietor, and form a part of his family, than when they are ſettled on a diſtant plantation, where he can know little of them, and is obliged to truſt them to the management of rapacious ſervants.

(a) He who wants to be convinced of the *practicability*, even in this country, of a complete repreſentation, ſhould read a pamphlet lately publiſhed, the title of which is, TAKE YOUR CHOICE.

It is particularly obſervable here, that *free* governments, though happier in themſelves, are more oppreſſive to their provinces than deſpotic governments. Or, in other words, that the *ſubjects* of free (a) ſtates are worſe ſlaves than the ſubjects of ſtates not free. This is one of the obſervations which Mr. Hume repreſents as an univerſal axiom in politicks (b).——"Though,

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(a) "A *free* ſubject of a free ſtate" is a contradiction in terms.—See the Proclamation for a Faſt.

(b) Mr. Hume's Eſſays. Vol. i. Eſſay iv. p. 31.

"ſays he, free governments have been commonly "the moſt happy for thoſe who partake of their "freedom, yet are they the moſt oppreſſive and "ruinous to their provinces; and this obſervation "may be fixed as an univerſal axiom in politics. "What cruel tyrants were the Romans over the "world during the time of their commonwealth? "——After the diſſolution of the commonwealth "the Roman yoke became eaſier upon the pro-"vinces, as *Tacitus* informs us; and it may be "obſerved, that many of the worſt Emperors "(*Domitian*, for inſtance) were very careful to "prevent all oppreſſion of the provinces.—— "The oppreſſion and tyranny of the *Carthaginians* "over their ſubject ſtates in *Africa* went ſo far, as we learn from *Polybius* (Lib. 1. cap. 72.) "that not content with exacting the *half* of all "the produce of the ground, which of itſelf was a "very high rent, they alſo loaded them with many "other taxes.—If we paſs from antient to modern "times we ſhall always find the obſervation to "hold. The provinces of abſolute monarchies "are always better treated than thoſe of free "ſtates."

Thirdly, Among the worſt ſorts of governments I reckon all governments by a corrupt repreſentation.——There is no inſtance in which the trite obſervation is more true than in this, "that the beſt things when corrupted become the "worſt."

" worſt." A corrupt repreſentation is ſo far from being any *defence* againſt oppreſſion, that it is a *ſupport* to it. Long eſtabliſhed cuſtoms, in this caſe, afford no ſecurity, becauſe, under the ſanction of ſuch a repreſentation, they may be eaſily undermined or counteracted; nor is there any injury to a people which, with the help of ſuch an inſtrument, may not be committed with ſafety. It is not, however, every degree of corruption, that will deſtroy the uſe of a repreſentation, and turn it into an evil ſo dreadful. In order to this, corruption muſt paſs a certain limit. But *every degree* of it *tends* to this, ſaps the foundation of Liberty, and poiſons the fountain of Legiſlation. And when it gets to its laſt ſtage, and has proceeded its utmoſt length; When, in particular, the means by which candidates get themſelves choſen are ſuch as admit the *worſt*, but exclude the *beſt* men; a Houſe of Repreſentatives becomes little better than a ſink into which is collected all that is moſt worthleſs and vile in a kingdom.—— There cannot be a greater calamity than ſuch a government.——It is impoſſible there ſhould be a condition more wretched than that of a nation, once free, ſo degenerated.

CONCLUSION

IT is time to diſmiſs this ſubject. But I cannot take a final leave of it, (and probably of all ſubjects of this kind) without adding the following reflections on our own ſtate in this kingdom.

It is well known, that MONTESQUIEU has paid the higheſt compliment to this country, by deſcribing its conſtitution of government, in giving an account of a perfect government; and by drawing the character of its inhabitants, in giving an account of the manners and characters of a free people.——"All (he ſays) having, in free ſtates, a ſhare in "government, and the laws not being made for "ſome more than others, they conſider themſelves "as *monarchs*, and are more properly *confederates* "*than fellow-ſubjects*.——No one citizen being "ſubject to another, each ſets a greater value on "his Liberty than on the glory of any of his fel"low-citizens.——Being independent, they are "proud; for the pride of kings is founded on "their independence.——They are in a conſtant "ferment, and believe themſelves in danger, "even in thoſe moments when they are moſt "ſafe.——They reaſon; but it is indifferent whe"ther they reaſon well or ill. It is ſufficient "that they *do* reaſon. Hence ſprings that Li-"berty which is their ſecurity.——This ſtate, "however, will loſe its Liberty. It will periſh, "when the *Legiſlative* power ſhall become more "corrupt than the *executive*." (*a*)

Such is the account which this great writer gave, many years ago, of the *Britiſh* conſtitution and people. We may learn from it, that we have nothing to fear from that diſpoſition to examine every public meaſure, to cenſure miniſters of ſtate, and to be reſtleſs and clamorous, which has hitherto characterized us.——On the contrary; we ſhall have every thing to fear, when this diſpoſition is loſt. As ſoon as a people grow ſecure, and ceaſe to be quick in taking alarms, they are undone. A free conſtitution of government cannot be preſerved without an earneſt and unremitting jealouſy. OUR Conſtitution, in particular, is ſo excellent, that it is the propereſt object of ſuch a jealouſy. For my own part, I admire ſo much the general frame and principles of it, that I could be almoſt ſatisfied with that repreſentation of the kingdom, which forms the moſt important part of it, had I no other objection to this repreſentation than its *inadequateneſs*. Did it conſiſt of a body of men, fairly elected for a ſhort term, by a number of independent perſons, of all orders in every part of the king-

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(*a*) Spirit of Laws. Book xix. ch. 27.

dom, equal to the number of the preſent voters; and were it, after being elected, under no undue influence; it would be a ſecurity of ſuch importance, that I ſhould be leſs diſpoſed to complain of the injuſtice done, by its inadequateneſs, to the greateſt part of the kingdom by depriving them of one their natural and unalienable rights. To ſuch a body of repreſentatives we might commit, with confidence, the guardianſhip of our rights, knowing, that having one intereſt with the reſt of the ſtate, they could not violate them; or that if they ever did, a little time would bring the power of gaining redreſs without tumult or violence.——Happy the people ſo bleſſed.—— If wiſe, they will endeavour, by every poſſible method, to preſerve the purity of their repreſentation; and, ſhould it have degenerated, they will loſe no time in effecting a reformation of it.—— But if, unhappily, infection ſhould have pervaded the whole maſs of the ſtate, and there ſhould be no room to hope for any reformation, it will be ſtill ſome conſolation to reflect, that ſlavery, in all its rigour, will not immediately follow. Between the time in which the ſecurities of Liberty are undermined, and its final ſubverſion, there is commonly a flattering interval during which the *enjoyment* of Liberty may be continued, in conſequence of fundamental laws and rooted habits which cannot be at once exterminated. And this interval is longer or ſhorter, according as the progreſs of corruption is more or leſs rapid; and men in power more or leſs attentive to improve favourable opportunities. —— The government of this country, in particular, is ſo well balanced, and the inſtitutions of our common law are ſo admirable, and have taken ſuch deep root, that we can bear much decay before our liberties fall. ——Fall, however, they muſt, if our public affairs do not ſoon take a new turn. That very evil, which, according to the great writer I have quoted, is to produce our ruin, we ſee working every where and increaſing every day.——The following facts, among many others, ſhew too plainly whither we are tending and how far we are advanced.

Firſt. It ſeems to me, that a general indifference is gaining ground faſt among us.——This is the neceſſary effect of increaſing luxury and diſſipation; but there is another cauſe of it, which I think of with particular regret.—In conſequence of having been often duped by falſe patriots; and found, that the leaders of oppoſition, when they get into places, forget all their former declarations; the nation has been led to a conviction, that all patriotiſm is impoſture, and all oppoſition to the meaſures of government nothing but a ſtruggle for power and its emoluments. The honeſt and independent part of the nation entertain at preſent moſt of this conviction; and, therefore, having few public men to whom they can look with confidence, they give up all zeal, and ſink into inactivity and deſpondence.

Secondly. At the Revolution, the Houſe of Commons acquired its juſt weight in the conſtitution; and, for ſome years afterwards, it was often giving much trouble to men in power. Of late, it is well known, that means have been tryed and a ſyſtem adopted for quieting it.——I will not ſay with what ſucceſs——But I muſt ſay, that the men whoſe policy this has been, have ſtruck at the very *heart* of public liberty, and are the worſt traitors this kingdom ever ſaw.——"If ever, (ſays Judge *Blackſtone*) it ſhould happen, that the independency of any one of the three branches of our legiſlature ſhould be loſt; or that it ſhould become ſubſervient to the views of either of the other two, there would ſoon be an end of our conſtitution. The legiſlature would be changed from that which was originally ſet up by the general conſent and fundamental act of the ſociety; and ſuch a change, however effected, is according to Mr. *Locke* (who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire diſſolution of the bands of government, and the people are thereby reduced to a ſtate of anarchy, with liberty "to conſtitute to themſelves a new legiſlative "power." (*a*)

Thirdly. Soon after the REVOLUTION, bills for triennial parliaments paſſed both Houſes, in oppoſition to the court (*b*). At the ACCESSION, ſeptennial parliaments were eſtabliſhed. Since this laſt period, many attempts have been made, by the friends of the conſtitution, to reſtore triennial parliaments; and, formerly, it was not without difficulty that the miniſtry were able to defeat theſe attempts. The diviſion in the Houſe of Commons in 1735, on a bill for this purpoſe, was 247 to 184.——I need not ſay, that *now* all ſuch attempts drop of themſelves. So much are the ſentiments of our repreſentatives changed in this inſtance, that the motion for ſuch a bill, annually made by a worthy member of the Houſe of Commons, can ſcarcely produce a ſerious debate, or gain the leaſt attention.——For ſeveral years, at the beginning of the laſt reign, the HOUSE OF COMMONS conſtantly paſſed *penſion* and *place* bills, which were as conſtantly rejected by the HOUSE OF LORDS. At preſent, no one is ſo romantic as ever to think of introducing any ſuch bills into the Houſe of Commons.

(*a*) Introduction to the Commentaries on the Laws of England, p. 48. See alſo Book i. ch. 8.

(*b*) In 1692 King William rejected a bill for triennial Parliaments, after it had paſſed both Houſes. But in a following year he thought proper to give his aſſent to it.

Fourthly,

Fourthly. Standing armies have in all ages been deſtructive to the Liberties of the ſtates into which they have been admitted.—MONTESQUIEU (*a*) obſerves, that the preſervation of Liberty in ENGLAND requires, that it ſhould have no land forces.——Dr. FERGUSON calls the eſtabliſhment of ſtanding armies "A FATAL REFINEMENT in "the preſent ſtate of civil government." (*b*)——Mr. *Hume* pronounces "our ſtanding army a "mortal diſtemper in the Britiſh conſtitution, of "which it muſt *inevitably* periſh." (*c*)—Formerly, the nation was apprehenſive of this danger; and the *ſtanding army* was a conſtant ſubject of warm debate in both Houſes of Parliament. The principal reaſon then aſſigned for continuing it was, the ſecurity of the Houſe of HANOVER againſt the friends of the *Pretender*. This is a reaſon which now exiſts no more; the Houſe of *Hanover* being ſo well eſtabliſhed as not to want any ſuch ſecurity.——The ſtanding army alſo is now more numerous and formidable than ever; and yet all oppoſition to it is loſt, and it is become in a manner a part of the conſtitution.

Fifthly. For many years after the acceſſion the national debt was thought an evil ſo alarming, that the reduction of it was recommended every

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(*a*) Spirit of Laws. Book xix. ch. 27.

(*b*) Hiſtory of Civil Society. Part vi. ſect. 5.

(*c*) *Political* Diſcourſes. Eſſay xii. p. 301.

year from the throne to the attention of Parliament as an object of the laſt importance. The FUND appropriated to this purpoſe was called the ONLY HOPE of the kingdom; and when the practice of alienating it begun, it was reckoned a kind of ſacrilege, and zealouſly oppoſed in the Houſe of *Commons*, and proteſted againſt in the Houſe of *Lords*. But now, though the debt is almoſt *tripled*, we ſit under it with perfect indifference; and the ſacred fund, which repeated laws had ordered to be applied *to no other purpoſe* than the redemption of it, is always alienated of courſe, and become a conſtant part of the current ſupplies, and much more an encouragement to diſſipation than a preſervative from bankruptcy.

Sixthly. Nothing is more the duty of the repreſentatives of a nation than to keep a ſtrict eye over the expenditure of the money granted for public ſervices.—In the reign of King William, the Houſe of Commons paſſed almoſt every year bills for appointing commiſſioners for taking, ſtating and examining the public accounts; and, particularly, the army and navy debts and contracts. In the reign of Queen Ann ſuch bills became leſs frequent. But ſince the acceſſion, only two motions have been made for ſuch bills; one in 1715, and the other in 1741; and both were rejected.

Seventhly. I hope I may add, that there was a time when the kingdom could not have been brought to acquieſce in what was done in the caſe of the *Middleſex* election. This is a precedent which, by giving the Houſe of Commons the power of excluding its members at diſcretion, and of introducing others in their room on a minority of votes, has a tendency to make it a ſelf-created Houſe, ~~and to~~ deſtroy entirely the right of repreſentation: And a few more ſuch precedents would completely overthrow the conſtitution.

Laſtly. I cannot help mentioning here the addition which has been lately made to the power of the Crown, by throwing into its hands the *Eaſt-India Company*. Nothing more unfavourable to the ſecurity of public Liberty has been done ſince the REVOLUTION: And ſhould our ſtateſmen, thus ſtrengthened by the patronage of the EAST, be farther ſtrengthened by the conqueſt and patronage of the WEST, they will indeed have no ſmall reaſon for triumph; and there will be little left to protect us againſt the encroachments and uſurpations of power. ROME ſunk into ſlavery, in conſequence of enlarging its territories, and becoming the center of the wealth of conquered provinces, and the ſeat of univerſal empire. It ſeems the appointment of Providence, that free ſtates, when, not contented with *ſelf*-government, and prompted by the love of domination, they make themſelves maſters of other ſtates, ſhall loſe Liberty at the ſame time that they take it away; and, by ſubduing, be themſelves ſubdued. Diſtant and dependent provinces can be governed only by a military force. And a military force which governs abroad, will ſoon govern at home. The *Romans* were ſo ſenſible of this, that they made it treaſon for any of their generals to march their armies over the *Rubicon* into *Italy*. CÆSAR, therefore, when he came to this river, heſitated; but he paſſed it, and enſlaved his country.

“ Among the circumſtances (ſays Dr. FERGUSON) which in the event of national proſperity and in the reſult of commercial arts, lead to the eſtabliſhment of deſpotiſm, there is none perhaps that arrives at this termination with ſo ſure an aim as the perpetual enlargement of territory. In every ſtate the freedom of its members depends on the balance and adjuſtment of its interior parts; and the exiſtence of any ſuch freedom among mankind depends on the balance of nations. In the progreſs of conqueſt thoſe who are ſubdued are ſaid to have loſt their liberties. But, from the hiſtory of mankind, to conquer or to be conquered has appeared in effect the ſame.” (a)

(a) Hiſtory of Civil Society. Part iv. ſect. 5.

Many more facts of this kind might eaſily be enumerated; but theſe are ſufficient.——They ſhew, with ſad evidence, how faſt we have, for ſome time, been advancing towards the greateſt of all public calamities.

We may, alſo, infer from the preceding obſervations, that there is only one way in which our deliverance is poſſible; and that is, by RESTORING OUR GRAND NATIONAL SECURITY. This is the object which our great men in oppoſition ought to hold forth to the kingdom, and to bind themſelves by ſome deciſive teſts to do all they can to obtain. That patriotiſm muſt be ſpurious which does not carry its views principally to this. Without it, nothing is of great importance to the kingdom; and even an accommodation with *America* would only preſerve a limb, and ſave from preſent danger, while a gangrene was left to conſume the vitals.

But, probably, we are gone too far; and corruption has ſtruck its roots too deep to leave us much room for hope.——Mr. HUME has obſerved, (*a*) that as the affairs of this country are not likely to take a turn favourable to the eſtabliſhment of a perfect plan of Liberty, "an abſolute monarchy is the eaſieſt death, the true "EUTHANASIA of the Britiſh conſtitution."—

(*a*) See Mr. Hume's Eſſays. Vol. i. p. 91.

If this obſervation is juſt, our conſtitution (ſhould no great calamity intervene) is likely, in ſome future period, to receive a very quiet diſſolution. ——At preſent, however, it muſt be acknowledged, that we enjoy a degree of Liberty, civil and religious, which has ſeldom been paralleled among mankind. We ought to rejoice in this happineſs; and to be grateful to that benevolent diſpoſer of all events who bleſſes us with it. But, at the ſame time, our hearts muſt bleed when we reflect, that, the ſupports of it having given way, it is little more than a *ſufferance* which we owe to the temper of the times; the lenity of our governors; and ſome awe, in which the friends of deſpotiſm are ſtill held, by the voice and ſpirit of the uncorrupted part of the kingdom.——May theſe cauſes, if no better ſecurities can be hoped for, long delay our fate.

It muſt not be forgotten, that all I have now ſaid is meant on the ſuppoſition, that our affairs will proceed ſmoothly till, by a common and natural progreſs, we have gone the round of other nations once free, and are brought to their end. ——But it is poſſible this may not happen.—— Our circumſtances are ſingular; and give us reaſon to fear, that we have before us a death which will not be eaſy or common.

PART II

CONTAINING

REMARKS on ſome Particulars in a SPEECH at opening the BUDGET in *April* 1776.

SECT. I.

Supplemental Obſervations on the Surplus of the Revenue; the Quantity of Coin in the Kingdom; and Paper-Credit.

IT is well known, that the great miniſter who preſides over our finances, took occaſion, at opening the Budget in April laſt, to enter into a particular account of the ſtate of the nation. In this account, he repreſented us as in a condition the moſt ſound and happy; our trade and revenue flouriſhing; our common people well provided for; our debts and taxes light; our current ſpecie ſufficiently ample; our paper-circulation ſafe; and the BANK, in particular, as little leſs firm and durable than the world.

This account, ſo encouraging and flattering, was generally underſtood to be given in deſigned oppoſition to another account very different, which had been given in the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*.——It cannot, therefore, I hope, be thought too preſuming in me to offer the following remarks in my own defence.

I have grounded my opinion of the hazardous ſtate of the kingdom, partly on the ſmallneſs of the ſurplus in the revenue, and the nature and circumſtances of our paper-circulation, compared with the quantity of *ſpecie* in the kingdom, and the weight of our debts and taxes.

The ſurplus of the revenue I have made out in two different methods; and by a deduction ſo minute, that it is, I think, ſcarcely poſſible it ſhould be materially wrong. One of theſe methods brings it out 338,759*l. per ann.* (*a*): and the other, 300,000*l. per ann.* ſuppoſing the expence of calling in the gold coin, and the profits of lotteries excluded; the land-tax at three ſhillings in the pound; and the peace eſtabliſhment the ſame that it has been at a medium for eleven years, from 1764 to 1775.

Nothing more was ſaid in oppoſition to this, than a general intimation, that had it not been for the war with *America*, the peace-eſtabliſhment for

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(*a*) See the concluſion of the Third Part.

the navy would have been reduced, and a ſufficient ſurplus gained (including lotteries) to enable parliament to pay off a million every year of the public debt.

I am very ſenſible that reductions of the public expences and improvements in the revenue are practicable, which would give ſuch a ſurplus. But I am afraid, they will never take place. Nor can I think it proper, in determining what permanent ſurplus we poſſeſs, to include thoſe pernicious profits of lotteries, by which infinitely more is upon the whole loſt than gained; or, to form our judgment of the expence of *future* years, by any other rule than the medium expence of *paſt* years.——It would, however, give little conſolation, were there a certainty that, had peace continued, a MILLION annually of the public debt would hav been diſcharged. This would have made a ver ſlow progreſs in diſcharging our debts. A million every year diſcharged in peace, and eight o ten millions every year added in war, would leav us under the neceſſity of breaking at laſt. Bu hitherto we have not proceeded in a courſe ſ favourable. The great perſon to whom I refe muſt know, that in 1772, he announced in th *Houſe of Commons*, his intention to pay off a *mi lion and a half* every year, and SEVENTEEN MILLIONS in ten years; that yet only 2.800,000*l.* was paid off in the three ſubſequent years; and that, on account of the increaſe of the *navy* and *civil-liſt* debts, there has not been in fact the ability (without the help of lotteries) to pay half that ſum.

In page 74th of the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, I have ſaid, "that it has appeared lately, "that the gold ſpecie of the kingdom, is no more than about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF."——This aſſertion has been much controverted; and it is therefore neceſſary I ſhould give a diſtinct account of the reaſons on which it was grounded.

I had learnt from unqueſtionable authority, that the quantity of gold coin brought into the mint, by the Acts of Parliament and Proclamations in 1773 and 1774, was about NINE MILLIONS (*a*); or as much as, when recoined, amounted nearly to that ſum.——I find alſo, that it was expected by the beſt judges, that the proclamation lately iſſued would bring in about *three* millions. Theſe two ſums make up *twelve* millions; and they include the gold coin of *Ireland*. Let this be eſtimated at a (*b*) million; and the whole gold coin

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(*a*) This was confirmed by the account of the noble Lord at opening the laſt Budget.

(*b*) I have mentioned this ſum at random. It is not of great conſequence whether it is half a million too little or half a million too much.

of *Britain*, to be brought in by all the calls, will be ELEVEN millions; and none will remain, except that part which was deficient leſs than a grain in a guinea, and remained in the kingdom, at the time the coin Act took effect in June 1773. We are here left entirely to conjecture. But it ſhould be remembered, that for many years before 1773, the heavy coin was catched up as ſoon as iſſued, and either clipped, or melted down and exported; and that from hence aroſe ſuch a ſcarcity of heavy coin, that, in ſome counties, heavy guineas might be diſpoſed of at a premium.——In ſuch circumſtances, an allowance of about a million and a half, for the coin deficient leſs than a grain in a guinea before the coin Act in 1773, ſeems to be ſufficient; and therefore, it might, I think, with reaſon be ſaid, that it appeared that the gold coin of the kingdom was about TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF.

But there is another reaſon, by which I have been convinced, that this is a moderate eſtimate.

The quantity of gold coin, deficient between three and ſix grains in a guinea, was 4,890,000 *l.* and this, when recoined, made 4.600,000 *l.*—— The coin deficient leſs than three grains could not have been ſo much, for the following reaſons. Firſt, new coin being rougher, wears faſter than old coin; and therefore, does not remain ſo long in any given degree of deficiency.—Secondly, coin, deficient leſs than three grains, is ſubject to ſeveral peculiar cauſes of diminution and deſtruction.—Clipping and ſweating remove part of it to greater degrees of deficiency; and part is deſtroyed by being melted down and exported; whereas, lighter coin is diminiſhed only by being worn (a).

(a) The quantity of coin within all equal degrees of deficiency would be equal, were equal quantities iſſued every year, and were there alſo no cauſe which diminiſhed or deſtroyed it, except the *uniform* operation of time in wearing it. Any cauſe, therefore, which deſtroys it more, or diminiſhes it faſter at firſt than at laſt, muſt render the quantity leſs in the firſt degrees of deficiency. And the ſame muſt be the conſequence of a greater proportion iſſued formerly, in any given time, than of late.——The cauſes of diminution never probably operated ſo much on the gold coin as they did for about twelve years before 1773; and this will balance the greater proportion coined during that time. The very reaſon of the increaſe of coinage in thoſe years was, a neceſſity created by the loſs of the new coin, and never before felt in an equal degree. The coinage, however, in thoſe years, was not ſo much more than uſual as ſome may imagine. In ten years before 1770, eight millions and a half were coined; and in twelve years after the *Acceſſion*, the ſame quantity was coined; and, in twenty-ſeven years after the *Acceſſion*, more was coined than in twenty-ſeven years before 1770. See *Conſiderations on Money, Bullion*, &c. p. 2.—— The whole quantity of gold coined from the Acceſſion to 1770, was near 29 millions; more than one half of which muſt have been melted and exported; and, the greateſt part of the remainder muſt have been precipitated in its progreſs towards deficiency by being clipped and ſweated.

Theſe reaſons ſeem to prove, that if the gold coin, deficient in June 1773 leſs than three grains, is eſtimated at *five millions*, (that is, at a little more than the coin deficient between three and ſix grains) it will be rated rather too high; and the concluſion will be, that the whole of our gold coin (excluſive of the *Iriſh*) might poſſibly be *leſs*, but could not have been *much more*, than the ſum at which I have reckoned it.

Such have been the facts and arguments by which my judgment has been determined in this inſtance.——But it muſt not be overlooked, that it helps only to aſcertain the quantity of *circulating ſpecie* in the kingdom, as diſtinguiſhed from that which is *hoarded*. When the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty* were publiſhed, I did not apprehend, that this part of the coin could be conſiderable enough to deſerve regard. But the contrary has lately appeared. The Proclamation iſſued laſt ſummer, and which it was expected would bring in about three millions, has, I am informed, brought in about *ſix millions and a half*. This exceeds the ſum at which I have been led to ſtate the *whole* gold coin deficient leſs than three grains; and proves, that ſeveral millions muſt have been hoarded (*a*). Nor, I think,

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(*a*) When the ſilver *ſpecie* was recoined in King William's time, it appeared, that a great treaſure had been hoarded before

I think, will this appear incredible, when it is recollected, that only gold coin under three grains of deficiency is likely to be hoarded; and alſo, that diſtruſt of the *Funds* and of Paper-money has a particular tendency to increaſe the practice of hoarding.

Aſſiſted, therefore, by this new light, I would now ſtate the *circulating* gold coin of the kingdom before 1773, nearly as I did before; and call it TWELVE OR THIRTEEN MILLIONS. But the whole gold coin (including the hoarded part) I would reckon at SIXTEEN OR SEVENTEEN MILLIONS (*b*).

"An account very different from this was given at opening the Budget; the ſubſtance of which I will ſtate as faithfully as my memory will enable me; and juſt as I underſtood it.

"From the beginning of the year 1772, to "the 23d of April laſt, 13.200,000*l.* had been "coined at the Tower; and on that day there "was 600,000*l.* more ready to be coined.——

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before the *Revolution*, in conſequence of the danger of public liberty at that time. See Davenant's Works, Vol. I. p. 439, &c.

In *Ruſſia* it is reckoned, that as much money lies buried under ground, as exiſts above ground.

(*b*) In theſe ſums is included all the coin which the late Proclamations have brought in from HOLLAND and other foreign countries; and which, I think, ought not to be deemed a part of the reſting ſtock of the kingdom.

"All this, (it was intimated) is now left in the "kingdom. The laſt Proclamation, it was ex-"pected, would bring in three millions more; "which, added to the coin deficient leſs than a "grain reſting in the kingdom at the time of the "Coin Act in 1773, and iſſued before 1772, "will make the whole, EIGHTEEN OR NINETEEN "MILLIONS (a)."

On this account I would obſerve,

Firſt. That if juſt, it proves that, in 1773, a *third* at leaſt of the *circulating* coin was in the beſt ſtate poſſible. For the late calls having ſhewn, that there was then, in *Britain* and *Ireland*, no more than about twelve *millions* deficient *more* than a grain; ſix millions (that is, a third of eighteen millions) or ſeven millions (that is, more than a third of nineteen millions) muſt have been deficient *leſs* than a grain. (b)—It will alſo follow,

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(a) Or deducting a million for the *Iriſh* coin, ſeventeen or eighteen millions.

(b) This is ſaid on the ſuppoſition, that the laſt call would bring in no more than was expected, or about three millions. Its having brought in above double this ſum makes little difference. For it proves, that the whole quantity of gold coin muſt have been (according to Lord NORTH's method of computing) 21 or 22 millions; and the quantity deficient more than a grain about 15 millions; and, conſequently, ſix or ſeven millions (that is, near a *third*) will ſtill remain to be the quantity deficient leſs than a grain.

(ſince the quantity brought in by the firſt call is known to have been 4,900,000 l.) that but little more than a *fourth* could have been deficient ſo much as ſix grains, or a ſhilling in a guinea.—— No perſon can think this credible who recollects the diſtreſs of traffic, and the complaints of the kingdom before 1773.

Secondly. The truth of the account I have ſtated depends, in a great meaſure, on the ſuppoſition, that all the gold coined ſince the beginning of 1772 is now in the kingdom. I cannot conceive on what grounds this was taken for granted. ——From the beginning of 1772 to June 1773, the practice of clipping was more prevalent than it had ever been. During the greateſt part of 1772, the price of gold was ſo much above mint price, that a profit, from 2 to 4 *per cent.* might be got by melting heavy guineas (a). And, in February in that year, the price of gold was at

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(a) It has been thought very ſtrange, that a piece of metal ſhould bear a higher price, merely becauſe it wants the ſtamp of the mint. But the reaſon is, that bullion alone being exportable in any conſiderable quantity, the price of it muſt vary as the demand for it varies; or, in other words, as the *balance of payment* between us and the reſt of the world is favourable or unfavourable.——This will be explained at the beginning of the Third Part, where it will appear that, in conſequence of the increaſe of luxury and the national debt, this balance has been generally againſt us ever ſince the end of the laſt war.

4l. 1s. 6d. per ounce; and 4 ½ *per cent.* might be got by melting heavy guineas. Inſtead, therefore, of believing, that all the gold coined ſince the beginning of 1772 remains with us; I think it almoſt certain, that the greateſt part of all coined during the firſt year and a half of this period, has been either clipped or melted into bullion. That part which was clipped has been recoined; and that part which was melted has been either recoined or exported; and, therefore, neither has made any addition to the coin of the kingdom.

Theſe obſervations demonſtrate, that the amount of the gold coin at the time of the Coin Act in 1773, muſt have been near the ſum at which I have reckoned it. There may, for ought I know, have been an increaſe ſince; but I ſhall not believe there has, till I know, whether the coin brought in by the laſt proclamation, has been all recoined and iſſued. But this cannot be expected; for ſhould it be done, Four Millions (*a*) more will have been coined and iſſued, than has been brought in.—The truth, therefore, may be, that the coinage, ſince June 1773, has been car-

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(*a*) The coin brought in laſt Summer, added to near 4 millions coined from the beginning of 1773 to the time of the laſt call, amounts to about 20 millions and a half; but only 16 millions and a half have been brought in, including the coin from *Ireland* and foreign countries.

ried on only to provide a ſupply of new coin to be exchanged for old; in which caſe, the quantity of coin in the kingdom, even according to this method of computing it, will come out nearly the ſame with that which I have given.

After all, let the *ſpecie* of the kingdom, including the ſilver, be allowed to be as conſiderable as ſome have aſſerted; or about four millions more than I have reckoned it; the difference ariſing from hence will not be of particular conſequence; and it will be ſtill true, that notwithſtanding all our increaſe of trade and apparent opulence, the *ſpecie* of the kingdom (*a*) is not much more than it was at the *Revolution.*——What then is all the reſt of our circulating caſh? What is it keeps up rents; feeds our luxury; pays our taxes; ſupplies the revenue, and ſupports government? —Paper, chiefly, emitted, not only at the Bank, but by tradeſmen, merchants, and bankers in every corner of the kingdom.——And is this a ſolid

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(*a*) Or EIGHTEEN MILLIONS AND A HALF. See Dr. DAVENANT's Works, Vol. i. p. 363, &c. 443, &c. A great part of this ſpecie was carried out of the nation in King WILLIAM's wars; and the conſequence was, that the taxes became unproductive; and that Government fell under great difficulties, from which it was afterwards relieved by the eſtabliſhment of the *Bank* and the increaſe of trade. See the beginning of the Third Part.

and permanent ſupport? (*b*) Is there, in the annals of the world, another inſtance of a great kingdom ſo ſupported?——The cauſes are numberleſs which may ſuddenly deſtroy it; and were this

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(*b*) The paper currency of the Colonies is one of the greateſt diſadvantages under which they labour; but it is of a more ſafe and permanent nature than ours. Were it not ſo, it could not have been of the leaſt uſe to them for the laſt year and a half. He who doubts this, need only conſider what our paper would be worth were we now invaded as they are.

This difference depends chiefly, on the following circumſtances.——Their paper is not payable on demand.—It is a legal tender.——It repreſents fixed property which is mortgaged for it.——It does not ſupport ſuch a monſtrous debt as ours.—And when public emergencies require any extraordinary emiſſions, they are generally ſunk by taxes in four or five years.—— It is the firſt of theſe circumſtances that gives our paper its currency; and it is alſo this circumſtance that creates the danger attending it, by rendering it incapable of ſuſtaining any great ſhock or panic.——The poſſeſſion of ſecurities equal in nominal value to the amount of the paper emitted, or the debts contracted, is of little conſequence when the value of theſe ſecurities depends on the paper, and is created by it; that is, in other words, when the debts themſelves are the very caſh which muſt pay the debts.——Nothing can be more unnatural than ſuch a ſtate of things; and it may hereafter be a curious object of enquiry, how it could be ever poſſible that it ſhould ſubſiſt any long time.

In page 78 of the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, I have ſaid, "that the kingdom of FRANCE has no ſuch dependence as "we have on paper-credit; and that its ſpecie amounts to "67 millions ſterling." In mentioning this ſum I took the

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this to happen, we ſhould fall at once with a debt of 140 millions upon us, to the ſtate we were in before the REVOLUTION.——Imagination cannot paint to itſelf the ſhock this would give.——

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loweſt of different accounts which I had then received from different authorities. I have ſince received accounts which make it 87 millions and a half; or 2000 millions of *livres*. This, in particular, is the account of an author whom all know to be likely to be well informed on this ſubject; I mean the author of the Treatiſe on the *Legiſlation* and *Commerce of Corn*, Part I. chap. v.——In the ſame treatiſe it is ſaid, (Part I. chap. viii,) that it appears, from the returns made by the intendants of the different Provinces, that the number of *annual* deaths in the whole kingdom of France, for three years ended in 1772, was 780,040. I have been informed by the ingenious author, that this account may be depended on; and if ſo, *France* muſt contain 26 millions of inhabitants; for the beſt obſervations prove, that no more than a thirty-third part of a whole kingdom dies annually. See Obſervations on Reverſionary Payments, page 200.—In *Sweden*, though a nineteenth part die in the capital every year, only a thirty-fifth part die in the whole kingdom. See Philoſophical Tranſactions, Vol. lxv. for 1775, p. 426. The particulars now mentioned, added to the nature of the debts of FRANCE as mentioned in page 78 of the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, form a ſtriking contraſt between the ſtate of that kingdom and ours. Nothing gives us our ſuperiority but the advantages we derive from our RELIGION and our LIBERTY. Even in theſe reſpects, however, they ſeem to be improving, while we are declining. *Monteſquieu*, *Abbe Raynal*, and others of their moſt admired writers, inculcate principles of government, and breathe a ſpirit of Liberty, which, to the ſhame of this country, are become offenſive in it.

I muſt repeat here what I have ſaid in the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, page 73, &c. that we ſhould think of nothing but guarding ourſelves againſt the danger of ſuch a ſituation, by reſtricting our paper currency, and gradually diſcharging our public debts.——In giving this admonition, I look upon myſelf as doing my country one of the beſt offices in my power; and acting in the character of one who calls to another to awake who is ſleeping over a precipice.——But I know I call in vain.——The great miniſter, who directs our finances has aſſured us all is well; and, under this perſuaſion, we are advancing, with unſuſpicious and careleſs ſpeed, to the cataſtrophe I have pointed out; and purſuing meaſures which muſt increaſe the difficulty of avoiding it, and the diſtreſs attending it.

Among theſe meaſures, I have mentioned the preſent new coinage.——Before this coinage, I have obſerved, the light money always remained, becauſe nothing could be got by melting and exporting it. But now, as ſoon as gold riſes to the price it bore for many years before 1773, the melters and exporters of coin will be ſaved the trouble of ſelection; and every piece on which they can lay their hands will be proper for their purpoſe.——It ſeems, therefore, obvious, that, in conſequence of this meaſure, all our coin may be carried away, and the whole ſuperſtructure of paper ſupported by it, break down, before we are aware of any danger.

I will take this opportunity to add, that this meaſure will at the ſame time increaſe our paper. This has been the conſequence of the two former calls; but it will probably be more the conſequence of the laſt call. For, as no coin is now to be current which is more than a grain deficient; and as alſo a great deal of it is already at or near that limit; the vexation attending it will be ſo intolerable, that it will be generally cried down, and paper ſubſtituted in its room.——Certain it is, that nothing can prevent this evil, but another evil; I mean, the deficient coin forcing itſelf again into circulation, and furniſhing clippers with more employment than ever; and, conſequently, a return, with increaſed violence, of the confuſion and diſtreſs which took place before the Coin Act in 1773.——This, indeed, will be much the leaſt of the two evils; nor, in my opinion, are there any methods of preventing the diminution of the coin, which will not produce greater evils, except ſuch alterations in its form (a) as ſhall render clipping leſs practicable, joined to the execution of ſevere laws againſt clippers, and a ſtrict vigilance in detecting them.

Upon the whole. It ſeems to me, that enough had been done by the firſt coin act to reſtore the gold coin; and that all which has been done ſince, at the expence of about 650,000l. has been nothing but a preparation of the coin for melters and exporters, to the dreadful hazard of the kingdom.——Theſe are my preſent views of this ſubject. But I muſt ſay, that I ſuſpect my own judgment in this inſtance. The noble Lord, who is furniſhed with infinitely more of the means of information than I am, intimated, if I remember rightly, that there is no ſuch danger: And though I did not underſtand the reaſon he aſſigned for this aſſertion, I muſt believe, that, in a matter ſo particularly intereſting to the kingdom, he has gone upon the beſt evidence.

(a) See the propoſals and obſervations in a pamphlet lately publiſhed by Lord Viſcount MAHON on this ſubject.

SECT. II.

Of the State of the Nation; and the War with America.

AT the beginning of the preceding ſection, I have taken notice of the flattering account which was given, at opening the Budget in April laſt, of the ſtate of the kingdom with reſpect to its commerce, revenue, and opulence. On that account I ſhall beg leave to offer the following reflections.

Firſt. The obſervations in the laſt ſection prove, I think, that it is not ſo well ſupported by facts, as there is reaſon to wiſh. I am ſenſible, indeed, that we never made a more gay and ſplendid appearance. But no conſiderate perſon will draw much encouragement from hence. That pride and ſecurity; that luxury, venality and diſſipation which give us this appearance, are melancholy ſymptoms; and have hitherto been the forerunners of diſtreſs and calamity.

Secondly. When this account was given there was a particular end to be anſwered by it. Additional taxes were to be impoſed; and it was neceſſary to reconcile the public to the proſpect of a great increaſe of its burthens, in order to carry on the war with *America*.——On other occaſions, different accounts had been given. In order to prove the juſtice of taxing the *Americans*, the weight of our own taxes had been often inſiſted upon; and the difficulty of raiſing a ſufficient force among ourſelves to reduce them, had been urged as a reaſon for ſeeking and employing, at a great expence, the aſſiſtance of foreign powers. On ſuch occaſions, I have heard our unhappy and embarraſſed ſituation mentioned; and, at the end of the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, one of our greateſt men, whoſe opinion in favour of coercion, had contributed to bring us into our preſent ſituation, acknowledged the diſtreſs attending it, and repreſented the veſſel of the ſtate as having never before rode in ſo dangerous a ſtorm.

a ſtorm.——This is, without doubt, the truth. But, if the account on which I am remarking was juſt, we were then ſafe and happy; nor was the veſſel of the ſtate ever wafted by more gentle and proſperous gales.

But the reflection which, on this occaſion, has given me moſt pain is the following.

If, without *America*, we can be in a ſtate ſo flouriſhing, a war to reduce *America* muſt be totally inexcuſeable. I wiſh I could engage attention to this. War is a dreadful evil; and thoſe who involve a people in it *needleſsly*, will find they have much to anſwer for. Nothing can ever juſtify it, but the neceſſity of it to ſecure ſome *eſſential* intereſt againſt unjuſt attacks. But, it ſeems, there is no intereſt to be ſecured by the preſent war. The revenue has never flouriſhed ſo much, as ſince *America* has been rendered hoſtile to us; and it is now reckoned by many a decided point, that little depends on the *American* trade. It follows then, that if the end of the preſent war is to "obtain a revenue," it is a revenue we do not want; if "to maintain authority," it is an authority of no uſe to us.——Muſt not humanity ſhudder at ſuch a war?——Why not let *America* alone, if we can ſubſiſt without it?——Why carry fire and ſword into a happy country, to do ourſelves no good?—

Some of the very perſons who depreciate the value of the colonies, as a ſupport to our revenue and finances, yet ſay, that we are now under a neceſſity of reducing them, or periſhing.—I wiſh ſuch perſons would give an account of the cauſes which, according to their ideas, create this dreadful neceſſity. Is it the ſame that led *Haman* of old to reckon all his honours and treaſures nothing to him, while *Mordecai* the Jew would not bow to him?—Or, are we become ſo luxurious, that luxury even in the revenue is become neceſſary to us; and ſo depraved, that, like many individuals in private life, having loſt *ſelf*-dominion, we cannot ſubſiſt without dominion over *others*?

It muſt not be forgotten, that I ſpeak here on the ſuppoſition, that it is poſſible for this country to be as ſafe and proſperous without *America* as ſome have aſſerted, and as was implied in what was ſaid at opening the laſt Budget.—This is far from being my own opinion.—Some time or other we ſhall, in all probability, feel ſeverely, in our commerce and finances, the loſs of the colonies.—As a ſource of revenue they are, I think, of great importance to us; but they are ſtill more important as ſupports to our navy, and an aid to us in our wars.—It appears now, that there is a force among them ſo formidable and ſo growing, that, with its aſſiſtance, any of the great *European* powers may ſoon make themſelves maſters of all the *Weſt-Indies* and *North-America*; and nothing ought to be more alarming to us than that our natural enemies ſee this, and are influenced by it.—With the colonies united to us, we might be the greateſt and happieſt nation that ever exiſted. But with the colonies ſeparated from us, and in alliance with *France* and *Spain*, we are no more a people.—They appear, therefore, to be indeed worth any price.—Our exiſtence depends on keeping them.—But how are they to be kept?—Moſt certainly, not by forcing them to unconditional ſubmiſſion, at the expence of many millions of money and rivers of blood. The reſolution to attempt this, is a melancholy inſtance of that infatuation which ſometimes influences the councils of kingdoms. It is attempting to keep them by a method which, if it ſucceeds, will deſtroy their uſe, and make them not worth the having; and which, if it does *not* ſucceed, will throw them into the ſcale of rival powers, kindle a general war, and undo the empire.

The extenſion of our territories in *America*, during the laſt war, increaſed the expence of our *peace*-eſtabliſhment, from 2,400,000 l. *per ann.* to four millions *per ann.*—Almoſt all the provinces in *America* which uſed to be ours, are now to be conquered. Let the expence of this be ſtated at 25 or 30 millions; or, at a capital bearing a million *per annum* intereſt.——*America* recovered by the ſword muſt be kept by the ſword, and forts and garriſons muſt be maintained in every province to awe the wretched inhabitants, and to hold them in ſubjection. This will create another addition of expence; and both together cannot, I ſuppoſe, be ſtated at leſs than two millions *per annum*.——But how is ſuch an increaſe of revenue to be procured?——The colonies, deſolated, and impoveriſhed, will yield no revenue.——The ſurpluſſes of the ſinking fund have, for many years, formed a neceſſary part of the current and ordinary ſupplies.——It muſt, therefore, be drawn from *new* taxes.——But can the kingdom bear ſuch an increaſe of taxes? Or, if it can, where ſhall we find a ſurplus for diſcharging an enormous debt of above 160 millions? And what will be our condition, when the next foreign war ſhall add two millions *per annum* more to our expences?——Indeed this is a frightful proſpect. But it will be rendered infinitely more frightful by carrying our views to that increaſe of the power of the Crown which will ariſe from the increaſe of the army, from the diſpoſal of new places without number, and the patronage of the whole continent of *North-America*.

Theſe conſequences have been ſtated moderately on the ſuppoſition, that we ſhall ſucceed in ſubduing *America*; and that, while we are doing it, our natural enemies will neglect the opportunity offered them, and continue to ſatisfy themſelves with aſſiſting *America indirectly.*——But ſhould the contrary happen.——I need not ſay what will follow.

Some time ago this horrid danger might have been avoided, and the colonies kept by the eaſieſt means.——By a prudent lenity and moderation.——By receiving their petitions.——By giving up the right we claim to diſpoſe of their property, and to alter their governments.——By guarantying to them, in theſe reſpects, a legiſlative independence; (*a*) and eſtabliſhing them in the

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(*a*) "There is ſomething (ſays a great writer) ſo unnatural "in ſuppoſing a large ſociety, ſufficient for all the good purpoſes of an independent political union, remaining ſubject "to the direction and government of a diſtant body of men "who know not ſufficiently the circumſtances and exigencies "of this ſociety; or in ſuppoſing this ſociety obliged to be "governed ſolely for the benefit of a diſtant country; that it "is not eaſy to imagine there can be any foundation for it "in juſtice or equity. The inſiſting on *old claims* and *tacit* "*conventions*, to extend civil power over diſtant nations, and "form grand unwieldy empires, without regard to the obvious maxims of humanity, has been one great ſource of "human miſery." *Syſtem of Moral Philoſophy*, by Dr. HUTCHESON, vol. ii. p. 309. In the ſection from whence this quotation is taken, Dr. HUTCHESON diſcuſſes the queſtion, "When colonies have a right to be releaſed from the domi- "nion of the parent ſtate?" And his general ſentiment ſeems the poſſeſſion of equal liberty with ourſelves.—— This a great and magnanimous nation ſhould have done. This, ſince the commencement of hoſtilities, would have brought them back to their former habits of reſpect and ſubordination; and might have bound them to us for ever.

MONTESQUIEU has obſerved, that ENGLAND, in planting colonies, ſhould have *commerce*[*], not *dominion*, in view; the increaſe of dominion being incompatible with the ſecurity of public liberty.— Every advantage that could ariſe from commerce they have offered us without reſerve; and their language to us has been——“ Reſtrict us, as much “ as you pleaſe, in *acquiring* property by regu-“ lating our trade for your advantage; but claim “ not the diſpoſal of that property after it has “ been acquired.—Be ſatisfied with the authority “ you exerciſed over us before the preſent reign.— “ PLACE US WHERE WE WERE IN 1763.”——On theſe terms they have repeatedly ſued for a reconciliation. In return, we have denounced them *Rebels*; and with our fleets in their ports,

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ſo be; that they acquire ſuch a right, “ Whenever they are “ ſo increaſed in numbers and ſtrength, as to be ſufficient by “ themſelves for all the good ends of a political union.”—— Such a deciſion given by a wiſe man, long before we had any diſputes with the colonies, deſerves, I think, particular notice.

and our bayonets at their breaſts, have left them no other alternative than to acknowledge our ſupremacy, and give up rights they think moſt ſacred; or ſtand on the defenſive, and appeal to heaven.—They have choſen the latter.

In this ſituation, if our feelings for *others* do not make us tremble, our feelings for *ourſelves* ſoon may.——Should we ſuffer the conſequences I have intimated, our pride will be humbled.——We ſhall admire the plans of moderation and equity which, without bloodſhed or danger, would have kept *America*.——We ſhall wiſh for the happineſs of former times; and remember, with anguiſh, the meaſures which many of us lately offered their lives and fortunes to ſupport.

I muſt not conclude theſe obſervations, without taking particular notice of a charge againſt the colonies, which has been much inſiſted on.—“They have, it is ſaid, always had independency “in view; and it is this, chiefly, that has produced their preſent reſiſtance.”——It is ſcarcely poſſible there ſhould be a more unreaſonable charge. Without all doubt, our connexion with them might have been preſerved for ages to come, (perhaps *for ever*) by wiſe and liberal treatment. Let any one read a pamphlet publiſhed in 1761, by Dr. *Franklin*, and entitled

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The Intereſt of Great Britain with reſpect to her Colonies; and let him deny this if he can.—Before the preſent quarrel, there prevailed among them the pureſt affection for this country, and the warmeſt attachment to the House of HANOVER. And ſince the preſent quarrel begun, and not longer ago than the beginning of laſt winter, independency was generally dreaded among them. There is the fulleſt evidence for this; and all who are beſt acquainted with *America*, muſt know it to be true. As a ſpecimen of this evidence, and of the temper of *America* till the period I have mentioned, I will juſt recite the following facts.

In the reſolutions of the *Aſſembly*, which met at *Philadelphia*, July 15, 1774, after making the ſtrongeſt profeſſions of affection to *Britain*, and duty to their ſovereign, they declare their abhorrence of every idea of an unconſtitutional independence on the parent ſtate.——An aſſembly of delegates from all the towns of the county of *Suffolk* (of which *Boſton* is the capital) delivered in September 1774, to General Gage, a remonſtrance againſt fortifying *Boſton-neck*. In this remonſtrance, they totally diſclaim every wiſh of independence.——The ſame is done in the inſtructions given by the ſeveral colonies to the firſt deputies choſen for a general Congreſs.——In the petition of the firſt Congreſs to the King, they declare they ſhall always, carefully and zealouſly, endeavour to ſupport and maintain their connexion with *Great Britain.* In the memorial of the ſame Congreſs to the people of this country, they repeat this aſſurance.——In the order of the *Congreſs*, which met in May 1775, for a general faſt, they call upon all *America* to unite in beſeeching the Almighty to avert the judgments with which they were threatened, and *to bleſs their rightful Sovereign, that ſo a reconciliation might be brought about with the parent ſtate.*——And in their declaration ſetting forth the cauſes of their taking arms, they warn us, "that, ſhould they find it neceſſary, foreign aſſiſtance was undoubtedly attainable;" but at the ſame time declare, "that they did not mean to diſſolve the union which had ſo long and ſo happily ſubſiſted between them and this country; that neceſſity had not yet driven them to that deſperate meaſure, or induced them to excite any other nation to war againſt us; and that they had not raiſed armies with ambitious deſigns of forming independent ſtates, but ſolely for the protection of their property againſt violence, and the defence of that freedom which was their birth-right."——In the inſtructions, delivered Nov. 9, 1775, by a committee of the repreſentatives of the province of *Penſylvania*, to their delegates in the third general congreſs, they enjoin them, in behalf of the province, "utterly to "reject any propoſitions, ſhould ſuch be made, "that might lead to a ſeparation from the mother "country."

What reaſon can there be for thinking the colonies not ſincere in all theſe declarations?—— In truth; it was not poſſible they ſhould be otherwiſe than ſincere; for ſo little did they think of war, at the time when moſt of theſe declarations were made, that they were totally unprepared for it: And, even when hoſtilities were begun at LEXINGTON in April 1775, they were ſo deſtitute of every inſtrument of defence, particularly ammunition, that *half* the force which is now invading them, would have been ſufficient to conquer them at once.

I will beg leave to add on this occaſion, the following extracts from letters, written by ſome leading perſons at NEW-YORK, the genuineneſs of which may be depended on.

New-York, *Auguſt* 3d. 1775.—— "I am "ſenſible of the many artifices and falſhoods "which have been uſed to biaſs the minds of "your countrymen, who believe evil reports of "us; and, particularly, that we are aiming at "independence.——Of this be aſſured, that even "HANCOCK and ADAMS are averſe to independence. There was a lye current laſt week, "that the congreſs had finally agreed upon inde-

" pendence to take place the 10th of March " next, ſhould not our grievances be redreſſed " before that time. I wrote to one of our " delegates, to enquire whether this report " was true. In his anſwer he declares, upon " his honour, that he believed there was not " one man in the Congreſs who would dare to " make a motion tending to independence; or, " that if any one did, two could not be found " to ſupport the motion.——None but thoſe " who are on the ſpot can conceive what a ſpirit " is gone forth among all ranks and degrees of " men.——We deſerve to be free. It is a heavy " ſacrifice we are making. Trade is at an end. " We expect our city to be knocked about our " ears. But I declare ſolemnly, I will ſubmit to " all, and die in a log-houſe in the wilds of " America, and be free; rather than flouriſh in " ſervitude."——In a ſubſequent letter, dated NEW-YORK, Jan. 3d. 1776, the ſame perſon writes as follows:—— " It is in the power of the " miniſtry to annihilate all our diſputes, by re- " ſtoring us to the ſituation we were in at the " concluſion of the laſt war. If this is done, we " ſhall immediately return to our allegiance. " But if not, be aſſured, that an awful ſcene will " be opened in the ſpring. Let me repeat a " caution to you; believe not the inſinuations "of our enemies, who would make you all believe "that *independence* is what *America* aims at. It "is an inſidious falſhood. Madmen will be "found, in all large ſocieties. It would be "ſingular, were there none ſuch to be found "in a body of three millions of people and "upwards. But they are like a grain of ſand on "the ſea ſhore."

Another perſon writes thus.——NEW-YORK, Nov. 2d. 1775. "We love and honour our "King. He has no ſubjects in all his dominions "more attached to his perſon, family and government, "notwithſtanding the epithet of rebels beſtowed "upon us. No charge is more unjuſt "than the charge that we deſire an independence "on *Great Britain*. Ninety-nine in a hundred "of the inhabitants of this country deprecate "this as the heavieſt of evils. But if adminiſtration "will perſiſt in their preſent meaſures, this "will and muſt inevitably be the event; for "ſubmit to the preſent claims of the Britiſh parliament, "while unrepreſented in it, you may be "aſſured they never will. And what deſerves "notice is, that all the violence of *Britain* only "unites the *Americans* ſtill more firmly together, "and renders them more determined to be free "or die. This ſpirit is unconquerable by violence; "but they may be eaſily won by kindneſs.

"——Serious people of all denominations among "us, epiſcopal and non-epiſcopal, are much em- "ployed in prayer to God for the ſucceſs of the "preſent ſtruggles of *America*. They conſider "their cauſe as the cauſe of God; and as ſuch, "they humbly commit it to him, confident of "ſucceſs in the end, whatever blood or treaſure "it may coſt them.

Since theſe letters were written, the ſentiments of *America*, with reſpect to *independence*, have been much altered. But it ſhould be remembered, that this alteration has been owing entirely to OURSELVES; I mean, to the meaſures of the laſt winter and ſummer, and particularly the following.

Firſt, The rejection of the petition from the Congreſs brought over by Governor PENN. In this petition they profeſſed, in ſtrong language, that they ſtill retained their loyalty to the King and attachment to this country; and only prayed, "that they might be directed to ſome mode by "which the united applications of the Colonies "might be improved into a happy reconciliation; "and that, in the mean time, ſome meaſures "might be taken for preventing their farther de"ſtruction, and for repealing ſuch ſtatutes as "more immediately diſtreſſed them."——The Colonies had often petitioned before without being heard. They had, therefore, little hope

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from this application; and meant that, if rejected, it ſhould be their laſt.

Secondly. The laſt prohibitory bill, by which our protection of them was withdrawn; their ſhips and effects confiſcated; and open war declared againſt them.

Thirdly. Employing *foreign* troops to ſubdue them. This produced a greater effect in *America* than is commonly imagined. And it is remarkable, that even the writers in *America* who anſwered the pamphlet entitled COMMON SENSE, acknowledge, that ſhould the *Britiſh* miniſtry have recourſe to foreign aid, it might become (*a*) proper to follow their example, and to embrace the neceſſity of reſolving upon *independence*.

I have, further, reaſon to believe, that the anſwer to the laſt petition of the City of London, preſented in March 1776, (*b*) had no ſmall ſhare in producing the ſame effect.

By theſe meaſures, and others of the ſame kind, thoſe Coloniſts who had all along moſt dreaded and abhorred independence, were at laſt reconciled to it.——I can, however, ſay from

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(*a*) See COMMON SENSE, and PLAIN TRUTH, p. 44. Publiſhed for Mr. *Almon*.

(*b*) The Colonies, I am aſſured, were not perfectly unanimous till they ſaw this anſwer.

particular information, that even ſo lately as the month of June laſt, an accommodation might have been obtained with the Colonies, on a reaſonable and moderate plan; without giving up any one of the rights claimed by this country, except that of altering their charters and diſpoſing of their property.——And, as it would have reſtored peace and prevented the deſolating calamities into which *America* and *Britain* are now plunged, no friend to humanity can avoid regretting that ſuch a plan, when offered, was not adopted. But our rulers preferred coercion and conqueſt: And the conſequence has been, that the Colonies, after being goaded and irritated to the utmoſt, reſolved to diſengage themſelves, and directed the CONGRESS to declare them Independent States; which was accordingly done, as is well-known, on the 4th of July laſt. Since that time, they have, probably, been making applications to foreign powers; and it is to be feared, that *now* we may in vain offer them the very terms for which they once ſued.——All this is the neceſſary conſequence of the principles by which human nature is governed.——There was a time when, perhaps, we ſhould ourſelves have acted with more violence; and, inſtead of remonſtrating and praying, as *America* has done, have refuſed the moſt advantageous terms when offered with defiance, and under an awe from a military

force,

force. Had King WILLIAM, inſtead of coming over by invitation to deliver us, invaded us; and, at the head of an army, offered us the BILL OF RIGHTS; we ſhould, perhaps, have ſpurned at it; and conſidered LIBERTY itſelf as no better than SLAVERY, when enjoyed as a boon from an inſolent conqueror.——But we have all along acted as if we thought the people of *America* did not poſſeſs the feelings and paſſions of *men*, much leſs of *Engliſhmen.*——It is indeed ſtrange our miniſters did not long ago ſee, that they had miſtaken the proper method of treating the Colonies; and that though they might be gradually *influenced* to any thing, they could be dragooned to nothing.—Had King *James the Second* avoided violence; and been a little more patient and ſecret in purſuing his views, he might have gained all he wiſhed for. But an eager haſte and an open avowal of the odious claims of prerogative ruined him.——This has been ſince conſidered; and a plan both here and in *Ireland*, (*a*) leſs *expeditious* indeed, but more *ſure*, has been purſued.

(*a*) I am ſorry to differ from thoſe reſpectable perſons who have propoſed placing *America* on the ſame ground with *Ireland*. If the ſame ground of LAW is meant, it is already done; for our laws give us the ſame power over *Ireland*, that we claim over *America*. If the ſame ground of PRACTICE is meant; it has been moſt unfortunate for *Ireland*, and would be equally ſo for *America*.

And had the ſame plan been purſued in *America*, the whole empire might in time have been brought, without a ſtruggle, to reſt itſelf quietly in the lap of corruption and ſlavery. It may, therefore, in the iſſue prove happy to the Colonies, that they have not been thought worthy of any ſuch cautious treatment. —Our coercive meaſures have done all for them that their warmeſt patriots could have deſired. They have united them among themſelves, and bound them together under one government. They have checked them in the career of vicious luxury; guarded them againſt any farther infection from hence; taught them to ſeek all their reſources within themſelves; inſtructed them in the uſe of arms; and led them to form a naval and military power which may, perhaps, in time, become ſuperior to any force that can attack them, and prove the means of preſerving from invaſion and violence, a government of juſtice and virtue, to which the oppreſſed in every quarter of the globe may fly, and find peace, protection, and liberty.——In ſhort. Theſe meaſures have, in all probability, haſtened that diſruption of the *new* from the *old* world, which will begin a new *æra* in the annals of mankind; (*a*) and produce a revolution more

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(*a*) See the Abbe Raynal's Reflections on this ſubject at the end of the 18th book of his Hiſtory of the *European Settlements* in the Eaſt and Weſt-Indies.——" Is it not likely, " ſays important, perhaps, than any that has happened in human affairs.——As a friend, therefore, to the general intereſt of mankind, I ought, probably, to rejoice in theſe meaſures; and to bleſs that all-governing Providence, which, often, out of the evil intended by wretched mortals, brings the greateſt good.——But when I conſider the *preſent* ſufferings which theſe meaſures muſt occaſion, and the *cataſtrophe* with which they threaten GREAT-BRITAIN; I am ſhocked; and feel myſelf incapable of looking forward, without diſtreſs, to the fate of an empire, once united and happy, but now torn to pieces, and falling a ſacrifice to deſpotic violence and blindneſs. Under the impreſſion of theſe ſentiments, and dreading the

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" ſays this writer, that the diſtruſt and hatred which have of
" late taken place of that regard and attachment which the
" *Engliſh* Colonies felt for the parent country, may haſten their
" ſeparation from one another? Every thing conſpires to pro-
" duce this great diſruption; the æra of which it is impoſ-
" ſible to know.——Every thing tends to this point: The
" progreſs of good in the new hemiſphere, and the progreſs
" of evil in the old.——In proportion as our people are
" weakened, and reſign themſelves to each other's dominion,
" population and agriculture will flouriſh in *America*; and
" the arts make a rapid progreſs: And that country riſing out
" nothing, will be fired with the ambition of appearing with
" glory in its turn on the face of the globe——O poſterity!
" ye, peradventure, will be more happy than your unfortunate
" and contemptible anceſtors."——Mr. *Juſtamond's* Tranſlation.

awful *criſis* before us, I cannot help, however impotent my voice, crying out to this country——"Make no longer war againſt *yourſelves.* With-"draw your armies from your Colonies. Offer "your power to them as a *protecting*, not a *de-"ſtroying* power. Grant the ſecurity they deſire "to their property and charters; and renounce "thoſe notions of dignity, which lead you to pre-"fer the exactions of force to the offerings of "gratitude, and to hazard *every thing* to gain "*nothing.*——By ſuch wiſdom and equity *Ame-"rica* may, perhaps, be ſtill preſerved; and that "dreadful breach healed, which your enemies "are viewing with triumph, and all *Europe* with "aſtoniſhment."

But what am I doing?——At the moment I am writing this, the poſſibility of a reconciliation may be loſt.——*America* may have formed an alliance with FRANCE——And the die may be caſt.

SECT. III.

Of Schemes for raiſing Money by Public Loans.

THE following obſervations were occaſioned by the ſcheme for the public loan of laſt year, propoſed to the *Houſe of Commons* at opening the *Budget*, and afterwards agreed to. I have thought proper, therefore, to introduce theſe obſervations here; and, as they appear to me of ſome importance, I ſhall endeavour to explain them with as much care and perſpicuity as poſſible.

In order to raiſe *two millions*, the Legiſlature created laſt year a new capital in the 3 *per cent.* conſolidated annuities, of 2.150,000l. Every ſhare of 77l. 10s. in this new capital was valued at 65l. 17s. 6d. or every 100l. *ſtock* at 85l. For the whole new capital, therefore, Government has received in money, 1.827,500l.—The remaining ſum, neceſſary to make up *two millions*, was a compenſation advanced to Government for relinquiſhing the profits of a Lottery, conſiſting of 60,000 tickets, each of the ſame value with 10l. *three per cent. ſtock*; and might have been obtained, without annexing the Lottery to the annuities.——This new capital the public may be obliged to redeem at *par*; in which caſe, 322,500l. (being the difference between 1.827,500 and 2.150,000l.) that is 17 ½ *per cent.* will be paid by the public more than it has received.——In this tranſaction, therefore, Government has acted as a private perſon would act, who, in order to raiſe 850l. on a mortgage, ſhould promiſe for it 30l. *per ann.* (or 3 ½ *per cent.* intereſt) and 150l. (that is 17 ½ *per cent.*

nearly) over and above the principal, when the mortgage came to be diſcharged.——Such a *premium* (ſhould the mortgage be diſcharged ſoon) would be very extravagant; but, if *never* to be diſcharged, would be inſignificant: Nor would it be poſſible to account for ſuch a bargain, except by ſuppoſing, that the borrower, inſtead of meaning to repay the ſum he borrowed, choſe to continue *always* paying intereſt for it, or returning 30l. annually for 850l. once advanced; and to ſubject his eſtate, for that purpoſe, to an eternal incumbrance.

The public, I have ſaid, may be obliged to diſcharge the new capital, lately created, at *par*; and, conſequently, to ſuffer a loſs by this year's loan of 322,500l. This will, undoubtedly, happen, ſhould the nation proſper, and the public debts be put into a regular and fixed courſe of redemption; for the 3 *per cents.* would then ſoon riſe to *par*.

The extravagance I have pointed out is the more to be regretted, becauſe it was entirely needleſs; for the ſame ſum might as well have been borrowed by ſchemes, which would not have ſubjected the public to the neceſſity of paying, when the loan came to be diſcharged, more money than had been received.——For inſtance. The ſum advanced for the new capital of 2,150,000l. *three per cent.* annuities, might have been procured by offering 3 ½ *per cent.* on a capital equal to the ſum advanced; or on 1.827,500 l. And the remainder, neceſſary to make up *two millions*, might have been obtained by the profits of a Lottery, conſiſting of 60,000 tickets each worth 10l. in MONEY. This ſcheme would have differed but little in value from the other; and the intereſt, or the annuity payable by the public, would have been 63,962 l. at 3 ½ *per cent.* on a capital of 1.827,500; (*a*) inſtead of 64,500l. at 3 *per cent.* on a capital of 2.150,000 l.

When a 100l. *ſtock* in the 3 *per cent.* annuities is ſold at 85 ¾, purchaſers get 3 ½ *per cent.* intereſt for their money. When, therefore, the 3 *per cents* are at this price, 3 ½ *per cents* would be at *par*; and a capital of 1.827,500l. might be redeemed by the public, (without loſing any advantage ariſing from its debts being at a diſcount,) by paying this ſum; or by returning the money borrowed (*b*). But in the ſame circumſtances, a capital

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(*a*) Had this intereſt been inſufficient, it might have been increaſed a 16th or even an 8th *per cent.* without any material difference; or, (which would have been better) 3 ½ *per cent.* might have been offered for *four fifths* of the ſum borrowed, and 4 *per cent.* for the remainder; in which caſe, the annuity payable by the public would have been 65,790 *l.*

(*b*) It ſhould be remembered here, that tho' Government, when its debts are at a diſcount, may be able, with the conſent capital of 2.150,000l. in the 3 *per cent.* annuities, for which 85l. *per cent.* or, in the whole, 1.827,500l. had been received, could not be redeemed without offering 86 or 87 *per cent.* for it; nor, therefore, without paying *more* than the original ſum borrowed.——When the 3 *per cents* are near *par*, there would be a loſs of 322,500l. in redeeming the ſame capital; whereas, the former annuities, for which the ſame ſum had been advanced, might be always diſcharged by either paying the very ſum (*a*) advanced, or a *leſs ſum.* In

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ſent of the creditors, to redeem a given capital by paying a leſs ſum than that capital; yet it can never be obliged to pay *more.* ——In other words; a 100l. capital in the 3 *per cents*; 3 ½ *per cents*; or 4, or 5 *per cents*, Government is always at liberty to redeem by paying 100l. whatever the market price of it may be, and whether the creditors will conſent or not.

(*a*) There is another very great advantage which would attend theſe annuities.——One and the ſame *ſurplus* would diſcharge a given capital in leſs time. For example. A ſurplus of a million *per ann.* invariably applied, and the firſt payment to be made immediately, would diſcharge a capital of a *hundred millions* bearing 3 *per cent.* intereſt in 46 years. But if the ſame capital bore 3 ½ *per cent.* intereſt, it would be diſcharged in 43 ½ years; if 4 *per cent.* in 40 years; if 5 *per cent.* in 37 ½ years.——A capital *leſs* than a 100 millions, in the ſame proportion that the intereſt is *more* than 3 *per cent.* and for which, therefore, the ſame annuity is paid, (as in the preſent caſe) the ſame ſurplus would diſcharge in 36 years, if the intereſt is 3 ½; in 34 ¼ years, if the intereſt is 4 *per cent.*

——In all poſſible circumſtances, therefore, theſe annuities would have the advantage.——But we never, when contracting debts, carry our views to the diſcharge of the principal; and the conſequences muſt prove fatal.

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cent. in 27 ¼ years if the intereſt is 5 *per cent.*——Suppoſing, therefore, 75 millions borrowed in the manner of our Government, by creating a capital of a 100 millions bearing 3 *per cent.* (that is, by ſelling 3 *per cent.* ſtock for 75l. in money) which might have been borrowed by creating a capital of only 75 millions bearing 4 *per cent.* (that is by ſelling 4 *per cent.* ſtock at 100) there will not only be a loſs of 25 millions by a needleſs increaſe of the capital; but alſo a loſs of 14 millions, by an increaſe of the time in which one and the ſame ſaving will diſcharge the two capitals.——This may be proved in the following manner.——A million *per ann.* will, in 34 years and a quarter, very nearly diſcharge a debt of 75 millions bearing intereſt at 4 *per cent*; but the ſame ſaving will, in the ſame time, diſcharge only a capital of 61 millions, if it bears intereſt at 3 *per cent.* When, therefore, ſuch a ſaving has compleated the redemption of the *one* capital, there will remain unpaid of the other, 39 millions.——What has been now applied to a large ſum holds true in proportion of any ſmaller ſums.

It appears from hence to be a very wrong obſervation which ſome have made; "that provided the annual charge is the ſame, "it ſignifies little what the *principal* of the public debt is."——As there is no way of removing the annual charge but by paying the *principal*, it is of juſt as much conſequence what it is, as whether it is practicable or impracticable, to remove a burden which weakens and cripples, and muſt in time ſink the public. An annuity of SIX MILLIONS, if the principal is

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It is neceſſary I ſhould obſerve, in juſtice to our preſent miniſters, that in adopting the ſcheme on which I have made theſe remarks, they have only followed the example of former miniſters; and that, however needleſs a waſte it occaſions of public money, there is reaſon to fear it will be followed by future miniſters; for the increaſe of difficulty and expence in redeeming the public debts, which ſuch ſchemes create, being to be felt *hereafter*, it makes no impreſſion, and is little regarded.

In 1759, the fifth year of the laſt war, the lenders of 6.600,000 l. were granted a capital in the 3 *per cents* of 7,590,000 l. together with the profits of the Lottery. Subtract from the ſum advanced, 150,000 l. for the profits of the Lottery; and it will appear, that, in this inſtance, 1.140,000 l. was *needleſsly* added to the capital; there being no reaſon to doubt, but that lenders would then have

a HUNDRED MILLIONS borrowed at 6 *per cent.* might be redeemed in 33 years with a million *per ann.* ſurplus. But if the principal is TWO HUNDRED MILLIONS bearing 3 *per cent.* the ſame ſurplus would, in the ſame time, pay off only 56 millions; and but little more than a *quarter* of the annuity would be redeemed. If, therefore, the ſame ſum might as well have been obtained by creating a principal of a hundred millions bearing 6 *per cent.* as by creating a capital of two hundred millions bearing 3 *per cent.* there will be a needleſs expence, in diſcharging the debt, of 144 millions.

readily advanced 6.600,000l. for a capital of 6.450,000l. bearing 3 ½ *per cent*, (*a*) intereſt, provided the profits of a Lottery were annexed; inſtead of advancing the ſame ſum for a nominal capital near 18 *per cent.* greater, but bearing 3 *per cent* intereſt.

Again. In 1762, in order to raiſe 12 millions, every contributor of 80 l. was entitled to a capital of 100l. to bear 4 *per cent.* intereſt for 19 years; and afterwards to become redeemable, and to bear intereſt at 3 *per cent.* And for the remaining 20 l. neceſſary to make up a 100l. contributors were entitled to an annuity of 1 l. for 98 years.——This was the ſame with promiſing, for every 60 l. advanced, a 100l. capital in the 3 *per cent.* annuities, not redeemable for 19 years; and, for the remaining 40 l. neceſſary to make up 100l. an annuity of 2 l. for 19 years; and, after that, of 1 l. for 79 years.

By this ſcheme no leſs a ſum than 4.800,000l. was needleſsly added to the capital of the public debts. For, had 5 *per cent.* been offered for for every 60 l. advanced; (*b*) and, for the remaining

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(*a*) The price of the 3 *per cents* at the time of this loan (in the beginning of Feb. 1759) was 88 ½ and 89.

(*b*) The 3 *per cents* juſt before this loan were at 69 l. and, conſequently, 5 *per cent.* intereſt, (or 3 l. *per ann.* for 60 l.) would maining 40l. an annuity of 2l. during 19 years, and afterwards of 1l. for 79 years; equal encouragement would have been given to contributors; the annuity payable by the public would have been the ſame; and the new capital would have been 7.200,000l. bearing 5 *per cent.* intereſt; which might, at any time, have been redeemed with a ſaving of a million *per ann.* (the firſt payment to be made immediately) in *five* years and a *quarter*: Whereas now, this debt will not become redeemable till 1781; and then, it will form a capital of 12 millions, not capable of being redeemed with the ſame ſaving, in leſs than *nine* years and a half. Five millions and a quarter, (*a*) therefore, will be waſted.

The capital of 12 millions four *per cent.* annuities created this year, were made irredeemable for 19 years, to guard againſt the effects of an apprehenſion then unavoidable, that an intereſt of 4 *per cent.* would, if the capitals were redeemable, be reduced, whenever peace came, to 3 *per cent.*

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would have afforded ſubſcribers a profit of 9l. for every 60l. advanced. The long annuity was worth, as the ſtocks then ſtood, 21 years purchaſe, and the ſhort annuity, 13 years purchaſe. Upon the whole loan, therefore, the profit would have been 3 *per cent.*

(*a*) That is, the difference between 12 millions, and the ſum bearing intereſt at 3 *per cent.* which a million *per ann.* would pay off, in five years and a quarter.

as had been done in the preceding peace.—But this end would have been anſwered, with equal effect and more advantage to the public, by pledging the faith of Parliament, that whatever intereſt was promiſed on any capital, ſhould not be *reduced* for 19 years; or (which comes to the ſame) that the capital ſhould not be *redeemed*, during that term, by borrowing money, and creating a new capital bearing *lower* intereſt. This would have placed capitals bearing any intereſt on the ſame footing *nearly* with the 3 *per cent.* annuities; and an aſſurance, that no part of them ſhould be diſcharged, without at the ſame time diſcharging an equal capital in the 3 *per cents*, would have placed them *entirely* on the ſame footing.——Had it, however, been neceſſary, on account of the fear of a reduction of intereſt, to make the capital here propoſed bearing 5 *per cent*, and the capitals to be mentioned preſently bearing 4 *per cent.* irredeemable, (and therefore the intereſt irreducible) for any term (ſuppoſe till 1781); had, I ſay, even this been neceſſary (and more could not have been neceſſary) no advantage of great conſequence would have been loſt. Theſe capitals would, during that term, have been exactly the ſame burden on the public with the capitals which were actually created; and after that term, they would have been a much leſs burden, as will be ſhewn at the end of this ſection.

Again; In January 1760, eight millions were borrowed by offering for this ſum a capital of eight millions to carry 4 *per cent.* intereſt for 21 years, and afterwards 3 *per cent*, together with a *premium* of 240,000l. ſtock carrying the ſame intereſt, and divided into 80,000l. lottery tickets, each 3l. ſtock.——This was the ſame with offering, for 80l. of every 100l. advanced, a capital of 100l. in the 3 *per cent.* annuities, (*a*) not redeemable for 21 years; and for the remainder beſides a lottery ticket an annuity of 1l. for 21 years.——The ſame ſum might have been raiſed by offering 4 *per cent*, irreducible during 21 years, or 3l. *per ann.* for 75l. of every 100l. advanced, and for the remaining 25l. an annuity of 1l. for 21 years, together with a lottery ticket.——In this caſe, the new capital, inſtead of 8.240,000l. bearing 3 *per cent.* not ſubject to redemption, and having an annuity of 82,400l. annexed to it, for 21 years; would have been 6.000,000l. bearing 4 *per cent.* with

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(*a*) The 3 *per cents* being at this time at 80l., an annuity of 3l. purchaſed for 75l. would have produced a profit of 5l. Therefore theſe ſchemes are of exactly the ſame value. But they are too narrow; and the ſubſcription this year fell immediately to one *per cent.* diſcount. But in the ſcheme I have propoſed this might have been prevented by only offering 4 *per cent.* for 77l. or 78l. (inſtead of 75l.) of every 100l.

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the ſame annuity annexed, but redeemable at *any* time; and 240,000*l.* (a) bearing 4 *per cent.* for 21 years, and afterwards 3 *per cent.*

By the ſcheme likewiſe in 1761, for borrowing 11.400,000*l.* a capital of 100*l.* bearing 3 *per cent. intereſt*, was given for part of every 100*l.* advanced; and for the other part, an annuity of 1*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* for 99 years. Had, in this caſe, 75*l.* FOUR *per cent.* STOCK, been offered for 75*l.* in *money*; and, for the remaining 25*l.* neceſſary to make up 100*l.* the ſaid annuity of 1*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* for 99 years; (b) the whole annual charge would have been the ſame; ſubſcribers could not have been ſenſible of any difference in the encouragement offered them; and the public, in paying its debts, would have ſaved 2.850,000*l.*

There was alſo this year 600,000*l.* received by government for 600,000*l.* ſtock, carrying 3 *per cent.* intereſt, and divided into 60,000 lottery tickets, each worth 10*l.* in ſtock.—As 150,000*l.* of this ſum was paid for the profits of the lottery;

(a) It is plain, that this capital, as well as the former, might have been a quarter (or 60,000*l.*) leſs, which would have made the whole ſaving of capital 2.060,000*l.*

(b) At the time of this loan, the 3 *per cents.* were above 75; and, therefore, a perpetual annuity of 3*l.* could not be purchaſed for 75*l.* and an annuity of 1*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* for 99 years, was worth at leaſt 27*l.* This, therefore, would have been a ſcheme very profitable to ſubſcribers.

and as 4 *per cent.* could not at this time be made of money laid out in the funds, it is out of doubt, that the ſame ſum (or 600,000*l.*) would have been given for 450,000*l.* ſtock, carrying 4 *per cent.* and divided into 60,000 lottery tickets, each of the ſame value with 7*l.* 10*s.* four *per cent.* ſtock; and thus 150,000*l.* more would have been ſaved.

In like manner; it will appear, that *three millions*, raiſed in 1757, by creating a capital of *three millions* bearing 3 *per cent.* intereſt, (*a*) with a life annuity annexed of 1*l.* 2*s.* 6*d.* for every 100*l.* advanced; and alſo, *four millions and a half* raiſed in 1758, by creating a capital of *four millions and a half*, bearing 3 *per cent.* with an annuity of a *half per cent.* annexed for 24 years; might have been

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(*a*) The life-annuity granted in this caſe could not have been worth ſo little as 16*l.* or 14 years purchaſe; and, therefore, a capital of 100*l.* in the 3 *per cents* was ſold for 84*l*; or a capital of three millions, for 2.520,000*l.*——A premium, therefore, was granted of 480,000*l*; and this was done without the leaſt reaſon. For the 3 *per cents* being at that time at 87 and 88, 2.520,000*l.* would undoubtedly have been lent at 3½ *per cent.* intereſt; and the remaining 480,000*l.* neceſſary to make up three millions, would have been given for the life annuities; in which caſe, the annual charge occaſioned by the new capital would have been ſomewhat leſs; and 480,000*l.* would have been ſaved, together with the additional expence occaſioned by the longer time which a given ſurplus would require to diſcharge a debt bearing 3 *per cent.* intereſt, as explained in the note, p. 94.

raiſed by creating, in the former caſe, a capital of two millions and a half, and, in the latter, a capital of four millions, bearing 3½ *per cent.* intereſt, with the ſame annuities annexed.

In 1758, the additional ſum of half a million was borrowed at 3 *per cent.* by a lottery, conſiſting of 50,000 tickets, each of the ſame real value with 10*l.* *ſtock*, but ſold to the ſubſcribers for 10*l.* in *money* (*a*). As the 3 *per cents.* were now at 94,

3½ *per*

(*a*) It is a general and certain maxim "that whenever "money is borrowed by a lottery which gives a right "to *ſtock* equal to the ſum advanced, there is a loſs "equal to the ſum which might have been received for "the profits of the lottery."——When the 3 *per cents.* are at 76 or 77, half a million might be borrowed by a lottery, conſiſting of 50,000 tickets, each of the ſame value with 10*l.* three *per cent.* ſtock: and hitherto ſuch a method of borrowing has been reckoned advantageous. But it only gives a fallacious appearance of borrowing at 3 *per cent.* It is the ſame with ſelling the profits of a lottery, and at the ſame time abſurdly converting the purchaſe-money into a debt due to the purchaſer.——Since the laſt war we have had ſeven of theſe lotteries, including two in 1763; and above a million has been loſt by them.

In Queen *Anne*'s time, there were ſeveral lotteries, conſiſting of all *prizes* and no *blanks*. This is ſo curious, and moſt perſons may be ſo much at a loſs to conceive of the poſſibility of it, that I cannot help explaining it.

A capital, equal to the whole money advanced, was diſtributed *equally* among all the tickets in the lottery; and, in order to make them prizes of different values, there was farther diſtributed among them different ſhares of an additional

capital,

3¼ *per cent.* could not be made of money laid out in the funds. Therefore, 350,000*l.* of this half

capital, to which a right was given, though no money had been paid for it.——For example——In 1711, two millions were raiſed by a lottery of this kind, called a claſs lottery. The whole ſum advanced was divided into 20,000 tickets, each 100*l.* ſtock bearing 6 *per cent.* intereſt. This capital was increaſed by a gratuitous capital of 602,200*l.* bearing the ſame intereſt, and divided into ſhares which were added to the tickets, in order to form prizes.——This was the ſame with giving near 8 *per cent.* for money, beſides a *premium* of 30 *per cent.*——As the intereſt of money was at this time 6 *per cent*, the ſum borrowed would moſt certainly have been advanced at 8 *per cent.* without any *premium*; but it was, I ſuppoſe, reckoned neceſſary that government ſhould not *ſeem* to give ſuch high intereſt.——In the ſame year, 1.500,000*l.* was borrowed by another ſuch lottery, and creating a capital of 1.928,570*l.* And in 1712, 3.600,000*l.* was borrowed by two more ſuch lotteries, and creating a capital of 4.683,080*l.*——The greateſt part of the debts contracted by theſe lotteries (amounting to 9.213,850*l.* though only 7.100,000*l.* was advanced) remains at this hour an incumbrance on the public; and the duties conſtituting the *general fund* are charged with the intereſt of it.

In 1714, the national intereſt was reduced to 5 *per cent.* But in that very year 1.400,000*l.* was borrowed by a lottery, which gave a right to a capital of 1.876,000*l.* bearing 4 *per cent.* that is, by giving near 5½ *per cent.* intereſt, beſides a *premium* of 34 *per cent.*——Thus have our debts been increaſed. But even worſe has been done. The taxes charged with the intereſt of the public debts proving often deficient, the ſhorteſt way of diſcharging the arrears has been often taken, by adding them to the principal, and paying *compound* intereſt for money.——Is it a wonder, that a nation which has been ſo careleſs in contracting debts, ſhould have done ſo little towards diſcharging them?

million might have been raiſed at 3½ *per cent.* intereſt, and the remaining 150,000*l.* might have been procured for the profits of the lottery. Or (which is the ſame) 10*l.* each would have been given for 150,000 tickets, of the ſame value taken all together, with 350,000 l. carrying 3½ *per cent.* intereſt; and a capital of 150,000*l.* would have been ſaved.

The ſame is true of the lottery, by which half a million was borrowed in 1756. — A million and a half alſo borrowed in this year, by creating a capital of a million and a half, bearing 3½ *per cent.* for 15 years, and afterwards 3 *per cent.* might have been procured, by creating a capital of only 1,400,000*l.* bearing 3½ *per cent.* intereſt. But I will not examine any more of theſe loans. Let us next conſider how detrimental they have been to the public.

All the ſavings and ſurplus monies of the kingdom from 1763 to 1775, have amounted (deducting 400,000*l.* gained by debts diſcharged at a diſcount) to 10,739,793*l.* and with this ſum 11,139,793*l.* of the national debt has been paid off. (See the *Poſtſcript* at the end of this work.) — The needleſs addition which was made to the capital of the national debt, by injudicious ſchemes for raiſing money during the laſt war, exceeded this ſum; and it follows, therefore, that the whole ſurplus of the revenue for twelve years, has not been ſufficient to diſcharge the capital, to which in the laſt war a right was given, without receiving any money for it, or obtaining the leaſt advantage by it.

The attentive reader muſt have obſerved, as I have gone along, that the extravagance on which I have infiſted, has been the conſequence of not ſeparating, in the ſchemes for raiſing money, the premiums (conſiſting of ſhort and long and life-annuities) from the perpetual annuities, and requiring them to be diſtinctly paid for; and alſo, of not attending to the difference between ſelling an *annuity*, and ſelling the *ſtock* for which that annuity is paid. When a 100*l.* *ſtock* in the 3 *per cents.* is at any given price, there is no one who would not be glad to purchaſe from government a perpetual annuity of 3*l.* at any *lower* price (*a*). But when government ſells the *ſtock*, inſtead of the *annuity*, at that price, the public is injured in the manner I have repreſented.

Would any one, in ſelling any part of his property, offer to make the purchaſe-money an outſtanding principal which he ſhall be bound to

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(*a*) That is, in other words, there is no one who would not be glad to lend to government on any higher intereſt than that which he can make in the funds. There is no one, for inſtance, who would not be glad to lend 75*l.* at 4 *per cent.* when the 3 *per cents.* are at 76, and when, therefore, he cannot make 4 *per cent.* by purchaſing them.

return? (*a*) This is what government has uniformly done in its propoſals for raiſing money.—Were I to deſire any ſum to be lent me *without* intereſt, offering as a *compenſation* or *premium* an annuity for a given term, or an advantageous contract; the propoſal would not be accepted, unleſs the annuity or the contract was worth the ſum to be lent; and I ſhould make myſelf a debtor to the purchaſer for the very thing which I ſold to him. ——The abſurdity would be the ſame, if inſtead of borrowing *without* intereſt, I ſhould in the ſame way borrow at a *low* intereſt. In every ſuch bargain, I ſhould bring upon myſelf a needleſs debt, equal to the value of the *premium*.

I am afraid I have tired my reader's attention on this ſubject. But as much depends upon a right underſtanding of it, I am anxious about ſhewing it in every poſſible light. In hopes, therefore, of being attended to a little longer, I ſhall endeavour to give a yet fuller view of this ſubject, and to prove its importance, by recapitulating ſome of the foregoing remarks, and comparing the *preſent* ſtate of our public debts, with

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(*a*) The expectation of receiving back ſome time or other the purchaſe-money would probably, in private loans, influence a purchaſer. But in the caſes to which I allude, this certainly was not conſidered, and did not at all influence. And if it had influenced, the obſervations I have made as I have gone along, demonſtrate that the ſame loans would have been made without any ſuch expectation.

that which would have been their ſtate, had the errors I have pointed out, in the ſchemes of the public loans during the laſt war, been avoided.

The ſum of 12 millions, borrowed in 1762, would have left, at the end of the war, a redeemable capital of 7.200,000l. carrying 5 *per cent.* intereſt, with an annuity added of 120,000l. for 18 years from January 1763, inſtead of an *ir*-redeemable capital of 12 millions carrying 4 *per cent.* for 18 years, and afterwards 3 *per cent.* See page 95, &c.

The ſum of 12 millions, borrowed in 1761, would have left a redeemable capital of 9 millions bearing 4 *per cent.* intereſt, with a long annuity annexed; inſtead of 12 millions with the ſame annuity annexed. Page 100.

The ſum of 8 millions, borrowed in 1760, would have left a redeemable capital of 6.180,000l. carrying 4 *per cent.* with an annuity of 82,400l. for 18 years from January 1763; inſtead of 8.240,000l. *ir*-redeemable, and carrying 4 *per cent.* for 18 years, and afterwards 3 *per cent.* Page 99.

The ſum of 6.600,000l. borrowed in 1759, would have left a capital of 6.450,000l. carrying 3 ½ *per cent*; inſtead of a capital of 7.590,000l. carrying 3 *per cent.* Page 95.

The ſum of five millions, borrowed in 1758, would have left a redeemable capital of 4.350,000l. bearing 3 ½ *per cent.* intereſt, with an annuity added of 22,500 l. for 19 years from Midſummer 1763; inſtead of a capital of five millions irredeemable, and carrying 3 ½ *per cent.* for 19 years, and afterwards 3 *per cent.* Page 101, 102, &c.

The ſum of three millions, borrowed in 1757, would have left a capital of two millions and a half bearing 3 ½ *per cent.* intereſt, inſtead of three millions bearing 3 *per cent.* intereſt.——And two millions, borrowed in 1756, inſtead of leaving a capital of two millions, would have left a capital of only 1.750,000 l. Page 104.

The reſult, therefore, is, that the whole capital of the public debts would have been, at the end of the laſt war, near TWELVE MILLIONS AND A HALF leſs than it was; and at the ſame time, the annual charge not greater.——In 1775, the difference would have been much more conſiderable. For,

Suppoſing all the ſame ſums applied ſince the laſt war to the diſcharge of the public debts that we know have been ſo applied, not only the *capital* but the *annual charge* would have been conſiderably leſs.——This will be demonſtrated by the following account.

It may be learnt from the *Poſtſcript* at the end of this Tract, that 11.139,793 l. of the public debts has been diſcharged with 10.739,793 l. of the public money, derived from various ſavings and ſurpluſſes. All this money *might* have been employed, and without doubt would have been employed, in redeeming first the capital I have mentioned in Page 107, of 7.200,000 l. bearing 5 *per cent.* intereſt; and afterwards, the two other capitals there mentioned of 19 millions, and of 6,180,000 l. bearing 4 *per cent.* intereſt. It would have been ſufficient to redeem the whole of the former capital, and alſo 3.539,793 l. of the two laſt capitals; which would have ſet free for the public an annual charge of 501,591 l.——To this ſum muſt be added an annual charge of 256,000 l. ſaved in 1765, 1766, 1767 and 1768, by redeeming, with 6,400,000 l. borrowed in thoſe years, ſo much of a debt unfunded at the end of the war, but afterwards funded, and carrying 4 *per cent.* intereſt. And alſo 12,537 l. *per ann.* gained by changing 1.253,700 l. from an intereſt of 4 to 3 *per cent.* and 7,500 l. *per ann.* gained in 1771, by the ceaſing of an annuity of a ½ *per cent.* annexed for 15 years to 1.500,000 l. borrowed in 1756.——The total decreaſe, therefore, of the annual charge would have been 777,628 l.——But at the ſame time there would have been the following additions to it.——Firſt. There would have been the addition of 199,500 l. *per ann.* being the intereſt of 6.650,000 l. borrowed ſince 1763.——Secondly. Of 69,187 l. *per ann.* being the intereſt of 2.306,240 l. applied, in 1764 and 1765, to the diſcharge of German and army debts derived from the war, and which might have been converted into a funded capital bearing 3 *per cent.* intereſt, by borrowing money to pay them off, in order to avoid diverting money employed in redeeming capitals bearing 5 *per cent.*

Theſe two ſums make 268,687l. which deducted from 777,628l. leaves 508,941l. And this is the clear annual charge which would have been ſaved to the public, excluſive of the ſavings which have ariſen from the falling in of life-annuities.

But the annual charge that has in fact been ſaved is only 382,129 (*a*).——The difference is 126,812l.——With this additional ſaving, as it fell in and increaſed from time to time during the courſe of 12 years, a million more of the public debts bearing 4 *per cent.* might have been redeemed; and this would have made a farther ſaving of 40,000l. *per ann.* It appears, therefore, upon the whole, that had the miſtakes I have pointed out, in the loans of the laſt war, been avoided, (all other public meaſures remaining the ſame) the nation would *now* have had 13 millions and a half leſs to pay, in order to redeem its debts; and alſo an annual charge upon it 166,812l. leſs.

(*a*) See the Poſtſcript.

All this ſuppoſes that the capitals of the 5 *per cent.* and 4 *per cent.* annuities in the improved ſchemes were redeemable.—But had they been made irredeemable till 1781, as mentioned in page 98, the public would not have been much leſs benefited: For, ſoon after 1781, theſe 5 and 4 *per cents.* (the former 7.200,000 l. and the latter 15.180,000 l.) might have been eaſily reduced to 3 ½ *per cent.* and this would have occaſioned an annual ſaving of 183,900 l. over and above the ſavings, which would have ariſen in that year, from the extinction of the ſhort annuities.

I will add, that had theſe annuities been made not only *irredeemable* till 1781; but *irreducible* for ſome time beyond that year, in the manner intimated in page 98, the public would ſtill have been greatly benefited. For, the annual charge upon it would not at any time have been greater; but its debts would have been 12 millions and a half leſs; and, at the ſame time, they would have been capable of being diſcharged with more expedition, and at a leſs expence, than a ſmaller quantity of its preſent debts. See the note, page 94.

I cannot doubt but that all who will attentivel examine theſe obſervations will find them to b juſt.——I have confined my enquiries to the loan of the laſt war. Had I extended them to all ou loans, it would have appeared, that a greater ſu

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than moſt perſons can think credible, (*a*) has been ſuch a needleſs addition to our debts as I have explained; or, "a pure and uncompenſated loſs, "which might have been avoided by only framing "differently the ſchemes of the public loans."——

(*a*) SIXTEEN MILLIONS have been ſpecified. It will come in my way to mention above FOUR MILLIONS more in the ſecond ſection of the next part. Notes 1, 12, 14.—No notice has been here taken of the loans of the war before the laſt; but loſſes of the ſame kind to a great amount were incurred by them.

PART III.

SECT. I.

Abstract of the Exports from and Imports to Great-Britain from 1697 to 1773, with Remarks.

Annual Medium	Imports.	Exports.	Excess of Exports.	
	£.	£.	£.	
for Four Years ended at 1700	4.956,975	6.034,724	1.077,749	or $\frac{10}{56}$ of the exports.
For Five Years ended at 1710	5.321,717	6.713,246	1.391,529	or $\frac{10}{48}$ of the exports.
at 1715	5.304,343	7.401,946	2.097,603	or $\frac{10}{35}$ of the exports.
at 1725	6.628,279	9.663,527	3.035,248	or $\frac{10}{32}$ of the exports.
at 1735	7.470,454	11,855,226	4.384,772	or $\frac{10}{27}$ of the exports.
at 1745	7.363,079	11.922,982	4.559,903	or $\frac{10}{26}$ of the exports.
at 1750	7.429,739	12.877,129	5.447,390	or $\frac{10}{24}$ of the exports.
at 1755	8.264,834	13.406,530	5.141,696	or $\frac{10}{26}$ of the exports.
at 1760	8.877,144	14.253,377	5.376,233	or $\frac{10}{26}$ of the exports.
For Four Years ended at 1764	10.110,870	15.793,158	5.682,228	or $\frac{10}{28}$ of the exports.
For Nine Years ended at 1773	11.996,769	14,814,074	2,817,305	or $\frac{10}{53}$ of the exports.

This ABSTRACT has been formed from the accounts delivered annually to the HOUSE OF COMMONS, and lately publiſhed by Sir CHARLES WHITWORTH.

In order to draw juſt inferences from it, the following particulars ſhould be remembered.—— Firſt. The EXPORTS in the *Cuſtom-Houſe* entries are, for reaſons well-known, too high. This exceſs has, by ſome of the beſt judges, been reckoned at a million *per ann.*——Secondly. The IMPORTS are too low, no ſmuggled commodities being included in them. This deficiency has been eſtimated at another million *per ann.* But, in order to be ſure of keeping within bounds, I will take both at a *million and a half per ann.*——Thirdly. The intereſt of the national debt paid to foreigners; the money ſpent in foreign countries by *Engliſh* travellers; the bullion conſumed in manufactures; and the wear of the current coin, cannot, perhaps, amount to much leſs than two millions *per ann.* I will, however, take them at no more than the annual ſum which has been commonly ſuppoſed to be due to foreigners from our funds; or, a *million and a half.*——In order, therefore, to find the GRAND BALANCE OF PAYMENT between *Britain* and the reſt of the world *ſince* the laſt war, all theſe ſums (making up THREE MILLIONS) muſt be deducted from the exceſs of the exports. ——But, in order to find the ſame balance *before* the end of the laſt war, leſs muſt be deducted, in proportion as the national debt and the foreign trade were *then* leſs than they are *now*.

If the foregoing Abſtract is examined with a due regard to this rule, it will be found that, from (*a*) 1710 to 1764, the BALANCE OF PAYMENT muſt have been in favour of *Britain*; and that conſequently, there muſt have been, during that period, an influx of money into the kingdom.—It was this, together with the increaſe of our paper, that produced the rapid fall of intereſt which began a few years before the *Acceſſion*. And it was this alſo that enabled us to bear the great expence of the two laſt wars, and the loſs of thoſe enormous ſums which were ſent out of the kingdom to pay foreign ſubſidies, and to ſupport armies on the continent.

Before 1710 it appears to be doubtful, whether the exceſs of the exports was ſuch as brought any money into the kingdom; but it ſeems certain, that it could not have been ſuch as in any degree compenſated that drain of the public caſh, which was occaſioned by the continental wars of King William

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(*a*) In the exports, as delivered to the *Houſe of Commons*, is included bullion exported. If this, as well as the other ſums I have mentioned, is deducted, there will be ſtill a balance left in favour of *Britain* during this period. Since 1764, it does not appear, from the accounts laid before the *Houſe of Commons*, as publiſhed by Sir *Charles Whitworth*, that any bullion has been entered for exportation.

William and Queen *Ann*. In conſequence of this, the quantity of *ſpecie* in the kingdom muſt have been greatly diminiſhed; and Dr. *Davenant* computes that in 1711 it was nine millions leſs than at the *Revolution*. Hence proceeded the high rate of intereſt; the unproductiveneſs of the taxes; and the difficulties which government met with in raiſing money during thoſe two wars: And there is reaſon to believe, theſe difficulties would have been inſurmountable, had not a ſubſtitute for *ſpecie* been provided by the eſtabliſhment of the *Bank*.

In the interval of peace between the two laſt wars, or from 1748 to 1755, the balance in favour of *Britain* was at the higheſt; and this contributed to raiſe the ſtocks (*a*) to ſuch a price, as enabled government to reduce the intereſt of the public debts from 4 to 3 *per cent*.

But the obſervation I here intended principally to make is, that the *balance*, ſince the year 1764, appears, from the preceding abſtract, to have been *againſt* BRITAIN; and that this accounts for the high price of bullion, the ſcarcity of ſpecie, and the diſtreſs of the *Bank* from that year to 1773.

(*a*) The 3 *per cent*. annuities were then at 105; and, during the firſt five years of the war which began in 1755, they were higher than they have generally been *ſince* the war.

It deſerves farther to be obſerved that, while the exports were decreaſing from 1764 to 1773, the IMPORTS appear to have increaſed faſter than ever: And the fact is, that ſince 1760, a greater addition has been made to them, than had been made during the whole time from the *Acceſſion* to that year.——This is a ſtriking proof that luxury has been for ſome years increaſing with rapidity among us; and it is worth adding, that the productiveneſs of the taxes has kept pace, as might have been expected, with this increaſe of luxury, both the CUSTOMS and EXCISES having brought in lately, near 250,000l. *per ann.* each, more than they did twelve years ago.——It ſhould be attended to, that this improvement of the revenue muſt be the effect ſolely of an increaſed conſumption occaſioned by luxury; the taxes, ever ſince the end of the laſt war, having been nearly the ſame.

The *exports* from 1710 to 1764 went on increaſing conſtantly. I have obſerved, that from 1764 to 1773 they have decreaſed. One reaſon of this has been, the decline of the PORTUGAL trade; the exports to that country having fallen, ſince 1760, from 1.200,000l. *per ann.* to 600,000l. *per ann.*——Another reaſon has been the check which a wretched policy has been giving, ever ſince 1763, to our trade with the Colonies. This trade had for many years contributed more than any other trade towards raiſing our *exports*; and even in the period between 1763 and 1774, notwithſtanding the checks it received, it went on increaſing, and produced a balance in our favour of a million and a half *per ann.* But ſince 1774 it has been entirely loſt. *Before* this loſs, the balance of payment between us and the reſt of the world was, according to the account I have given, *againſt* us. Undoubtedly then, it was a loſs we could by no means have ſuſtained, had it not been for the ſeaſonable interpoſition of ſome very particular cauſes. Time will ſhew whether theſe cauſes are of a permanent nature, or temporary and accidental.

SECT. II.

HISTORICAL DEDUCTION *and* ANALYSIS *of the* PUBLIC DEBTS.

STATE *and* AMOUNT *of the* NATIONAL DEBT, *at Midſummer*, 1775, *with the Charges of Management.*

CAPITALS and ANNUITIES transferrable at the BANK OF ENGLAND.

	Principal.	Intereſt.
	£.	£.
CAPITAL of their original Fund—See Note (1) p. 125 — —	3.200,000	96,000
EXCHEQUER bills, by 3d of *Geo.* I. c. 8th, bearing originally 5 *per cent.* intereſt, but reduced to 4 *per cent.* in 1727, and to 3 *per cent.* by 23d *George* II. 1749. See Note (2) p. 126 -	500,000	15,000
Purchaſed of the SOUTH SEA COMPANY in 1722, —reduced from 6 to 5 *per cent.* intereſt in 1717; from 5 to 4 *per cent.* in 1727; and to 3 *per cent.* by 23d of *George* II. 1749.—See Note (3) — —	4.000,000	120,000
Carried over	7.700,000	231,000

	Principal.	Intereſt.
	£.	£.
Brought over —	7.700,000	231,000
Lent to government at 4 *per cent.* in 1728, charged on the ſurplus of the fund for the lottery in 1714, and reduced to 3 *per cent.* by 23d *George* II. 1749	1.250,000	37,500
Lent at 4 *per cent.* in 1727; charged on the duties on coals; and reduced to 3 *per cent.* by 23d of *George* II. 1749 — —	1.750,000	52,500
Lent at 4 *per cent.* in 1746; charged on licences for retailing ſpirituous liquors; and reduced to 3 *per cent.* by 23d *Geo.* II. 1749 —	986,800	29,604
Amount of Bank capital £.	11.686,800	350,604
See Note (4) p. 126.		
Charge of management 5,898 *l. per ann.*		
BANK ANNUITIES.		
Conſolidated 4 *per cent.* annuities due *April* 5, and *October* 10—See Note (5) — —	18,986,300	759,452
Carried over £	30.673,100 *l.*	1.110,056

Theſe annuities fall to 3 *per cent.* in *January*, 1781.

Charge of management 10,680 *l. per ann.*

Annuities

	Principal.	Intereſt.
Brought over —	£.30.673,100	1.110,056
Annuities at 3½ *per cent.* 1758, due *Jan.* 5, and *July* 5.—Theſe annuities fall to 3 *per cent.* in 1782 — —	4.500,000	157,500
See an account of them in p. 101.		
Charge of management 2,805*l.* *per ann.* including management on half a million raiſed at the ſame time by a lottery, and made a part of the conſolidated 3 *per cents.*		
CONSOLIDATED 3 *per cent.* annuities due *Jan.* 5, and *July* 5. See Note (6)	38.251,696	1.147,551
Management 21,087 *l.* *per ann.*		
REDUCED 3 *per cent.* annuities, due *April* 5, and *Oct.* 10. See Note (7)	18.353,774	550,613
Charge of management 10,324*l.* *per ann.*		
Three *per cent.* 1726, due *Jan.* 5, and *July* 5, charged on the deduction of 6*d.* *per* pound on all penſions from the civil liſt; and on all payments from the crown, except to the navy and army—See Note (8) p. 128 —	1.000,000	30,000
Carried over	£. 92.778,562	2.995,720

Management 360*l.* *per ann.*

Long

	Principal.	Intereſt.
	£.	£.
Brought over —	92.778,560	2.995,720
Long annuity due *Jan.* 5, and *July* 5 — —	6.702,750	248,250
The remaining term from *Jan.* 1776, is 84 years—See Note (9) p. 128.		
Management 3,491*l.* *per ann.*		
CAPITALS and ANNUITIES transferrable at the SOUTH SEA HOUSE.		
SOUTH SEA STOCK —	3.662,784	109,884
The dividend on this ſtock, at 3½ *per cent.* is 128,197*l.* 9*s.*—Due *Jan.* 5, and *July* 5.		
SOUTH SEA 3 *per cent.* OLD Annuities due *April* 5, and *Oct.* 10	11.907,470	357,224
Three *per cent.* NEW Annuities due *Jan.* 5, and *July* 5 — —	8.494,830	254,845
Three *per cent.* 1751, due *Jan.* 5, and *July* 5 —	1.919,600	57,588
Charge of management on *South Sea* Stock and Annuities 15,100*l.* *per ann.*—See Note (10).		
Carried over £.	125.465,994	4.023,511

CAPITAL

	Principal.	Intereſt.
	£.	£.
Brought over ——	125.465,994	4.023,511
CAPITAL and ANNUITIES transferrable at the INDIA HOUSE.		
EAST INDIA STOCK —— Intereſt 3 *per cent.* *Dividend* 7 *per cent.* 224,000*l.* due *Jan.* 5, and *July* 5.——See Note (11).	3.200,000	96,000
Charge of management 1.285*l.* 14*s.* 4*d.*		
EAST INDIA Annuity due *April* 5, and *Oct.* 10, charged on the ſurplus of a tax on ſpirituous liquors. See Note (12)	1.000,000	30,000
Management 401*l.* 15*s.* 8*d.* *per ann.*		
ANNUITIES payable at the EXCHEQUER.		
ANNUITIES for 96 and 99 years, from various dates, in the time of King *William* and Queen *Anne*—See Note (13) — —	1.836,276	131,203
Salaries to Exchequer officers, and management—5,250*l.* *per ann.*		
Annuities for lives, with benefit of ſurvivorſhip, granted by the 4th of		
Carried over £.	131.502,270	4.280,714

	Principal.	Intereſt
	£.	£.
Brought over —	131.502,270	4.280,714
William and *Mary*, 1693. — Theſe annuities are not yet extinct, and they are valued at three years purchaſe	22,781	7,567
Annuities for lives, with benefit of ſurvivorſhip, by an Act of the 5th of *Geo.* III. 1765—See Note (14) — —	18,000	540
Annuities for two or three lives, granted in 1694. — Alſo, Annuities on ſingle lives 1745, 1746, and 1757. —See Note (15) — Their original amount, taken all together, was very nearly 124,000*l.* but they are now reduced by deaths to near 80,000*l.* and their value is here taken at 10 years purchaſe —	800,000	80,000
UNFUNDED DEBT, conſiſting of Exchequer bills, (1.250,000*l.*) Navy debt, (1.850,000*l.*) and Civil liſt debt, ſuppoſed 500,000*l.*—The intereſt is reckoned at 2 *per cent.*—See Note (16)	3.600,000	72,000
Salaries to Exchequer bill officers 650*l. per ann.*		
Total of the principal and intereſt of the National Debt at *Midſummer* 1775.	£. 135.943,051	4.440,821

NOTES *containing an* EXPLANATION *and* HISTORY *of the different Articles in the foregoing Account.*

NOTE (1)——BANK OLD CAPITAL. See Page 119.——The BANK was eſtabliſhed in 1694. Their original capital was 1.200,000*l.* bearing 8 *per cent.* intereſt, charged on $\frac{4}{7}$ths. of 9*d.* *per* barrel exciſe, with 4000*l.* *per ann.* for management.——In 1709, they lent to government 400,000*l.* without intereſt, which increaſed their old capital to 1.600,000*l.* bearing 6 *per cent.* intereſt. In 1742, they again lent to government 1.600,000l. without intereſt; and thereby increaſed this capital to its preſent amount, or to 3.200,000*l.* bearing 3 *per cent.* with the ſame annual ſum for management.——It is of particular importance to obſerve with reſpect to the ſums of 400,000*l.* and of 1.600,000*l.* juſt mentioned, that they were properly a compenſation from the *Bank* to the public for continuing their excluſive privileges; and would have been advanced, or at leaſt the greateſt part of them, though government had not bound itſelf to return the purchaſe money, by making it a part of the principal due to the *Bank*, provided the ſame intereſt had been continued for ſome time on their former principal, and the ſame liberty granted to increaſe their *ſtock.*——The like is true of 1.200,000*l.* advanced by the *India* Company without intereſt in 1708.—In theſe inſtances, therefore, a needleſs addition was made to the public debt of 3.200,000*l.* which, had it been avoided, the public would have had not only a principal ſo much leſs to pay; but it would have ſaved in intereſt at leaſt 96000*l.* *per ann.* for the old capital of the *Bank* and the capital of the *Eaſt India* Company would have formed, in this caſe, between them, a debt of only 3.200,000*l.* (inſtead of 6.400,000*l.*) the intereſt of which might long ago have been reduced at leaſt one half; or from 8 *per cent.* the original intereſt, to 4 *per cent.*

Note (2)——*Half a million*, part of the Bank Capital. See Page 119.——This part of the Bank capital conſiſted originally of two millions in *Exchequer* bills, cancelled for government by an act of the 3d of *Geo.* I. But half a million was diſcharged in 1729; and a million in 1738.

Note (3)——Four millions purchaſed of the South-Sea Company; part of the Bank Capital. See Page 119.——In order to procure this money, the *Bank* ſold new ſtock at 18 *per cent.* premium. This produced a ſaving of 610,169*l.* the ſale of 3.389,831*l.* *ſtock* having produced four millions in *money*. And, conſequently, 'though by this tranſaction the capital for which they received intereſt was increaſed four millions, yet the *ſtock* on which they made their dividends was increaſed only 3.389,831*l.*

Note (4)——Bank Stock and Dividend.——The *ſtock* on which the *Bank* divides is only 10,780,000*l.* This dividend varies as their profits vary; but for ſeveral years it has been 5½ *per cent.* payable half-yearly at *Lady-day* and *Michaelmas*. Their whole annual dividend is, therefore, 592,900*l.* which ſubtracted from 350,604*l.* the intereſt paid by government, makes their clear annual profit 242,296*l.*——Beſides intereſt, they receive for management of their capital 4000*l.* *per ann.* on account of their old capital, and 1,898*l.* *per ann.* on account of four millions purchaſed of the South Sea Company; in all, 5,898*l.* *per ann.*——The *Bank* receives farther the ſums ſpecified in the foregoing account, towards bearing the expences of managing the annuities commonly called *Bank Annuities*. All theſe expences, including the ſums granted for managing their capital, amount to 54,645*l.* *per ann.*

Note (5)——Consolidated 4 *per cent.* Bank Annuities. See Page 120.——The capital of theſe Annuities conſiſts of two loans, one in 1760, and the other in 1762, conſolidated into one ſtock, and charged on the additional duty of 3*d.* per buſhel on malt, the ſurplus of the duties on ſpirituous liquors, and the additional duties on windows; all which duties were ordered by 2d Geo. III. to be carried to the Sinking Fund, and the intereſt with which they were charged to be paid out of that fund.——I have made ſome remarks on theſe loans in page 96, and page 99. They amounted to 20.240,000*l.* But 1.253,700*l.* of this capital was changed in 1770, from an intereſt of 4 to 3 *per cent.* and the capital reduced to the preſent ſum.——A more full account of theſe annuities may be found in Mr. *Aſhmore's* Analyſis of the ſeveral Bank Annuities, p. 17.

NOTE (6)——CONSOLIDATED 3 *per cent.* BANK ANNUITIES. See page 121.—The capital of theſe annuities is made a diſtinct ſtock from that of the annuities called *Reduced*, becauſe it never bore a higher intereſt than 3 *per cent.*—It conſiſted originally of the following loans—37,821*l.* remaining in 1727, of 3 *per cent.* annuities, granted in lieu of St. *Chriſtopher's* and *Nevis* debentures—800,000*l.* borrowed in 1731—600,000*l.* borrowed in 1736——300,000*l.* in 1738——6.400,000*l.* in 1742, 1743, 1744 and 1745, and charged on additional duties on ſpirituous liquors, wines, vinegar, &c.——1.000,000*l.* borrowed in 1750——24.490,000*l.* borrowed in the courſe of the laſt war, and funded on the additional duties on beer, houſes, ſtamps, &c.——4.900,000*l.* borrowed in 1766, 1767 and 1768——And 1.253,700*l.* of the 4 *per cent.* annuities, ſubſcribed into the 3 *per cent.* annuities in 1770.

All theſe loans were by 25 Geo. II. 1751, and ſeveral ſubſequent Acts of Parliament, conſolidated into one joint ſtock; and carried, with the duties for paying the intereſt, to the *Sinking Fund.* And in 1770, they formed a capital of 39.781,521*l.* which has been ſince reduced, by the payments mentioned in the *Poſtſcript* at the end of this tract, to the ſum ſpecified in the account to which this note refers. See a more full account in Mr. Aſhmore's Analyſis, &c. from page 5 to page 11.

NOTE (7)——REDUCED 3 *per cent.* BANK ANNUITIES. See page 121.—The capital of theſe annuities conſiſted, in 1749, of loans in 1746, 1747, and 1748, and navy, ordnance and tranſport debts funded in 1749, amounting to 18.402.472*l.* and all bearing 4 *per cent.* intereſt.——By the 23d of Geo. II. 1749, theſe loans were reduced to an intereſt of 3 *per cent.* and by the great conſolidating Act in 1751, they were converted into one ſtock, and carried into the Sinking Fund with the duties on carriages, and the additional duties on glaſs, ſpirituous liquors, houſes, windows, ſtamps, merchandiſe imported, &c. which had been granted for paying the intereſt.—In 1751, certain exchequer tallies and orders, amounting to 129,750*l.* were ſubſcribed into this ſtock; and in 1765, navy bills to the amount of 1,482,000*l.* were ſubſcribed into it, which made its whole original amount 20.014.222*l.*——In 1751, there was paid off 830,898*l.* being ſtock which had not been ſubſcribed agreeably to the Act in 1749 for reducing intereſt; and in 1772, 1774, and 1775, ſo much more of this ſtock was paid off as reduced it to its preſent amount.—See Mr. Aſhmore's Analyſis, p. 12—16.

NOTE (8)——CIVIL LIST MILLION. See page 121.—The income ſettled upon King George I. for his civil liſt, was 700,000*l.*——In 1720, there had been granted him beſides, from the *Royal Exchange* and *London* Aſſurance companies, 300,000*l.* And in 1726, this million was farther granted towards paying off his debts.

NOTE (9)—— BANK LONG ANNUITY. See page 122.——This annuity conſiſts of 128,250*l.* *per ann.* for 99 years, given in 1761, as a *premium* to the ſubſcribers of 11.400,000*l.* at 3 *per cent*; and of 120,000*l.* *per ann.* for 98 years, given in 1762, as a premium to the lenders of twelve millions at 4 *per* *cent.* See page 95 and 100. It is charged, together with the loans to which it was annexed, on the *Sinking Fund.* ——— Its value in the Alley is about 25 years purchaſe; but the remaining term is really worth 27 years purchaſe, reckoning intereſt at 3½, (or the 3 *per cents.* being at 85¾.) But when intereſt is at 4 *per cent.* or the 3 *per cents.* are at 75, it is worth only 24 years purchaſe.——When this annuity is called a *premium*, it muſt not be imagined, that no compenſation was given for it. Government received the value of it; but, at the ſame time, made itſelf a debtor for that value. And, what is very ſurprizing, this has been uniformly practiſed with reſpect to all the premiums or douceurs granted by government; and the conſequence has been, that great and needleſs increaſe of the public debt explained in the 3d ſection of the 2d Part.

NOTE (10).—SOUTH-SEA STOCK AND ANNUITIES. See page 122.—Theſe four capitals amounting to 25,964,684*l.* 13*s.* conſiſt almoſt entirely of the remainder of debts contracted in the reigns of *King William* and Queen *Anne*. The following account will probably give ſufficient information concerning them.

In 1711, Lord Oxford being miniſter, the proprietors of certain navy, army, ordnance and tranſport debts, to the amount of 9,177,968*l.* including arrears of intereſt, and half a million for the current ſupplies, were incorporated into a company for trading to the *South-ſeas*. They were allowed 6 *per cent.* intereſt for this debt, with 8000*l.* *per ann.* for management; and the duties on wine, tobacco, *Eaſt-India* goods, candles, &c. were made perpetual, and granted as a *Fund* (ever ſince called the *South-ſea Company's Fund)* for paying the intereſt. This kept up public credit at the time, and has been called the *Earl of Oxford's* maſter-piece.——By the 1ſt of Geo. I. 822,032*l.* conſiſting chiefly of intereſt payable on the Company's capital, was added to the capital, in conſequence of which it was increaſed to TEN MILLIONS, (ever ſince called their *original capital)* bearing 6 *per cent.*

intereſt.——In 1717, they agreed to take 5 *per cent.* and this was the firſt great reduction of intereſt, which in conjunction with the ſame reduction of the other redeemable debts almoſt all carrying 6 *per cent.* laid the foundation of the SINKING FUND eſtabliſhed in this year. But it is remarkable, that ſo faſt did intereſt fall at this time, that the price of *South-ſea ſtock*, notwithſtanding this reduction, roſe from 105 to 111.—In 1719, the *South-ſea* capital was increaſed to 11,746,844*l.* bearing 5 *per cent.* intereſt (with an addition of [illegible] to their former allowance for management) by advancing to government 544,142*l.* and by the proprietors of 94,329*l.* 12*s.* lottery annuities for 32 years granted in 1710, accepting in lieu of them 1.202,702*l.* *South Sea ſtock.*——In 1720, the agreement was made by government with the South Sea Company, which produced the great SOUTH SEA BUBBLE.——There exiſted at that time *long* annuities to the amount of 666,821*l.* 8*s.* and *ſhort* annuities, for 32 years from 1710, to the amount of 127,260*l.* 6*s.* The proprietors of theſe annuities were allowed to ſubſcribe them into the *South Sea* trading ſtock; and the Company, for every 100*l.* of the *long* annuity which ſhould be ſubſcribed, were to receive from government an addition to their capital of 2000*l.* bearing 5 *per cent.* intereſt till 1727, and afterwards 4 *per cent.* till redeemed: and for every 100*l.* of the *ſhort* annuities, they were to receive an addition to their capital of 1400*l.* bearing the ſame intereſts.——They were beſides to take in the redeemable debts to the amount of 16.546,482*l.* and to receive an addition to their capital of 100*l.* for every 100*l.* ſubſcribed.——By the ſubſcription of the *long* and *ſhort* annuities which followed this agreement, a capital due from government to the Company was created, which was greater by 3.034,769*l.* than the original ſum advanced for the annuities ſubſcribed. And as much of theſe annuities and of the redeemable debts were ſubſcribed, as increaſed the *South Sea* trading capital to 37.802,203*l.*——In 1722, four millions of this capital was

purchaſed

purchaſed by the BANK, (See Note 3.) which reduced it to 33.802,203*l.*——By 9 Geo. I. 1723, this remaining capital was divided into two equal parts, one of which alone (or 16.901,101*l.*) was ordered to be the trading capital of the Company, and the other part was directed to be called *South Sea Annuities.*——In 1733, the *South Sea* trading capital had been reduced by payments at different times to 14.651,137*l.* 12*s.* By an Act of Parliament in that year, this remaining ſtock [illegible] a farther diviſion; and only a fourth part, or 3.662,784*l.* was allowed to be the Company's ſtock; and the other three parts, or 10.988,353*l.* were directed to be called NEW South Sea Annuities, in order to diſtinguiſh them from the former annuities, which have ever ſince gone under the name of OLD South Sea annuities.——From 1733, to the preſent time, SOUTH SEA STOCK has continued the ſame; but the capital of the OLD South Sea annuities has been reduced, by redemptions, to 11.907.470*l.* and of the NEW South Sea annuities, to 8.494,830*l.* And of the whole *South Sea* debt, which in 1722 was 33.802,203*l.* there has, ſince that year, been paid off in all 9.737,119*l.* This ſhould have reduced it to 24.065,081*l.* but it is in reality 25.984,685*l.* The reaſon of this is, that the diminution juſt mentioned of the *South Sea* debt was made in part with money borrowed in 1751, to pay off ſuch proprietors of South Sea annuities as had refuſed to conſent to the reduction of intereſt propoſed to them in 1749. The ſum borrowed for this purpoſe was 2.100,000*l.* bearing 3 *per cent.* with 1181*l.* 5*s.* for management. This debt is now reduced by redemptions to the ſum ſpecified in the preceding account; or to 1.919,600*l.*

NOTE (11).——EAST-INDIA STOCK. See page 123.——In 1698, a company of merchants, in conſideration of two millions lent to government at 8 *per cent.*, were incorporated, and entitled to the ſole privilege of trading to the *Eaſt-Indies.*——Theſe two millions formed the firſt capital of the preſent *Eaſt-India* Company.——In 1702, an old company of traders to the *Eaſt-Indies* was united to this company; and in

1703,

1708, theſe united companies lent to government 1,200,000*l.* without additional intereſt, which made their capital 3,200,000*l.* bearing 5 *per cent.*——In 1730, this intereſt was reduced to 4 *per cent.* and by the 23d Geo. II. 1749, to 3 *per cent.*——The ſalt duties, and ſome additional ſtamp duties, were at firſt charged with the annuity due on this capital; but at preſent the duties conſtituting the aggregate fund are charged with it.

NOTE (12).—EAST-INDIA ANNUITY. See page [illegible].—The capital of this annuity was advanced to government in 1744, at 3 *per cent.* and, in conſideration of this loan, the excluſive charter of the Company was continued to Lady-day 1783, at which time it is to ceaſe, provided three years notice has been given, and the debt due from government diſcharged.

An obſervation here forces itſelf upon me, which I have often had occaſion to make.——Part of this loan was a compenſation from the *Eaſt-India* Company for prolonging the term of its charter; and, therefore, ought not to have been included in the loan. The Company would have lent 750,000*l.* on the intereſt common at the time, or 4 *per cent.* and the remainder would have been advanced as a gratuity.—It is a pity thoſe who managed theſe contracts for the public, did not attend to the abſurdity and extravagance of making a *debt* of purchaſe money, and *borrowing* in the very act of *ſelling*.

NOTE (13).——EXCHEQUER LONG ANNUITIES. See page 123.——Theſe are the *long* annuities which, in 1720, remained unſubſcribed to the South Sea Company. See Note 10.——They conſiſt firſt of annuities to the amount of 54,900*l.* 14*s.* 6*d.* purchaſed by the 4th, 5th, and 6th of *William* and *Mary*, for 96 years, from January 1695, with the addition of 1350*l.* *per ann.* for ſalaries to exchequer officers. Theſe annuities were originally 14 *per cent.* life-annuities. By the 6th and 7th of *William* and *Mary*, in order to raiſe more money, theſe annuitants, or any other perſons for them, were offered a reverſionary intereſt in the annuities after the failure of the lives, till the end of 96 years from January 1695, on paying 4½ years purchaſe, (that is 63*l.*) for every annuity of 14*l.*——The predeceſſors of the preſent company of the MILLION BANK (ſo called from the MILLION lottery 1694, in which they were ſome of the principal adventurers) purchaſed 30,669*l.* 4*s.* of theſe reverſionary annuities. The life annuitants being now reduced to a very ſmall number, almoſt the whole of this annuity is lapſed to the *company*; and though they have divided for ſeveral years 5 *per cent.* on a capital of half a million, yet their growing ſavings, from the falling in of lives, have been ſuch, that, when their annuity ceaſes in 1791, they will, I am informed, have accumulated a fund conſiderably larger, than the capital on which they have made their dividends. But to return.

These EXCHEQUER Annuities conſiſt farther of

	£.	s.	d.	
	30,400	6	8	purchaſed for 99 years from *Chriſtmas* 1705, by 2d and 3d of *Anne*, with 1450*l.* for management.
	23,234	16	6	purchaſed for 99 years from *Lady-day*, 1706, by 4 *Anne*, with 1470*l. per ann.* for management.
	7,776	10	0	purchaſed for 99 years from *Lady-day*, 1707, by 5 *Anne*, with 375*l.* 12*s.* *per ann.* for management.
	4,710	0	0	purchaſed for 99 years from *Lady-day*, 1708, by 6th of *Anne*, with 208*l.* 2*s.* *per ann.* for management.
	10,181	0	0	purchaſed for 99 years from *Lady-day*, 1707, by a 2d Act of 5th of *Anne*, with 416*l. per ann.* for management.
Add	54,900	14	6	
	131,203	7	8	Total,

The original ſum contributed for theſe annuities was 1.836,276*l.* They are even now worth more than this ſum. The public has already paid above TEN MILLIONS, and by the time they are all extinct, it will have paid above THIRTEEN MILLIONS, on their account. This is great extravagance; but it is nothing to the extravagance conſtantly practiſed of borrowing on perpetual annuities, without putting them into a fixed courſe of redemption.

NOTE (14).—TONTINE by an act of 6 Geo. III. See page 124.—The intention of this Act was to raiſe 100,000*l.* towards paying off navy bills, by offering to ſubſcribers for every 100*l.* advanced, an annuity of 3*l.* for their lives, with benefit of ſurvivorſhip. But the ſcheme did not ſucceed, and only 18000*l.* was ſubſcribed.

NOTE (15).——LIFE ANNUITIES. See page 124.——The annuities on *two* lives in 1694, were ſold at 12*l.* *per ann.* during *two* lives, of any ages, and the annuities on *three* lives, at 10*l.* *per ann.* during *three* lives, for every 100*l.* advanced.——This was very extravagant; for, ſuppoſing the annuitants in general, about the age of 20 or 30, it was the ſame, in the caſe of *two* lives, with giving above 10 *per cent.* for money; and in the caſe of three lives, 9 *per cent.*——It is, likewiſe, extremely abſurd in theſe caſes to pay no regard to difference of ages. A *ſingle* life at the age of 60, ſuppoſing money improved at 4 *per cent.* is intitled to 11 *per cent.* but at the age of 10, ſcarcely to 6 *per cent.* *Two* lives at 60, are entitled, on the ſame ſuppoſition, to 8½ *per cent.* but at 10, not to 5 *per cent.*——The original amount of theſe annuities was 22,700*l.* nearly. In 1762, that is, in 68 years, they were reduced by deaths no lower than 9,215*l.*

The other life-annuities mentioned in the preceding account were *douceurs* granted for loans in 1745, 1746, and 1757. An account of the annuities granted in the laſt of theſe years may be ſeen in page 101.

The life-annuities in 1745, amounted to 22,500*l.* and were granted, together with the profits of a lottery, for a loan of two millions at 4 *per cent.*

The life-annuities in 1746, amounted to 45,000*l.* and were granted, with the profits of another lottery, for a loan of three millions, at the ſame intereſt.——The remarks made in the 3d ſection of the laſt part, and particularly in the note, p. 101, are applicable to theſe two loans. The value of the life-annuities, and the profits of the lotteries, were made a part of the public debt. And, ſuppoſing the life-annuities worth, one with another, only 14 years purchaſe, and the profits of the two lotteries worth 300,000*l.* it will follow, that the capital created by theſe loans, inſtead of being 5.000,000*l.* ſhould have been only 3.755,000*l.*

But there is another remark, which it is proper to mention here. The life-annuities granted in 1757, amounting to 33,750*l.* were, in January 1775, that is in 18 years, reduced by deaths to 28,732*l.* or but a little more than a ſeventh part. But, ſuppoſing the annuitants all in the firmeſt ſtage of life, or between the age of 10 and 30, they ought, according to ſome of the beſt tables of obſervations, to have been reduced a *quarter.* Theſe life-annuities have, therefore, fallen in much more ſlowly than could have been expected; and I have found the ſame to be true of all the other life-annuities.——The reaſon, undoubtedly, is, that the tables exhibit the rate of mortality among all ſorts and orders of men taken together; whereas, the lives on which annuities are bought, are a ſelection of the better ſort of lives from the general maſs, and therefore muſt be of greater value.—— Indeed I am not acquainted with any table of obſervations which gives the probabilities of the duration of life high enough to be a guide in this caſe; except that which was formed by Mr. *De Parcieux,* from the French *Tontines.*——A calculation, therefore, of the values of lives, agreeably to this table, would be of conſiderable uſe.

NOTE (16).——UNFUNDED DEBT. See page 124.——I have given the navy debt, as it was in January, 1775.——The civil liſt debt in 1775, was probably more than the ſum at which I have reckoned it. Lord STAIR, in his account of the national debt, income, and expenditure, reckons it at 800,000*l.*

Much the greateſt part of the foregoing debts, with the taxes for paying the intereſt, including the duties compoſing the *Aggregate*, *South-Sea*, and *General* Funds, have, by the 25th of *George* the Second, 1751, and ſeveral ſubſequent acts of Parliament, been thrown into one general account; and the *ſurplus* of the whole, after deducting the intereſt, 800,000 l. *per ann.* for the civil liſt, and a few other payments, forms the SINKING FUND.——The debts not brought to this account are about ſeven millions and a half in the *South-Sea* Houſe; 11,186,800 l. of the *Bank* capital; the Civil Liſt million; four millions and a half borrowed at 3½ *per cent.* in 1758; the capital of the Eaſt-India annuity; and the Exchequer long and life annuities, except thoſe granted in 1758. But the *ſurpluſſes* of the duties which pay the intereſt of theſe debts are either carried *immediately* into the *Sinking Fund* account; or brought *firſt* to the *Aggregate* Fund, and from thence carried into that account.——On the contrary. Deficiencies in theſe duties when they happen, are made good out of the Sinking Fund; and afterwards replaced from the ſupplies.

For example. Three old nine-penny exciſes on beer, with an additional three-pence per barrel, producing above half a million annually; alſo, 3,700 l. *per* week out of the hereditary exciſe on beer, together with ſome duties on paper, coals, &c. and ⅓ additional ſubſidy of tonnage and poundage, are appropriated to the payment of the Banker's Annuity; the Life Annuities granted in 1693 and 1694; the Exchequer Long Annuities; and annuities on various ſums ſubſcribed to the South-Sea Company in 1720. The ſurpluſes make a part of the *Aggregate Fund*; and after contributing to ſatisfy the charge on that fund, are carried into the *Sinking Fund.*——Again. Certain additional duties on ſoap, parchment, coals, &c. are appropriated to pay the intereſt of 1.250,000l. and of 1.750,000l. parts of the Bank capital.——The ſurpluſſes are carried *directly* to the *Sinking Fund.*——In like manner. The duties on houſes and windows impoſed by an act of the 20th of *George* the Second, 1747, (*a*) after deducting from them 91,485l. *per ann.* to ſatisfy certain charges on old houſe-duties in the *Aggregate Fund*; and, alſo, other duties on houſes and windows impoſed by the 2d and 6th of *George* the Third, amounting in all to about 205,000l. *per ann.* are carried into the Sinking Fund, together with the capitals, the in-

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(*a*) Theſe duties were appropriated to the payment of the intereſt at 4 *per cent.* of a capital of 4.400,000l. created in 1747, for which four millions only had been advanced. It is now a part of the capital of the reduced 3 *per cent.* annuities.

tereſt of which has been charged upon them. But the addition to theſe duties (with a tax on penſions) granted in 1758, and charged with the intereſt (at 3 ½ *per cent.*) of the loan in that year, having not been carried into the *Sinking Fund*, and proving deficient; the deficiency is conſtantly made good out of this fund, and afterwards replaced from the ſupplies.

State and Amount of the NATIONAL DEBT *at Chriſtmas* 1753; *with the Charges of Management.*

BANK OF ENGLAND.

	Principal. £.	Intereſt. £.
BANK capital —	11.686,800	393,038
Of this capital 3.200,000l. bore at this time 3 *per cent.* intereſt; and the remainder bore 3 ½ *per cent.* till 1757, by 23d Geo. II. 1749.——See note (1) p. 125.		
Management 5,898l. *per ann.*		
Three *per cent.* BANK Annuities conſolidated by 25 Geo. II. 1751.—See note (6) p. 127. —	9.137,821	274,135
Management 4,450l. *per ann.*		
Total	£20.824,621	667,173

BANK

	Principal. £.	Intereſt. £.
Brought over	20.824,621	667,173
BANK Annuities conſolidated by 25 Geo. II. 2.713,618l. carrying 3½ *per cent.* intereſt till 1755; and 14.857,956l. carrying the ſame intereſt till 1757. See note (7) p. 128. —	17,7401,32	619,546
Management 9,884l. *per ann.*		
Civil Liſt million, 1726	1.000,000	30,000
Management 360l. *per ann.*		
Whole charge of Management at the Bank in 1753—20,592l. *per ann.*		
SOUTH-SEA COMPANY.		
SOUTH-SEA Stock carrying 4 *per cent.* till 1757 —	3.662,784	146,511
Old and New SOUTH-SEA Annuities carrying 3½ *per cent.* till 1757 —	21.362,525	747,688
Three *per cent.* 1751—See note (10) p. 131.	2.100,000	63,000
Whole charge of management at the *South-Sea-Houſe* on ſtock and annuities, 15,748 l. *per ann.*		
EAST-INDIA HOUSE.		
EAST-INDIA STOCK, reduced to 3½ till 1757	3.200,000	112,000
	£.69.851,254	2.385,918

EAST

	Principal.	Interest.
	£.	£.
Brought over	69.8[illegible]	2.385,918
EAST-INDIA annuity 1744	1.000,000	30,000
Management 1,687l. 10s. *per ann.*		
Total (*a*)	£. 70,851,464	2.41[illegible],918

(*a*) The whole of this ſum, (except 16.4[illegible] l. consisting of the old Bank capital, the conſolidated 4 *per cents*, the South-Sea 3 *per cent.* annuities [illegible] Civil Liſt million, and the Eaſt-India annuity) t[illegible] l. was reduced by 23 Geo. II. 1749, from an intereſt of 4 *per cent.* to 3 ½ till 1757, and afterwards to 3 *per cent.*—The proprietors of a capital of 3.290,000 l. refuſed to conſent to this reduction, which, therefore, was paid off ([illegible]) with *Exchequer* Bills (afterwards cancelled); and [illegible] with money borrowed at 3 *per cent.* and added to the capital of the *South-Sea* annuities. The whole ſum, therefore, reduced and paid off, was 57.703,475l. which produced a ſaving to the public, and an addition to the Sinking Fund after 1757, of 612,735l. *per ann.*

The SALT DUTIES in 1753 had been for ſome time mortgaged to pay the principal and intereſt of a million borrowed in 1745. In 1757, after clearing the mortgage, they became free, and were carried into the Sinking Fund, of which they have ever ſince formed a part. This produced a farther addition to the *Sinking Fund*, after 1757, of about 220,000 l. *per ann.*

I have not included the million now mentioned in the account given above of the public debts in 1753, becauſe it was in a fixed courſe of redemption; nor have I included 499,600l. in Excheqeer Bills charged on the duty on ſweets, becauſe theſe Exchequer Bills were paid off in 1754.

EXCHEQUER

	Principal.	Intereſt.
	£.	£.
Brought over	£70.851,254	2.415,918
EXCHEQUER.		
ANNUITIES for 96 and 99 years from various dates in King *William*'s and Queen *Anne*'s times being the original ſum contributed. See note (13) page 132. —	1.836,276	131,203
Management 2[illegible]l. *per ann.* incluſive of management for the two next articles.		
ANNUITIES for lives with benefit of ſurvivorſhip, being the original ſum contributed —	108,100	7,567
ANNUITIES for two and three lives, being the remainder after deducting the annuities fallen in by deaths, and reckoned worth 10 years purchaſe — —	106,650	10,665
ANNUITIES for ſingle lives 1745, being the remainder after deducting the annuities fallen in by deaths; and reckoned worth 14 years purchaſe — —	296,142	21,153
	£73.198,422	2.586,506

ANNUITIES

	Principal. £.	Intereſt. £.
Brought over	73.198,422	2.586,506
ANNUITIES for ſingle lives 1746, being the remainder after the lives fallen in —	582,274	41,591
Navy debt in 1754—Intereſt reckoned at 2 *per cent.* —	1.296,568	25,931
Total of the principal and intereſt of the public debts in *1753* —	£.75.077,264	2.654,028

STATE *and* AMOUNT *of the* NATIONAL DEBT *in* 1739.

BANK OF ENGLAND.

	Principal. £.	Intereſt. £.
BANK CAPITAL, conſiſting of 1.600,000l. old capital carrying 6 *per cent*; and 7.500,000l. carrying 4 *per cent.* See note 1, p. 123. — —	9.100,000	396,000
BANK ANNUITIES at 3 *per cent.* for the lottery in 1731. — —	800,000	24,000
	£.9.900,000	420,000

	Principal. £.	Intereſt. £.
Brought over	623,312	2.321,215
SOUTH-SEA COMPANY.		
Stock and annuities bearing 4 *per cent.* — —	27.302,203	1.092,088
EAST-INDIA COMPANY.		
EAST-INDIA ſtock carrying 4 *per cent.* —	3.200,000	128,000
EXCHEQUER ANNUITIES.		
Annuities at 3 ½ by 4 Geo. II. paid off in 1752	400,000	14,000
ANNUITIES at 4 *per cent.* charged on the duty on wrought plate by 6 Geo. I. 1720 — —	312,000	12,480
182,250l. of this capital was paid off in 1750. The remainder is now included in the capital of the reduced 3 *per cent.* annuities.		
ANNUITIES at 3 *per cent.* charged on the Sinking Fund by 9 and 10 Geo. II. Now included in the conſolidated 3 *per cent.* annuities —	900,000	27,000
ANNUITIES on *Nevis* and St. *Chriſtopher* Debentures at 3 *per cent.* Now included in the conſolidated 3 *per cents.* —	37,821	1,135
	£.42.052,024	1.694,703

	Principal. £.	Intereſt. £.
Brought over	42.052,024	1.694,703
EXCHEQUER BILLS charged on a duty upon victuallers by 12 Geo. I. 1726—Carrying 3 *per cent.* — —	480,000	14,400
EXCHEQUER BILLS charged on a duty on ſweets by 10 of Geo. II. 1737—Carrying 3 *per cent.* and paid off in 1754—See the note p. 140. —	499,600	14,988
ANNUITIES for long terms from various dates —	1.836,276	131,203
ANNUITIES for lives with *benefit* of *Survivorſhip* granted in 1693 —	108,100	7,567
ANNUITIES for two and three lives, 1694 —	106,650	15,000
Navy debt (*a*) —	1.300,000	26,000
Total of the *Principal* and *Intereſt* of the National Debt in 1739 (*b*)	£.46.382,650	1.903,861

(*a*) Having met with no account of the Navy Debt at this time, I have choſen, rather than omit it, to ſuppoſe it nearly the ſame that it was at the commencement of the laſt war; which, probably, is reckoning it too high.

(*b*) In this account I have omitted a million borrowed in 1734, becauſe the redemption of it was near being completed by the Salt Duties. I have alſo omitted *Short Annuities* amounting to 24,334l. being the remainder of 9 *per cent.* annuities for 32 years created in 1710, becauſe the term for which they were created was near expiring.

From the account in the POSTSCRIPT, at the end of this tract, it will appear, that 10.639,793l. of the public debt was diſcharged between the years 1763 and 1775; and alſo that the *funded* debt was, in 1775, 1,400,000l. greater than it was at the end of the laſt war. From hence, and from the amount of the public debt in 1775, as ſtated in page 124, it follows, that the funded debt at the end of the war was 130.943,051 l. and the whole debt 146.582,844l. and, conſequently, that the war left upon the nation an *unfunded debt* amounting to (*a*) 15.639,793l. This unfunded debt conſiſted of the following particulars.—Of 3,500,000l. borrowed after the peace in 1763, and applied towards bearing ſuch expences of the war as could not immediately ceaſe with its operations.——Of near *eight millions* in navy, victualling, ordnance, and tranſport debts.——Of 1.800,000l.

(*a*) The author of the *Conſiderations on the Trade and Finances of this Kingdom* makes this debt 1.318,000l. more than the ſum at which I have here ſtated it. See page 22; and *State of the Nation* by the ſame author, page 15, quarto editions.——The reaſon of this difference is, that this writer has included in the unfunded debt left by the war the deficiencies of grants and funds in 1763 and 1764, and the *whole* army debt not provided for in thoſe years; whereas I have excluded the former entirely; and admitted only as much of the latter as exceeded the army debts common in ſubſequent years.) See the Poſtſcript.

Exchequer bills; and the remainder, of ſubſidies to foreign princes, extraordinaries of the army, and German demands.

In the interval of peace between 1748 and 1755 the following debts were paid off.

	£.
Bank Annuities bearing 4 *per cent.* —	1.013,148
SOUTH-SEA Annuities bearing 4 *per cent.* — —	176,893
Annuities bearing 3 ½ *per cent.* charged by 4 Geo. II. on additional ſtamp duties — —	400,000
EXCHEQUER Bills bearing 3 *per cent.* charged by 10 Geo. II. 1737 on the duties on ſweets —	499,600
Borrowed in 1745 at 3 ½ *per cent.* on the credit of the Salt duties —	1.000,000
See note, page 140.	
(*a*) Total	£.3.089,641

(*b*) In 1751 there was applied to the payment of Navy debts 200,000l. and in 1752, the ſum of 900,000l. But I have not reckoned theſe ſums, becauſe they did little more than make up the conſtant deficiency in the *Peace Eſtabliſhment* for the Navy.

From the whole, the following account of the progreſs of the National Debt, from 1739 to 1775, may be deduced.

	Principal	Intereſt.
	£.	£.
Amount of the *principal* and *intereſt* of the national debt before the war which begun in 1740 — —	46.382,650	1.903,861
Amount in 1749 immediately after the war	78.166,906	2.765,608
Increaſed by the war —	31.784,256	861,747
Diminiſhed by the Peace from 1748 to 1755	3.089,641	111,590
Amount at the commencement of the laſt war — —	75.077,264	2.654,018
Amount at the end of the war in 1763 —	146.582,844	4.840,821
Increaſed by the laſt war	71.505,580	2.186,803
Diminiſhed by the Peace, in twelve years from 1763 to 1775 —	10.639,793	(*a*) 400,000
Amount at *Midſummer*, 1775 — —	135.943,051	4.440,821

We are now involved in another war, and the public debts are increaſing again faſt. *Exchequer* Bills have been increaſed from 1.250,000l. to 1.500,000l. A new capital of 2.150,000l. has been added to the 3 *per cent.* Conſolidated Annuities.

(*a*) See the Poſtſcript.

nuities. And a vote of credit was given in the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament for a million. The laſt year, therefore, has added 3.400,000l. to our debts, beſides a vaſt ſum not yet provided for, conſiſting of navy, ordnance, victualling, tranſport and army debts.——The preſent year (1777) muſt make another great addition to them; and where they will be at the end of theſe troubles, no one can tell.——The union of a *foreign* war to the preſent *civil* war might perhaps raiſe them to TWO HUNDRED MILLIONS about, more probably, it would ſink them to——NOTHING.

SECT. III.

Of the DEBTS *and* RESOURCES *of France.*

MINISTERS have of late ſought to remove the public apprehenſions by general accounts of the weakneſs of powers, which, from the circumſtances of former wars as well as national prejudices, have been felt by the people as jealous rivals or formidable enemies.——I wiſh it was poſſible for me to confirm theſe accounts; and by contraſting the preceding ſtate of our own debts with a ſimilar one of thoſe of FRANCE, to ſhew, that from this power in particular we have nothing to fear. The following particulars, on the correctneſs of which I can rely, may give ſome aſſiſtance in judging of this ſubject.

The whole expence of the laſt war to FRANCE was 1.118.307,047 livres; that is, 49.702,000 l. ſterling: of which 23.152,000 l. (520.926,000 livres) conſiſted of money procured by the ſale of taxes, by free-gifts, and extra-impoſitions during the war, which left behind them no debts: And 26.550,000 l. (597.380,100 livres) conſiſted of LOANS, or money raiſed on perpetual annuities, life-annuities, and lotteries.—At the beginning of 1769 the whole amount of the debts of *France*, including all arrears and capitals advanced on annuities and lotteries, was 128.622,000 l. ſterling, or 2.894.053,616 livres. The annual charge derived from this debt was 6.707,500 l. ſterling (150.919,284 livres)——All the appropriations amounted to 8.218,500 l. ſterling (184.919,284 livres).——The expences of the army, navy, king's houſhold, prince's houſhold, foreign affairs, &c. amounted to 8.947,000 l. or 201.307,312 livres. So that the whole annual expence was 17.165,000 l. (386.226,596 livres).—The whole revenue had amounted, before 1769, to 13.484,500 l. ſterling (303.401,696 livres).——The public expence, therefore, had exceeded the revenue 3.681,000 l. (82.800,000 livres) *per ann.*

From

From the year 1769 to the preſent King's Acceſſion, by forced reductions of intereſt, and by new taxes, the public revenue was carried to 16,289,000l. ſterling (366.508,000 livres) and the public expence was reduced ſo as not to exceed the revenue above 766,800l. *per annum* (17.253,000 livres).——The anticipations alſo of the revenue, which before 1769 had extended to *ſeventeen* months, were reduced to *five* months.—Such was the progreſs of reformation; namely, an increaſe of revenue amounting to little leſs than THREE MILLIONS ſterling *per ann.* in a few years, under an unpopular miniſter, in the latter days of a reign never characterized by an attention to oeconomy, or a regard to the public intereſt; and at this time particularly ſtamped by unprecedented profuſion and a general relaxation.

A new reign produced a new miniſter of finance whoſe name will be reſpected by poſterity for a ſet of meaſures as new to the *political* world, as any late diſcoveries in the ſyſtem of nature have been to the *philoſophical* world.—Doubtful in their operation, as all unproved meaſures muſt be, but diſtinguiſhed by their tendency to lay a ſolid foundation for endleſs peace, induſtry, and a general enjoyment of the gifts of nature, arts, and commerce.——The edicts iſſued during his adminiſtration exhibit indeed a phænomenon of the moſt extraordinary kind. An abſolute king rendering a voluntary account to his ſubjects, and inciting his people to *think*; a right which it has been the buſineſs of all abſolute princes and their miniſters to extinguiſh in the minds of men.—— In theſe edicts the King declared in the moſt diſtinct terms againſt a bankruptcy, an augmentation of taxes, and new loans; while the miniſter applied himſelf to increaſe every public reſource by principles more liberal than *France*, or any part of *Europe*, ever had in ſerious contemplation.——It is much to be regretted that the intrigues of a court, want of addreſs, or perhaps want of due regard to that degree of public conviction, which muſt influence more or leſs in a deſpotic as well as free ſtate, ſhould have deprived the world of thoſe lights which muſt have reſulted from the example of ſuch an adminiſtration.

After a ſhort interval, a nomination, in ſome reſpects ſtill more extraordinary, has taken place in the court of FRANCE. A court which a few years ſince was diſtinguiſhed by its bigotry and intolerance, has raiſed a *Proteſtant*, the ſubject of a ſmall but virtuous republic, to a deciſive lead in the regulation of its finances. It is to be preſumed, that ſo ſingular a preference will produce an equally ſingular exertion of integrity and talents. Though differing from Monſieur TURGOT in ſeveral principles, which regard the larger lines of government, he appears by his firſt ſteps,

and,

and, particularly, the preamble to a late edict for raiſing 24 millions of livres by a lottery, to put his foot on the ſame great baſis of general juſtice, and a ſtrict conſervation of the faith of the king; and points more particularly at the ſureſt of all reſources in any modern ſtates, a ſimplification of taxes and a reformation in the collection of them. This adminiſtration, making improvements in the Revenue its immediate object, is more capable of preſent exertion; and, as ſuch, is more formidable.

From theſe facts and obſervations it is impoſſible not to conclude, that if we truſt our ſafety to the difficulties of FRANCE, we may find ourſelves fatally deceived. I will add, that though (like the 3 s. land-tax and lotteries among ourſelves) ſome of the extraordinary impoſitions of the laſt war have been continued in *France*, there are ſome which ceaſed with the war, and which they can renew. It is, particularly, an advantage of unſpeakable importance to them, that they can carry on a war, as they did the laſt, at *half* our expence; and that, having no dependence on the flattering deluſion of paper, they can, as they did in 1759, bear even a bankruptcy in the middle of a war, and yet carry it on vigorouſly.—Their debts time itſelf is ſinking faſt. Of 3.111,000 l. (ſeventy millions of livres) in annuities on the *Hotel de Ville* at *Paris* 1.777,000 l. (forty millions of livres) conſiſted in 1774 of Life-Annuities, which were falling by deaths at the rate of 71,000l. (1.600,000 livres) every year.——Even their loſs of credit, whatever preſent embarraſſment attends it, favours them upon the whole. To this they owe the advantages juſt mentioned. The facility with which our high credit has enabled us to run in debt enſnares us; and, if a change of meaſures does not take place, (a) muſt *ruin* us. Experience has given them a juſt horror at borrowing on permanent funds; and were they inclined to do it, they are not able to do it to any great amount; and, conſequently, they cannot go on mortgaging one reſource after another till none is left.—While we loſe ſight of the capital in the intereſt, they carry their views chiefly to the reimburſement of the capital; and after receiving high intereſt, for ſome years, can be ſatisfied with receiving back a part of their capital.——Their debts, being confined in a great meaſure to the *Farmers General* and others at PARIS, are not circulated and diffuſed among the body of the people in the manner ours are: And it is well known, that they can make uſe of methods to diſcharge them which our government muſt never think of. The acts of arbitrary power and unjuſt expedients to which, on many occa-

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(a) "Either the nation (Mr. Hume ſays) muſt deſtroy "public credit, or public credit will deſtroy the nation." Political Eſſays, page 135.

ſions, they have had recourſe for this purpoſe without producing any tumults, are ſuch as appear to us almoſt incredible; and ſhould the time ever come, when it will be neceſſary in this country to make uſe of any violence of the ſame kind, all government will probably be at an end.

In point of territory and number of inhabitants, the two countries will bear no compariſon (*a*). We have hitherto oppoſed *France* by our free ſpirit, and our colonies; and to them chiefly we owe our proſperity and victories. Our colonies once ſeparated from us, the iſlands will ſoon follow. But ſhould they remain ours, our comparative advantages will beſt appear from the following authentic account of the imports into *France* from their iſlands.

In 1774.

	Weight in Pounds.
Sugar imported into *France* —	147.986,959
Indigo — — —	1.734,206
Rocou — — —	210,187
Coffee — — —	58.247,133
	208.178,485

(*a*) The number of inhabitants in *France* is 26 millions. In *Britain* it cannot exceed ſix or ſeven millions. See p. 66. And *Obſervations on Reverſionary Payments*, page 85, third edition.

In 1775.

				Weight in Pounds.
Sugar imported into *France*			—	171.932,972
Indigo	—	—	—	2.134,247
Rocou	—	—	—	169,831
Coffee	—	—	—	58.545,000
				(a) 232.782,050

Value of the above commodities re-exported from *France*, taken upon the average price.

		Livres.		*Sterling.*
In 1774	—	75.901,373	—	3.375,000
In 1775	—	74.961,318	—	3.331,000

The whole importation from the *Weſt-Indies* into *Britain* is about three millions *per ann.*

But I have gone much beyond the views with which I begun this ſection. The facts which have been ſtated, and the reflections which they have occaſioned, are intended principally to ſhew that we ought not to ſuffer ourſelves to be drawn into ſecurity by any aſſurances of the weakneſs of *France*.—May ſhe, however, find herſelf the weakeſt of kingdoms whenever, from motives of intereſt or ambition, ſhe ſhall attempt to injure any of her neighbours.——May *Britain*, hitherto the moſt favoured ſpot under heaven, always preſerve her diſtinguiſhed happineſs, and eſcape the danger which now threatens her. And may the time ſoon come, when all mankind, ſenſible of the value of the bleſſings of peace and equal liberty, ſhall ſuffer one another to enjoy them, and learn war no more.

(a) Near one half of all this importation is made into *Bourdeaux* only; and the reſt into *Rochelle*, *Marſeilles*, *Nantz*, *Havre*, and *Honfleur*.

S E C T. IV.

Containing the Corrections and Additions in the different Editions of the Obſervations on Civil Liberty, *with Remarks on the* EARL OF STAIR'*s Account of the National Income and Expenditure.*

ALL the corrections and additions, of the leaſt conſequence, in the different editions of the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, are confined to the APPENDIX; and the proprietors of any of the editions of that pamphlet will be poſſeſſed of it in all the correctneſs that I have been capable of giving it, by ſtriking out, in the four firſt editions, the account in p. 115. of the national income and expenditure; and by ſubſtituting, in all the editions, the preceding account of the national debt, and alſo the following accounts (*a*), in the room of accounts correſponding to them, in page 119, and page 123, &c. of the four firſt editions, and in page 115, 118, &c. and 123, &c. of the ſubſequent octavo editions.

APPROPRIATED REVENUE *at Midſummer*, 1775.

Intereſt of the national debt —	4,440,821
Civil liſt revenue — —	800,000
Expences of management attending the national debt; of which 71,432 l. is the expence of management at the Bank, South-Sea Houſe, and *India* Houſe; and 5,900 l. ſalaries to *Exchequer Officers*. See Page 119, &c. —	77,332
Annuities payable out of the Aggregate Fund to the DUKE OF GLOUCESTER, 8000 l.—DUKE OF CUMBERLAND, 8000 l.—the Repreſentatives of ARTHUR ONSLOW, Eſq; 3000 l.—And the Sheriffs of ENGLAND and WALES, 4000 l.—In all.	23,000

(*a*) The chief difference between theſe accounts is, that thoſe which follow are, in ſome inſtances, more full; and enlarged by references to *Lord Stair*'s accounts.

Clerk of the Hanaper in Chancery—

Coinage (*a*) expence—Tenths and firſt fruits of the Clergy appropriated to the augmentation of ſmall livings—Extra revenues of the crown, conſiſting of *American* quit-rents; duty of 4½ *per cent.* in the Leeward Iſlands; revenues of Gibraltar and dutchy of *Cornwall*, &c.—Fees for warrants and orders, for auditing and engroſſing accounts of dividend warrants, and other charges at the EXCHEQUER and TREASURY (*b*) — — 100,000

Total of the Appropriated Revenue £. 5.441,153

(*a*) In order to defray the expence of coinage, a duty of 10s. *per* ton has been laid on wines imported; and, as far as this duty happens to fall ſhort of 15,000l, the deficiency is made good out of the ſupplies.

(*b*) I am not able to give the exact amount of this part of the appropriated revenue. I have, therefore, reckoned it at ſuch a round ſum, as, I think, cannot much exceed or fall ſhort of it.

State of the SURPLUS *of the* REVENUE *for* 11 *years ended at* 1775.

UNAPPROPRIATED REVENUE.

	£.
NEAT PRODUCE of the Sinking Fund, for five years, including caſual ſurpluſſes, reckoning to *Chriſtmas* in every year; being the annual medium, after deducting from it about 45,000l. always carried to it from the ſupplies, in order to replace ſo much taken from it every year to make good a deficiency in a Fund eſtabliſhed in 1758. — —	2.610,759
Neat annual produce of Land Tax at 3s. militia deducted; and of the Malt Tax (*a*) — —	1.800,000
(N. B. Theſe two taxes in 1773, brought in only 1.665,475l.)	
There are ſome caſual Receipts, not included in the Sinking Fund, ſuch as Savings in Pay-Office, duties on Gum Senega, American Revenue, &c. But they are ſo uncertain and inconſiderable, that it is ſcarcely proper to give them as a part of the permanent Revenue. Add however on this account —	50,000
Total of unappropriated Revenue	£. 4.460,759

(*a*) The Land-tax at 3 s. is given by Parliament for 1.500,000l.; and the Malt-tax for 750,000l. but they are always greatly deficient.—Both theſe taxes (and alſo ſometimes the income of the Sinking Fund) are borrowed of the *Bank*, and ſpent long before they come into the Exchequer; and therefore, are debts conſtantly due to the Bank, for which intereſt is paid.

Produce of the SINKING FUND, *reckoned to* Christmas [illegible]

1770	—	[illegible]
1771	—	2.553,5[illegible]
1772	—	2.683,831
1773	—	2.823,150
1774	—	2.731,476

The average of theſe five years is 2.655,759 l. or, deducting 45,000 l. (as directed in the laſt page), 2.610,759 l.

In 1775, the Sinking Fund was taken for 2.900,000 l. including an extraordinary charge of 100,000 l. on the *Aggregate* Fund; but it produced 2.917,869 l. The average of ſix years, including 1775, was 2.654,443 l. The average of five years before 1770, was 2.234,780 l.

ANNUAL EXPENDITURE.

Peace Eſtabliſhment, for the Navy and Army, including all miſcellaneous and incidental expences	£. 3.700,000
Annual increaſe of the Navy and Civil Liſt debts — —	350,000
Intereſt at 2 *per cent.* of 3.600,000 l. unfunded debt, which muſt be paid out of the unappropriated Revenue — — —	72,000
Total	4.122,000
ANNUAL SURPLUS of the Revenue	338,759
Annual income £.	4.460,759

Th

The eſtimate for the peace eſtabliſhment, including miſcellaneous expences, amounted, in 1775, to 3.703,476 l.—But the extraordinary expences, occaſioned by the war with America, made it fall very ſhort.—In 1774 it amounted to 3.784,452 l. excluſive of 250,000 l. raiſed by Exchequer Bills, towards defraying the expence of calling in the gold coin. And the medium for eleven years, from 1765, has been nearly 3.700,000l.—According to the accounts which I have collected, the expence of the peace eſtabliſhment (including miſcellaneous expences) was in 1765, 1766, and 1767, 3.540,000 l. *per ann.*—In 1768, 1769, and 1770, it was 3.354,000 l. *per ann.*——In 1771, 1772, 1773, 1774, and 1775, the average has been nearly four millions *per ann.* excluſive of the expence of calling in the coin.

The parliament votes for the ſea ſervice 4 l. *per* month *per* man, including wages, wear and tear, victuals and ordnance. This allowance is inſufficient, and falls ſhort every year more or leſs, in proportion to the number of men voted. From hence, in a great meaſure, ariſes that annual increaſe of the navy debt, mentioned in the ſecond article of the *National Expenditure*. This increaſe in 1772 and 1773 was 669,996 l. or 335,000l. *per ann.* The number of men voted in thoſe two years, was 20,000. I have ſuppoſed them reduced to 16,000, and the annual increaſe of the Navy

Debt to be only 250,000 l.——Add 100,000 l. for the annual increaſe of the Civil Liſt Debt, and the total will be 350,000 l.

Soon after the publication of the preceding account in *February* laſt year, the EARL OF STAIR obliged the public with another account of the ſame kind, which brings out a concluſion much more unfavourable. According to this account, were lotteries aboliſhed, and the land-tax at 3s. in the pound only, there would be a *deficiency* in the revenue, inſtead of ſuch a *ſurplus* as I have ſtated. The following remarks will ſhew the reaſon of this difference.

The EARL OF STAIR has taken the annual produce of the *Sinking* Fund at 2.506,400 l. being the average produce of EIGHT years ended at *Lady day* 1775.——I have taken it at 2.610,759 l. being the average of FIVE years ended at *Chriſtmas* 1775.——The neat produce of the land and malt taxes has been alſo taken near 50,000 l. higher in my account; and I have beſides admitted 50,000 l. *per ann.* for caſual ſupplies, which his Lordſhip has not charged.

The annual increaſe of the Navy Debt, LORD STAIR ſtates at 300,000 l. and of the Civil Liſt at 200,000 l. I have ſtated the former at 250,000 l. and the latter at 100,000 l.—In order alſo to avoid, as much as poſſible, all exaggeration, I have thrown out the expence of the new coinage. Lord Stair has admitted it, and given an yearly expence derived from hence of 100,000 l.——He has alſo taken the Peace Eſtabliſhment for 1774, as a fair medium for common years of peace, becauſe it was lower in that year than in the three years preceding 1775. I have taken the average of *eleven* years of peace, which is 75,000 l. leſs.

In conſequence of theſe differences, the national PEACE expenditure in *Lord Stair's* account comes out 325,000 l. *per ann* *higher* than in mine; and the national income comes out 204,359 l. *lower*; from whence it follows, that without lotteries, and the land being at 3 s. in the pound, the kingdom muſt, according to his Lordſhip's calculation, run out at the rate of about 200,000l. every year.

In ſome of the particulars I have mentioned, this account is probably neareſt to the truth; but, I hope, it will be conſidered, that I have ſtudied to give moderate accounts, and aimed at erring always rather on the favourable than the unfavourable ſide.

Second Method of deducing the SURPLUS *of the* REVENUE.

From the year 1763 to the year 1775, or during a period of 12 years, 10.639,793 l. of the public (*a*) debt was paid off.—The money employed for

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(*a*) The account given by Lord North at opening the Budget in 1775, was, that the public debt had been diminiſhed ſince 1763, near nine millions and a half. The grounds on which I have ſtated this diminution at 10,639,793 l. may be ſeen in the POSTSCRIPT, p. 171.

this purpoſe muſt have been derived from the ſurplus of the *ordinary* revenue, added to the *extraordinary* receipts. Theſe receipts have conſiſted of the following articles.——1ſt. The land-tax at 4s. in the pound in 1764, 1765, 1766, and 1771; or 1s. in the pound extraordinary for four years, making 1.750,000 l.——2. The profits of ten lotteries (*a*) making (at 150,000l. each lottery) 1.500,000 l.——3. A contribution of 400,000 l. *per ann.* for five years from the EAST INDIA Company, making 2.000,000 l.—4. Savings by debts diſcharged at a diſcount, (*b*) making at leaſt 400,000 l.——5. Paid by the Bank in 1764 for the renewal of their charter, 110,000l.—6. Savings on high grants during the war; produce of *French* prizes taken before the declaration of war; ſale of lands in the ceded iſlands; and compoſition for maintaining *French* priſoners, (*c*) making 2.520,000 l.

(*a*) Four of theſe lotteries have been annexed to annuities; but it would be a great miſtake to think that they have not been equally profitable with the other lotteries. For inſtance; in 1767, a million and a half was borrowed on an annuity of 45,000l. with a lottery of 60,000 tickets annexed. In the ſame year, 2.616,777 l. was paid off; but, had it not been for the lottery, only 1.350,000l. could have been raiſed on the annuity; and 150,000l. leſs muſt have been paid off.

(*b*) The diſcounts on a million and a half paid off in 1772, and two millions paid off in 1774 and 1775, amounted nearly to this ſum.

(*c*) The particular ſums may be found in a pamphlet, entitled, *The Preſent State of the Nation*, p. 28, quarto edition.

2.520,000 l. ——All theſe ſums amount to 8.280,000 l. There remains to make up 10.639,793 l. (the whole debt diſcharged) 2.359,793 l. and this, therefore, is the amount of the whole ſurplus of the *ordinary* revenue for twelve years; or 196,000 l. *per ann.* (*b*).

The Earl of STAIR has alſo, in this method, calculated the *ſurplus* of the Revenue; and makes the total, for eleven years, to be no more than 2.557,378 l. even with the aſſiſtance of lotteries, and the land-tax at 4s. in the pound for five years; from whence it follows, that *without* theſe aſſiſtances, there would have been a deficiency of near 60,000 l. *per ann.*—The reaſon is, that his Lordſhip has taken the whole debt paid ſince 1763, at no more than 7.053,855 l. or three millions and a half leſs than I have made it; and he has taken it ſo much leſs, chiefly in conſequence of including in the amount of the public debt in 1775, the exceſs of the expences of that year above the common peace expences. This exceſs is to be charged to the preſent war; and, in determining the ordinary peace *ſurplus*, which is my

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tion. But I have not included all the ſums there enumerated; nor have I admitted the Army ſavings in 1772, and ſome other ſmaller ſums.

(*b*) This ſurplus, being the medium for the whole 12 years of peace, is leſs than that in p. 160, which is the medium at the end of this period, when the Sinking-Fund produced above a quarter more than it did at the beginning of it.

object, it was proper to exclude it, and to terminate the account at the commencement of the war.— I will only add, that Lord STAIR has alſo included more in the extraordinary receipts than I have; and, particularly, 700,000 l. which he ſuppoſes the public gained by the TEA INDEMNITY.—— But this was only a compenſation made by the *Eaſt-India* Company for the loſs which the public ſuſtained by taking off, in 1766, a part (or 1 s. *per* pound) of the duty on tea. In 1772 it was reſtored; and the exciſe upon tea has ſince, if I am rightly informed, produced as much as ever. *Before* 1766, it produced annually 474,091 l. Immediately (*a*) after 1766, it produced 341,284 l.— But in 1775, it produced near half a million.

Sketch of an Account of the Money drawn from the Public by the Taxes, before the Year 1776.

	£.
CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the medium of the payments into the Exchequer, for 3 years ending in 1773 (*b*) — — —	2 528,275
Amount of the EXCISES in ENGLAND, including the malt tax, being	

(*a*) I have here taken the average of two years before and after 1766.

(*b*) The annual medium of the payments into the Exchequer from the CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, for the laſt five years, has been

	£.
being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773	4.649,892
Land Tax at 3 s.	1.300,000

been 2.521,769 l.—In 1774 the payment into the Exchequer was 2.547,717 l.—In 1775, it was 2.476,302 l.—The produce of the CUSTOMS, therefore, has been given rather too high.

The produce of the EXCISES in England has been higher, in 1772 and 1775, than in any two years before 1776; but the average of any three ſucceſſive years, or of all the five years ſince 1770, will not differ much from the ſum I have given.—In 1754, or the year before the laſt war, the CUSTOMS produced only 1.558,254 l.—The Exciſes, excluſive of the Malt-tax, produced 2.819,702 l.—And the whole revenue, excluſive of the Malt-tax and Land-tax at 2 s. was 5.097,617 l.—In 1753 the whole revenue was 5.189,745 l. And the appropriation or annual charge upon it, (conſiſting of the Civil Liſt, 834,443 l. intereſt of the national debt, excluſive of navy debt, 2.628,087 l. expences of management, 43,691 l. 4½ *per cent.* from the Leeward Iſlands 27,378 l. annuity to the late Duke of Cumberland 25,000 l. firſt-fruits and tenths of the Clergy 13,597 l. &c. &c.) was 3.733,713 l. The Sinking-Fund, therefore, produced 1.456,000 l.; which, added to 1.500,000 l. (the neat produce, at that time, of Land at 2 s. and Malt-tax) made the unappropriated revenue 2.956,032 l.—The expence of the peace eſtabliſhment, conſiſting of 10,000 ſeamen, and 18,857 landmen, was, in 1753 and 1754, (including an allowance for the increaſe of the Navy-debt) 2.400,000 l. nearly; which left an annual ſurplus in the national income of 556,000 l. *without* lotteries, and land at 2 s. This ſurplus (with land at 3 s.) has of late ſcarcely exceeded 300,000 l.; and, therefore, has not been a THIRD of what it was in the laſt peace, and before the reduction of intereſt to 3 *per cent.* was compleated.

Land Tax at 1 s. in the pound —	£. 450,000
SALT DUTIES, being the medium of the years 1765 and 1766 —	218,739
Duties on Stamps, Cards, Dice, Advertiſements, Bonds, Leaſes, Indentures, News-papers, Almanacks, &c. — —	280,788
Duties on houſes and windows, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1771 — —	385,369
Poſt Office, Seizures, Wine Licences, Hackney Coaches, Tenths of the Clergy, &c. — —	250,000
EXCISES in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773	95,229
CUSTOMS in SCOTLAND, being the medium of 3 years ending in 1773 — — —	68,369
Annual profit from Lotteries —	150,000
Inland taxes in SCOTLAND, coinage duties, caſual revenues, ſuch as the duties on Gum-Senega, American revenue, &c. — —	150,000
EXPENCE of collecting the EXCISES in ENGLAND, being the average of the years 1767 and 1768, when their produce was 4.531,075 l. *per ann.*	
6 *per cent.* of the groſs produce --	297,887
EXPENCE of collecting the Exciſes in SCOTLAND, being the medium	

of

	£.
of the years 1772 and 1773, and the difference between the groſs and nett produce——31 *per cent.* of the groſs produce —	43,254
EXPENCE of collecting the CUSTOMS in ENGLAND, being the average of 1771 and 1772, bounties included, and 15 *per cent.* of the groſs produce, excluſive of drawbacks and over-entries — —	468,703
N. B. The bounties for 1771 were 202,840 l.—for 1772, 172,468 l.	
The charges of management for 1771, were 276,434 l.	
For 1772, 285,764 l. or 10 *per cent.* nearly.	
Intereſt of loans on the land tax at 4 s. expences of collection, militia, &c. — —	250,000
PERQUISITES, &c. to Cuſtom-houſe officers, &c. ſuppoſed — —	250,000
EXPENCE of collecting the Salt-duties in ENGLAND, 10½ *per cent.* —	27,000
Bounties on fiſh exported — —	18,000
EXPENCE of collecting the duties on Stamps, Cards, Advertiſements, &c. 5¼ *per cent.* — —	18,000
Total £.	11.900,50

It muſt be ſeen, that this account is imperfect and defective. It is, however, ſufficient to prove, that the whole money raiſed DIRECTLY by the taxes, (excluſive of tithes, county rates, and the taxes which ſupport the poor,) cannot be much leſs than TWELVE MILLIONS. The *Earl of Stair* has in his papers made it to be above 400,000 l. more, by including in his eſtimate ſeveral articles which I have omitted; particularly, the intereſt and management on the equivalent to *Scotland*, the Scotch crown Revenues, Dutchy of *Cornwall* and *Lancaſter* Fines, &c. He has alſo given an eſtimate of the fees and perquiſites of office of every kind, and reckoned them at half a million; whereas, I have only reckoned the perquiſites of office at the *Cuſtom-houſe*.

I ſhould be inexcuſable were I to quit this ſubject, without taking notice of the particular gratitude due from the public to *Lord Stair*, for publiſhing his papers; and for ſtepping forth at this time to draw attention, by the weight of his name and character, to calculations, which, as he juſtly ſays, "it be-"comes every man of property among us to "underſtand; to awaken the nation from the "lethargy into which the mockery of paper "wealth has plunged it; and to bear his teſtimony "againſt the preſent unnatural war."

POSTSCRIPT.

THE following POSTSCRIPT has been publiſhed only in a few of the laſt Editions of the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty.* It has been often referred to in the preceding work; and, therefore, it is neceſſary to give it a place here.

ACCOUNT *of Public Debts diſcharged, Money borrowed, and Annual Intereſt ſaved from* 1763 *to* 1775.

Debts paid off ſince 1763.				Annuity decreaſed.	
	£.			£.	*s.*
1765—	870,888	funded, bearing intereſt at	4 *per cent.*	34,835	1
	1.500,000	unfunded,	4 *per cent.*	60,000	0
1766—	0.870,888	funded,	4 *per cent.*	34,835	1
	1.200,000	unfunded,	4 —	48,000	0
1767—	2.616,777	funded,	4 —	104,671	0
1768—	2.625,000	funded,	4 —	105,000	0
1771—	1.500,000	funded,	3 *per cent.*	45,000	0
1772—	1.500,000	funded,	3 *per cent.*	45,000	0
1773—	800,000	unfunded,	3 —	24,000	0
1774—	1.000,000	funded,	3 —	30,000	0
1775—	1.000,000	funded,	3 —	30,000	0
Total	15.483,553		Total	561,342	0

In 1764, there was paid off 650,000*l.* navy-debt; but this I have not charged, becauſe ſcarcely equal to that annual increaſe of the navy-debt for 1764, 1765, and 1766, which forms a part of the ordinary peace eſtabliſhment. The ſame is true of 300,000*l.* navy-debt, paid in 1767; of 400,000*l.* paid in 1769; of 100,200*l.* paid in 1770; 200,000*l.* in 1771; 215,883*l.* in 1772; and 200,000*l.* in 1774.

Account of money borrowed and debts contracted ſince 1763.

		£.	Annual intereſt increaſed.
orrowed and funded, at *3 per cent.* - in	1765	1.500,000	45,000
in	1766	1.500,000	45,000
in	1767	1.500,000	45,000
in	1768	1.900,000	57,000
Unfunded in	1774	250,000	7,500
Civil liſt debt in	1775 *(a)*	500,000	
Total		7.150,000	199,500

(a) This article was omitted in the former editions of this *Poſtſcript*; and its inſertion here makes the diminution of the public debts, ſince 1763, half a million leſs than the ſum at which it is taken in p. 104 and 108.——It might have been proper alſo to add, the exceſs of Navy debts *contracted* above the Navy debts *diſcharged*, from 1763 to 1775; and had this been done, the ſurplus in p. 165, would have been reduced to 150,000l.

From 15.483,553 *l.* the total of debts diſcharged, ſubſtract 7.150,000 *l.* the total of debts contracted; and the remainder, or 8.333,553 *l.* will be the diminution of the public debts ſince 1763. Alſo, from 561,342 *l.* the total of the decreaſe of the annual intereſt, ſubtract 199,500 *l.* (the total of its increaſe), and the remainder, or 361,842 *l.* will be the intereſt or annuity ſaved ſince 1763.—To this muſt be added 12,537 *l. per ann.* ſaved by changing a capital of 1.253,700 *l.* (part of 20.240,000 *l.*) from an intereſt of 4 to 3 *per cent.* purſuant to an act of the 10th of George III.; alſo the life-annuities that have fallen in; and 7,500 *l. per ann.* gained by the falling (in 1771) of 1.500,000 *l.* from an intereſt of 3½ to 3 *per cent.*; which will make a ſaving in the whole of near 400,000 *l. per annum*: And it is to this ſaving, together with the increaſe of luxury, that the increaſe of the *Sinking-Fund* for the laſt ten years has been owing.

To the debts diſcharged the following additions muſt be made.

In 1764 there was paid towards diſcharging the extraordinary expences of the army, 987,434 *l.*: In 1765, theſe expences amounted to 404,496 *l.*: In 1766, to 479,088 *l.*—Total 1.871,018 *l.*—— This ſum is at leaſt a million higher than the extraordinary expences of the army for three years ir a time of peace. This exceſs, being derived fron the preceding war, muſt be reckoned a debt lef by the war. And the ſame is true of 1.106,000 l. applied, in 1764, 1765, and 1766, towards ſatiſfying *German* demands.——There are likewiſe ſome ſmaller ſums of the ſame kind; ſuch as ſubſidies to *Heſſe-Caſſel*, *Brunſwick*, &c. And they may be taken at 200,000*l.*——The total of all theſe ſums is 2.306,240 *l.*; which, added to 8.333,553*l.* makes the whole diminution of the public debt ſince 1763, to be 10.639,793*l.*

Soon after the peace in 1763, an unfunded debt, amounting to 6.983,553*l.* was funded on the *Sinking Fund*, and on new duties on wine and cyder, at 4 *per cent.* There has been ſince borrowed and funded on coals exported, window-lights, &c. 6.400,000*l.* The funded debt, therefore, has increaſed ſince the war 13.383,553*l.* It has decreaſed (as appears from page 171) 11.983,553*l.*; and, conſequently, there has been on the whole an addition to it of 1.400,000*l.*———During ſeven years, from 1767 to 1774, 1.415,883*l.* navy-debt was paid off. See page 172. But, as this is a debt ariſing from conſtant deficiencies in the peace eſtimates for the navy, it is a part of the current peace expences.—In 1768 this debt was (*a*) 1.226,915*l.*—In 1774 it was 1.850,000*l.*; and conſequently, though 1 415,883*l.* was paid off, an addition was made to it, in ſeven years, of 623,085*l.* It increaſed, therefore, at the rate of 291,000*l.* *per ann.*

(*a*) See *The Preſent State of the Nation*, page 26.

THE paper from which I have taken the following account, came into my hands after almoſt the whole of this work had been printed off. It contains a fact of ſo much importance, that I cannot ſatisfy myſelf without laying it before the public. ——— In a Committee of Congress in *June* 1776, a declaration was drawn up containing an offer to Great Britain, "that "the Colonies would not only continue to grant "extraordinary aids in time of war, but alſo, if "allowed a free commerce, pay into the Sinking-Fund ſuch a ſum annually for one hundred years, as ſhould be *more* than ſufficient "in that time, if faithfully applied, to extinguiſh "all the preſent debts of Britain. Or, provided "this was not accepted, that, to remove the "groundleſs jealouſy of *Britain* that the Colonies "aimed at Independence and an abolition of the "Navigation Act, which, in truth, they had never "intended; and alſo, to avoid all future diſputes "about the right of making that and other Acts "for regulating their commerce for the general "benefit, they would enter into a covenant with "*Britain*, that ſhe ſhould fully poſſeſs and exerciſe "that right for *one hundred years* to come."

At the end of the *Obſervations on Civil Liberty*, I had the honor of laying before the public the Earl of *Shelburne*'s plan of Pacification with the

Colonies. In that plan, it is particularly propoſed, that the Colonies ſhould grant an annual ſupply to be carried to the Sinking Fund, and unalienably appropriated to the diſcharge of the public debt.—It muſt give this excellent Peer great pleaſure to learn, from this reſolution, that even this part of his plan, as well as all the other parts, would, moſt probably, have been accepted by the Colonies. For though the reſolution only offers the alternative of either [illegible] extraordinary aids and an annual ſupply, or an *excluſive* trade confirmed and extended; yet there can be little reaſon to doubt, but that to avoid the calamities of the preſent conteſt, BOTH would have been conſented to; particularly, if, on our part, ſuch a reviſal of the laws of trade had been offered as was propoſed in Lord Shelburne's plan.

The preceding reſolution was, I have ſaid, drawn up in a Committee of the Congreſs. But it was not entered in their minutes; a ſevere Act of Parliament happening to arrive at that time, which determined them not to give the ſum propoſed in it.

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